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Under the terms of the Water Act 1989, the Office of Water
Services (Ofwat) was established and given responsibility
for the economic regulation of the English and Welsh water
industry. One of the concepts underpinning the new
regulatory regime was comparative or 'yardstick'
competition. Implementation of the regime required the
establishment of a methodology for comparative efficiency
measurement.
The thesis presents econometric results from estimates of
a series of ordinary and stochastic frontier cost
functions. These are used to compare the efficiency of
operators in both the water supply and sewage treatment
branches of the industry. A new water supply database
covering the period 1977/86 is constructed for the purpose,
and the comparative efficiency rankings for both branches
of the industry are shown to be robust.
Fieldwork methods are used to analyse the role of yardstick
competition in the regulatory regime and the way in which
the comparative efficiency results could be applied. The
fieldwork covers twelve interviews with officials of water
companies, and one with the Director General of Water
Services. Based on results of both quantitative and
qualitative work, conclusions are drawn as to whether
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To preserve the anonymity of water industry interviewees
their personal and company names have been withheld from
the text. A confidential appendix setting out the schedule




In UK economic policy terms, privatisation was one of the
dominant themes of the last decade. Domestically it
quickly took root, flourishing in a favourable economic and
political climate. Internationally, countries such as
France, West Germany and the Netherlands followed the
pioneering British example more hesitantly. Nevertheless,
within a decade the face of British industry had been
transformed; the movement had gathered momentum in Europe;
whilst privatisation campaigns had begun to emerge in
former communist states such as Russia and Poland.
In one sense the term 'privatisation' is a piece of
shorthand. A generic word which, when used rather loosely,
may refer to industrial policies ranging from the sale of
public sector assets to the contracting out of refuse
services. However in the economic literature it is
generally used to describe the transfer of assets or
service functions from public to private ownership and
control1. In the British context, three elements of
privatisation policy have become focal points for the
economic debate, namely: ownership, competition and
regulation2. Property rights theory has been employed in
the analysis of. the ownership question as shares in
publicly owned companies have been offered for sale to
private investors3. Contestability considerations have been
1 For example, see Kay and Thompson (1986) .
2 In their classic textbook treatment of the issue Vickers
and Yarrow (1988) employ these three headings for the theoretical
discussion of privatisation.
3 Boardman and Vining (1989) take a property-rights approach
in a recent paper examining ownership and performance in a
competitive environment.
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prominent in the discussion of competition policy and the
liberalisation of trading conditions4. Principal-agent,
game-theoretic results have been used in the analysis of
new regulatory arrangements with the emergence of semi-
autonomous government bodies such as Oftel, Ofgas, Offer
and Ofwat5. Privatisation is today understood within a wide
range of separately evolving areas of research.
However, these three facets of policy do not receive equal
political and media attention at any one time. For example,
in the UK, a government announcement of its intention to
privatise an organisation or industry has invariably led to
the question of ownership becoming the immediate focus of
discussion. This was perhaps most marked at the time of
the privatisation of utilities such as gas, water and
electricity6. All these industries have some natural
monopoly characteristics and long histories of public
ownership. But in these and other instances, once the
reallocation of property rights had been completed, the
spotlight moved away from ownership and on to the questions
of competition policy and regulation7. And whilst
competition policy exercised the minds of politicians,
4 For example, Harrison and McKee (1985) present some
experimental evidence in investigating a variety of methods of
regulatory control as alternatives to increasing market
contestability.
5 Vickers and Yarrow (1988) employ the work of Baron and
Myerson (1982) in this way; discussing a model of regulation
under conditions of asymmetric information.
6 For water the publication of Littlechild's report to the
Department of the Environment (Littlechild 1986) was a catalyst
for heightened media interest in the ownership issue. See for
example Evans, R. 'Dangerous Currents in the Privatisation Pool'
Financial Times 5/2/86.
7 Thus a Financial Times survey of the water industry
published two years after privatisation of the water authorities
highlighted regulation and competition, rather than ownership,
in its analysis. (Financial Times 22nd November 1991)
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professional economists and high-ranking businessmen, it
was regulation which, arguably, came closest to capturing
the public imagination8. Consequently the issue moved up
the political agenda where it has remained.
These policy reforms took place against a background of
rising interest in the economic theory of regulation: one
product of which was the development of a theory of
'yardstick competition' by Shleifer9. In a 1985 Rand
Journal article, he proposed a system of regulation in
which the price that a regulated monopolist would receive
would depend on the costs of identical firms. By operating
under this regime he argued that firms would choose
socially efficient levels of cost reduction. The mechanism
was shown to generalise to cover heterogeneous firms with
observable differences. In the following year, Stephen
Littlechild referred to the theory in his influential
report to the Government on the privatisation of the ten
English and Welsh Water Authorities10. It was argued to be
an appropriate regulatory solution where companies
exercised considerable local monopoly power, and was
adopted, in modified form, in the final privatisation
settlement.
Two factors then motivate the thesis. Firstly the continued
debate and interest over the efficacy of UK utility
regulation. Secondly the development of a new theory of
regulation, yardstick competition. A theory which attracts
by its simplicity and yet is powerful in its conclusions.
This locates the research firmly within the wider
8 The phenomena is unsurprising given the highly technical
nature of many proposals for the reform of competition policy.
9 Shleifer, A. (1985) ' A theory of yardstick competition'
Rand Journal of Economics, vol 16, pp319-27.
10 Littlechild (1986).
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privatisation debate under the sub-heading of regulation.
We ask, 'Can Yardstick Competition work?' and in seeking an
answer turn to the water and sewerage industry in England
and Wales as an appropriate testbed.
The aims of the thesis may be stated as follows. The
general aim is to analyse, and develop the understanding of
yardstick competition as it operates in the English and
Welsh water industry. The subsidiary aims are: to develop
(and illustrate the workings of) a tractable means of
comparative efficiency measurement for the industry, and to
establish whether there are any general principles which
would guide a policy maker towards or away from employing
a similar regulatory solution in other industries. In
other words, can regulation by yardstick competition work
for water? Is it a more widely applicable regulatory
device?
In addressing these questions the study has several
distinctive features. First it examines a regulatory system
still in its infancy, whose workings in the UK remain
largely unexplored. Second it uses the English and Welsh
water and sewerage industry as an empirical testbed. The
choice of industry is entirely appropriate given the
theoretical setting of the work. Yardstick competition was
proposed by Shleifer as a device for the regulation of
monopolists providing similar or identical services in
different geographical locations. Therefore an industry,
such as water, consisting of a series of local natural
monopolies would supply the most appropriate empirical
observations11. However, until fairly recently, the UK
water industry has been neglected by econometricians.
Papers by Ford and Warford (1969) and Knapp (1978) are now
11 Littlechild noted in his report to the Department of the
Environment (1986) that "The UK water industry is thus the
natural monopoly par excellence." (p5)
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very dated, but remain the two most widely cited pieces of
empirical work for the UK industry. The thesis presents
updated econometric results based on an entirely new
database constructed for the purpose. Technically, the
estimation of a series of stochastic frontier cost
functions for comparative efficiency measurement advances
previously published work for the industry. This is also
true of the fieldwork undertaken and presented as
qualitative evidence on the operation of the new regulatory
regime.
The study has four major results. First, that econometric
methods may be employed in obtaining a robust set of
comparative efficiency rankings for both water supply and
sewage treatment functions. It is argued that these could
be used by the Regulator of the industry to improve the
regulatory outcome. Second, that the principle of
yardstick competition had underpinned the 1989 regulatory
settlement, and had continued to influence the direction of
industrial policy. Third, that performance incentives for
company management had been enhanced since the introduction
of the new regulatory regime. And although the system
suffered from severe imperfections at present the outlook
was more positive given the ongoing improvements in the
quality of data and sophistication of analytical techniques
available. Finally, that general principles could be
established in the light of the research, which would guide
a policy maker towards or away from employing a similar
regulatory solution in other industries.
The thesis is split into eight chapters. Following the
introduction chapter two sets out the theory of yardstick
competition; critically assessing its advantages and
drawbacks. Chapter three presents methodology and a survey
of recent econometric work relating to the modelling of
producer behaviour. Chapters four and five present the
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results of econometric work in making comparative
efficiency assessments. Chapter six outlines field research
methodology used in the second half of the work, and
chapter seven presents the results. Chapter eight
concludes.
So if, as Vickers (1991) maintains,
"Regulatory economics in Britain is only at the
end of the beginning"12
this thesis may be seen as a relatively early contribution
to a body of research only just emerging from its infancy.
12 Vickers (1991) , p2 9.
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Chapter 2.
Yardstick Competition: The Development of a Theory of
Regulation.
Introduction.
The theory of yardstick competition may be traced to the
work of Shleifer (1985) . In an influential Rand Journal
article he presented a system of monopoly regulation which
drew its inspiration from the comparison of firms. The
system, it was argued, would serve a dual purpose. First,
it would lead to the revelation of the cost minimising
potential of every firm; second, it would establish an
incentive structure appropriate to the achievement of that
potential. By comparing the costs of similar firms the
regulator would establish a set of 'benchmarks' of
performance from which he could infer any one firm's
attainable cost level. By establishing a pricing formula
in which the price received by a monopolist depended on the
financing requirements of firms, the regime would reward
competitive behaviour. This system he labelled 'yardstick
competition' .
The scheme neatly avoided some of the pitfalls inherent in
other regulatory systems. For under rate of return or cost
plus regimes, prices generally tracked costs, giving the
monopoly supplier little incentive to cost minimise. In the
absence of competitive pressure X-inefficiencies added to
the welfare loss. The problem, which appeared
insurmountable, was how to bring together firms separated
in space to enable them to compete. Yardstick competition
overcame the problem in the following way.
Shleifer considered a situation in which two firms,
identical in every respect, served identical markets,
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distinguished only by their geographical location. The
appointed regulator would obtain comparative cost
information for both, adopting the lower figure as his
benchmark, standard or yardstick. The low cost firm would
be rewarded - for example, by a price increase - and the
high cost firm penalised. The process would be repeated at
a later date, meanwhile both firms would have an incentive
to ensure their costs were minimised at the time of the
next round. In this way, by making comparisons at discrete
intervals, continuous competitive pressure would be applied
to both firms.
The result requires that the strong assumptions of
identical competitors and environment should hold. Any
deviation from these conditions would allow yardstick
competitors to contend that their inherent heterogeneity
led to the observed cost differences. Shleifer went on to
show that if this heterogeneity could be controlled for
perfectly, the result would carry over. Continuous
competitive pressure would be exerted and a socially
efficient level of cost reduction employed by each firm.
The apparent simplicity of the scheme gives little clue to
its theoretical pedigree. But its descent may be traced
through several distinct ideas explored relatively recently
in the economic literature. This chapter presents a
critical examination of the theory itself, of the proposal
that it be used as a regulatory device for the English and
Welsh water industry and of its workings since
privatisation.
Development of the Theory.
The theory of yardstick competition is first and foremost
a theory of monopoly regulation of particular relevance to
the regulation of natural monopolies. But within it are
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the problems of agency and asymmetric information which
have attracted much attention in the economic literature
in recent years. For the discussion of yardstick
competition, one issue may be seen as being nested within
another. Thus the central problem of asymmetric
information may be regarded as being nested within the
concerns of principal agent analysis which are in turn
nested within the overall problem of monopoly regulation.
In order to get to the heart of the problem it will be
necessary to begin with the outer skin of the theoretical
onion.
The problem of monopoly regulation in general, and natural
monopoly regulation in particular has proved fertile ground
for economic debate since well before the time of Adam
Smith. For natural monopolies, theorists were apparently
unwilling to deny a logic which carried any discussion of
scale economies in production to monopoly prices in the
market place. A large literature grew up around the
various methods of utility regulation, which in time came
to be balanced by an equally large literature criticising
the suggested techniques. In a celebrated contribution to
the debate Stigler and Friedland (1962) questioned whether
there was any evidence at all to suggest that public
regulation had a discernable effect. Public regulation
looked in danger of taking on the appearance of an empty
box making little or no difference to the activities of an
industry.
In 1968 Demsetz challenged the received orthodoxy by
arguing that the existence of a natural monopoly did not
necessarily imply monopoly prices given an elastic supply
of potential bidders for a monopoly contract (franchise)
and prohibitive collusion costs by potential suppliers.
Resurrecting Chadwick's (1859) distinction between
competition for the field and competition within the field,
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Demsetz showed that competition at the franchise award
stage would be sufficient to reduce the price of a service
below the monopoly level even though increasing returns
would imply that only one firm would supply. The argument
was not that regulatory agencies were undesirable per se,
rather,
"It is my belief that the rivalry of the open market
place disciplines more effectively than do the regulatory
processes of the commission."13
The result was striking in its theoretical simplicity but
difficult to implement given the rather strong assumptions
underpinning it. Nevertheless one important theme of the
theory of yardstick competition may be traced to this
contribution. Namely the idea that competition in one form
or another may be relied upon to promote the efficient
allocation and use of resources even under apparently
hostile conditions. For Demsetz, the auctioning of
franchises was the institutional device to allow
competitive pressures to curb the pricing excesses of
monopolistic behaviour. As before, others were quick to
point out the many practical difficulties which dogged the
award and monitoring of contracts. Williamson (1976)
concluded that in many cases the franchise solution may not
be superior to conventional regulation and that
consequently the regulator would not wither away. But the
importance of Demsetz to the development of the theory of
yardstick competition lay not in the insights it offered
into the franchise auctioning process, but in the
affirmation that competitive devices, of whatever sort, may
be put to good use in the conduct of regulatory policy.
Over the last quarter century methodological advances in
the economics of incentives and incomplete information have
done much to influence the regulation literature.
13 Demsetz (1968) p65.
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Traditionally, economic theory had little to offer by way
of explanation as to how non-market organisations like
firms worked. Consequently analysis of the regulatory
process was restricted. More recent developments of the
information literature have done much to lift some of these
restrictions. The principal-agent literature is one such
development which has contributed to the theory of
yardstick competition.
Regulation itself may be regarded as a principal-agent
problem in which the principal, or regulator, voluntarily
attenuates his property rights to permit an agent, or
regulatee, to act on his behalf. Models of this sort reveal
quite clearly two basic features of the regulatory
relationship: namely, incomplete information, and goal
conflict. Levinthal (1988), in a survey of agency models
argues that these agency models are a neoclassical response
to questions regarding the behaviour of an organisation of
self-interested agents with conflicting goals in a world of
incomplete information. Typical of this sort of approach
is the work of Baron and Myerson (1982) 14 who present a
model of regulation where the firm but not the regulator
has access to cost information. A feasible incentive-
compatible regulatory policy is derived that maximises
social welfare and ensures that the firm has no incentive
to report its costs untruthfully. Laffont and Tirole
(1986) extend the approach assuming that costs are
influenced by the firm's cost reducing effort and that the
regulator may observe costs but not effort or the state of
nature. Again the optimal regulatory regime is outlined
given the available information.
However these, although articulating the regulatory problem
within a principal agent framework do not feed in to the
14 See also Baron and Besanko (1984) where the regulator
observes a firm's marginal cost ex post with observation error.
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theory of yardstick competition as clearly as other strands
of the literature. And it may be argued that this
literature, was at least partially inspired by the early
work done by regulatory commissions, particularly in the
USA.
Although Shleifer formalised the approach to using cost
comparisons at discrete time intervals for regulation, this
'yardstick' device had been employed in one form or another
throughout the twentieth century in the USA. For example,
Nash (1925) noted that by the 1920s the Wisconsin and
Illinois Regulatory Commissions had developed quite
elaborate schemes for grading, or ranking, the efficiency
of utilities under their jurisdiction.
In the following decades the US electricity and defence
contracting industries employed similar approaches to
encourage effective regulation and low cost procurement15.
However, it was Iulo (1961) who published work in which he
used a formal statistical technique - regression analysis -
in his attempt to identify efficient and inefficient firms
in a cross section of US electric utilities.16
Following important papers discussing contractual
incentives and incentive pricing within a regulatory
context by Scherer (1964) and Cross (1970)11, Sherman
(1980) showed that the setting of prices or evaluation of
performance by reference to other firms' contemporaneous
costs, motivated socially efficient input choices. These
input choices were held to be free of the bias that was
15 See, for example, Johnson (1985) .
16 Schmalensee (1979 pl30) notes that the technical
weaknesses of some of Iulo's procedures may have discouraged
regulators from adopting this more sophisticated approach to
comparative efficiency measurement.
17 See also Holthausen (1979) .
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possible under rate of return regulation. Holmstrom (1982)
and Mookherjee (1984) argued that in a principal agent
setting, with multiple agents and asymmetric information,
it was generally the case that improved incentive contracts
for agents would be attained if the reward for each agent
was to some extent contingent on the performance of all
other agents, as well as his own. The result was
strengthened to the extent that agents faced similar
conditions. Holmstrom (1982) went on to demonstrate that
this comparative competition among agents was useful first
and foremost as a device for extracting information.
The tournament literature developing at this time took up
the point. Green and Stokey (1983), for example, present an
elegant analysis of a situation in which a risk neutral
principal employs a group of identical risk-averse agents.
Each agent's output is deemed to depend on his own effort
and a common disturbance term. If the distribution of the
common disturbance term is sufficiently diffuse then a
tournament, in which agents are ranked and only the
'winner' receives the payoff, dominates the use of optimal
independent contracts.18 The tournament, in effect,
eliminates the uncertainty associated with the common
disturbance terms while adding only a minor element of
uncertainty associated with the agent's private signal.
Asymptotically, the result holds as the number of agents or
the variance of the common disturbance term increase.
Indeed, the effect is more pronounced the larger are the
two variables.19
18 Lazear and Rosen (1981) derive an analogous result in the
context of labour markets finding the tournament solution
dominates a linear piece rate.
19 Empirically, the implication is that tournament contracts
should be found in employment relations in which the shared
element of uncertainty is relatively great.
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In addition Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983b) argue that
tournament systems based on relative performance have an
advantage over conventional systems that pay relative to
outcome only. They are more flexible. For example, if a
technological advance makes the performance targets easier
to reach then a conventional system has to be rebased. But
a system based on relative performance automatically
adjusts as everyone does better.
From this it is a short step to Shleifer's yardstick
competition in which, instead of agents being granted
tournament contracts, they are evaluated relative to the
performance of other agents. As the number of agents
increases the comparison mitigates the effect of
uncertainty associated with the common disturbance term,
leaving only the uncertainty associated with the agent's
idiosyncratic risks.
The key result, however, in terms of the tractability of
yardstick competition as a regulatory device was presented
independently by Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) .
These two authors both drew on earlier work by Harris and
Raviv (1976, 1978) who posed the question concerning the
value of information in a principal-agent setting. Given
that asymmetry characterised the relationship the question
was whether information (about the agent's effort) supplied
to the principal was of value if that information happened
to be imperfect. Where incentives diverged (ie goal
conflict) and information was asymmetric would imperfect
monitoring improve the outcome?
Holmstrom demonstrated that it did.
"It is shown that any additional information about the
agent's action, however imperfect, can be used to improve
the welfare of both principal and the agent. This result,
which formalizes earlier references to the value of
monitoring in agency relationships (Stiglitz 1975,
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Williamson 1975) serves to explain the extensive use of
imperfect information in contracting."20
Both Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) proved that any
informative signal, regardless of how noisy it was, would
be of positive value if obtained costlessly. The result is
perhaps counterintuitive, for it may be expected that a
noisy signal would compound the uncertainty and so be of
less value in establishing a contract. But the point is
made quite clearly by Holmstrom,
"We have studied efficient contractual agreements in
a principal-agent relationship under various assumptions
about what can be observed, and hence contracted upon by
both parties. When the payoff is observable, optimal
contracts will be second-best owing to a problem of moral
hazard. By creating additional information systems (as in
cost-accounting, for instance), or by using other available
information about the agent's action or the state of
nature, contracts can generally be improved."21
The improvement in contractual arrangements brought about
by the use of imperfect information is the second
foundation on which yardstick competition rests. Given that
even noisy information has some value, by making imperfect
cost comparisons between agents the regulator, or
principal, is able to produce a superior outcome to that
pertaining were the information not used.
In a more technical paper Shavell (1979) comes to the same
conclusion by a different route. Given that the fee paid by
the principal to a risk averse agent is a function of the
outcome and the agent's effort, imperfect information is
always of value. He continues,
20 Holmstrom (1979) p75.
21 Holmstrom (1979) p 89.
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"...we are not assuming that effort is necessarily
observed with complete accuracy. Thus, the use of
information about effort would introduce the new risk that
the fee might reflect an inaccurate perception of the
agent's true effort. Other things being equal the
introduction of a new risk is, of course, undesirable for
the agent; and, if the principal is risk averse, it is
undesirable for him too. Consequently, there is a real
question whether the information is useful...we prove that
(v) if the agent is risk averse, his fee would always
depend to some extent on the information which the
principal has about his effort - the information is always
of value; this result has been independently proved by
Holmstrom (1979) . 1,22
The result validates the use of imperfect information for
the purposes of yardstick comparison. Without it,
Shleifer's system of regulation is as practically
unworkable as that of Loeb and Magat (1979). With it, the
system is an important policy option for regulatory
authorities. To highlight its tractability Shleifer's
model will now be outlined in detail.
Yardstick Competition: The Theory.
Shleifer (1985) presents the basic theory of yardstick
competition using a simple one-period model in which N
identical, risk-neutral firms operate in a certain
environment. Each firm serves a different market but faces
an identical downward sloping demand curve, q(p). c0
represents the initial marginal cost profile of each firm.
By investing in cost reduction activity, R(c), marginal
costs may be reduced from cD to a level c. If no investment
in cost reduction occurs no change in marginal cost comes
about. The higher the investment in cost reduction the
lower is final unit cost, although cost reduction becomes
22 Shavell (1979) pp 5S-57.
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R' (c) < 0
R' '(c) > 0
The instruments in a regulator's hands are prices, p, and
lump sum transfers to the firm, T. Firms maximise profits,
V, where,
V = (p-c)q(p) + T - R (c) [2.4]
The regulator's problem is one of constrained optimisation.
In the command optimum he uses the instruments available to
maximise the sum of consumer and producer surplus subject
to the firm earning positive profits. The problem may be
written in the following way.
/» CO
maximise q(x) dx+(p-c) q(p)-R(c)
J p
subject to V a 0 [2.5]
Lump sum transfers, T, may be adjusted to ensure positive
profits. Solving the above equation gives a social optimum
where
p* = c* [2.6]
R(c*) = T* [2.7]
-R' (c*) = q (p*) [2.8]
[2.6] implies marginal cost pricing, [2.7] ensures the
transfer just covers expenditure on cost reduction and
23 The assumptions of identical demand conditions and
homogeneous cost reduction technologies are later relaxed.
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[2.8] is the condition for total cost minimisation to
produce output q. Existence of a unique optimum is
guaranteed by the following conditions.
These imply that cost reduction is initially cheap but then
gets progressively costlier. The procedure followed is that
the regulator announces his pricing rule, and establishes
that he will set both prices and transfers on the basis of
what he observes. Firms then invest in cost reduction, the
regulator observes cost levels c, and cost reduction
investment R(c) . With this knowledge the regulator then
sets prices and makes transfers according to the announced
rule. Finally, firms produce output, sell it at the
regulated price level and receive transfers.
The linchpin of the whole system, however, is the ability
of the regulator to break the link between a firm's own
cost level and the price it receives. This is done by
determining price according to the cost levels of other
firms. Taking the case of N identical firms, where N>2, a
firm i is assigned a ' shadow firm' . This shadow, or
benchmark, firm has its unit cost level calculated as the
mean marginal cost of all other firms. In addition the
mean cost reducing expenditure for all other firms is
calculated. Then the price permitted by the regulator is
set equal to this shadow marginal cost, and the transfer
(T) set equal to the mean cost-reducing expenditure.
Shleifer shows that if firms find this scheme credible and
choose cost levels accordingly not only will the social
optimum, c± = c*, be achieved, but the equilibrium will be
unique. The rule generalises; but its workings rest
finally on the ability of the regulator,
-R' (c0) < q(c0)
-R' (0) > q (0)





"...to commit himself not to pay attention to the
firms' complaints and to be prepared to let the firms go
bankrupt if they choose inefficient cost levels. Unless
the regulator can credibly threaten to make inefficient
firms lose money...cost reduction cannot be enforced. 1,24
The model is extended in two ways. Firstly it is shown that
compensation based on prices alone and not lump sum
transfers is sufficient to permit the functioning of
yardstick competition. Secondly the model may be adapted to
cope with the problem of heterogeneity.
In the real world local monopolists serving separate
markets seldom operate in identical environments.
Heterogeneity is a characteristic of firms themselves and
the markets they serve. The workings and conclusions of
the models presented above are undermined by this fact and
the price rule must be redefined in order to return the
outcome to first best. Shleifer extended the analysis in
the following way. Assume that firms differ in terms of
their exogenous characteristics, 0. This heterogeneity, it
is argued, may be corrected for by regressing costs on
characteristics that determine the diversity. Thus, a new
first-best solution is attained with costs c(0), prices
p(0) and transfers T(0) that satisfy the modified
conditions for each type of firm 8,
-Rx (c, 8) = q (p) [2.12]
[2.13]
[2.14]
c (0) = p (0)
T ( 0 ) = R (c, 0 )
Substituting [2.13] in [2.14] gives
-Rx (c,0 ) = q(c(0) ) [2.15]
24 Shleifer (1985) p323 .
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A Taylor approximation may be made of this around some
point (0m , cm (0J), which may in turn be solved to give,









where subscripts represent derivatives evaluated at
(0m , cm). Higher order Taylor expansions may be used, but
Shleifer argues that [2.16] is in fact a good approximation
for [2.15] .
The regulatory system then works in a similar way to
previously. The regulator estimates [2.16] using cost and
other data on firm characteristics and commits himself to
using the predicted unit cost level to set the price. If
firms are identical as before, the system reduces to pure
yardstick competition. The transfer, T, may be established
in a similar way, using a Taylor expansion of R(c,0) and
running a regression to give an estimated R, the level of
the transfer.
Two properties of the system accounting for heterogeneity
may be noted. Firstly if [2.16] is an exact solution for
[2.15] and if the list of exogenous characteristics, 6, is
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complete in every way the outcome in terms of unit cost is
first best. Similarly, if the estimated R is in fact exact,
then each firm breaks even in equilibrium. Nevertheless
the outcome diverges from the optimum to the extent that
the equation [2.16] is an approximation and leaves some
heterogeneity unaccounted for. Two other potential sources
of error are noted by the author. The first being that
omitted exogenous characteristics must be uncorrelated with
6 if omitted variable bias is to be avoided in the
estimated coefficients. However this may not be
problematic in practice if it may be assumed that the
covariance between excluded and included characteristics is
the same for all firms. If this is so, unbiased parameter
estimates are not required and costs may be predicted
consistently with the variables available. The second
problem concerns the exogeneity of 6; where firms may have
some control over their characteristics. Again the problem
may not be insurmountable. In estimating the reduced form
consistent predictions of costs may be obtained even if
coefficient estimates are biased.
Overall then, a system of yardstick competition will lead
to an efficient set of outcomes if firm heterogeneity is
accounted for completely and correctly. The theoretical
justification of this result is clear, but several
criticisms may be levelled at the scheme.
Criticisms and Caveats.
The two main drawbacks of the system noted by Shleifer are
its susceptibility to strategic manipulation and its
inadequacy in dealing with heterogeneity. Larger numbers
of competing firms are suggested for the first problem to
ensure that cartels are more difficult to maintain.
Heterogeneity is dealt with by regression analysis,
although problems remain where not all factors are
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adequately accounted for. Waterson (1988) brings four more
telling criticisms to bear.
The Shleifer analysis contains the assumption that the
regulator has knowledge of the demand function facing the
firm, q(p) . Whilst this may be a close approximation to
the truth for metered utility services such as electricity
and gas, demand estimation is altogether more difficult in
the case of unmetered goods such as water; or services
subject to rapid technological change such as
telecommunications. Another assumption is that the
regression approach is a wholly adequate analytical device
for picking up all relevant features determining costs.
Clearly the assumption that every factor influencing cost
reduction expenditure may be captured in this way is
strong. Considerable cross sample variation may be omitted
by the process.2s
The model presented is confined to one period and the
dynamics of the competitive process are unclear. Waterson
(1988) notes that there is some implicit notion of a period
over which current costs are gathered and fed into future
actions although this is not made explicit. Furthermore,
as Shleifer makes clear, the analysis critically rests on
the assumption that the regulator is the only actor
behaving strategically. Much scope remains for firms to
collude explicitly or implicitly leading to a complete
breakdown of the system. For yardstick competition to work
it must be very strictly the case that those coming
together to form each other's yardsticks are not allowed to
collaborate in any way.
25 See also Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) who say there is
little yardstick competition in executive compensation schemes
in the US electricity generation industry because so many factors
lie outwith their control.
In terms of the practical




implementation of the system
have cast doubt upon its
the context of electricity
"First, it [the system of yardstick competition] is
simply too weak and remote a goad to performance,
especially as compared with more traditional, head to head
competition. Second, as Landon has so tellingly
demonstrated (1983), the problems of correcting cost data
for differences beyond the control of management... are
sufficiently daunting to make the range of error so wide,
the cost comparisons so imperfect, that the authorities
would not be able, sensibly, to order changes in prices on
the basis of such shaky evidence alone."26
In other words, the problems of collusion and heterogeneity
(noted by Shleifer) are considerable.
So whilst there appears to be a strong theoretical case for
the use of yardstick competition in regulation, practically
its implementation appears fraught with difficulties. These
difficulties did not, however, prevent the system being
adopted in modified form for the regulation of the
privatised English and Welsh water and sewerage industry.
A Regulatory Device for the Water Industry.
From the beginning of the debate over privatisation of the
English and Welsh Water Authorities, the key question in
the minds of politicians was that of natural monopoly
regulation. In an early written answer to Parliament the
Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, stated,
26 Stelzer (1988) p69.
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"...the Water Authorities are natural monopolies for
many of their functions and we need to be particularly
careful when considering replacing a public monopoly by a
private one. Because of the environmental and public
health responsibilities any proposal to privatise them
would also raise issues of regulation." 27
The question was singled out for attention by the
Department of the Environment when, in October 1985, they
commissioned Professor Stephen Littlechild to write a
report on the economic regulation of water authorities. He
confirmed their view of its importance, outlining what he
considered to be the three main features of the industry
with respect to regulation. First, the position of water
as the natural monopoly 'par excellence'. The
characteristic being derived from the networks of mains and
sewers. Second, that the monopoly was permanent given the
production processes involved. Therefore any regulation
would be permanent. Third, that privatisation involved ten
companies, not one, each with local monopoly power. It was
this third point that proved crucial in shaping the
regulatory solution. Littlechild suggested that Shleifer's
yardstick competition could be applied to the industry. He
wrote,
"Privatising ten authorities provides the opportunity
to make regulation more effective in protecting consumers
than it otherwise could be. It does so by making more
information and instruments available to the regulator. He
can make comparisons... He can use the performance of the
water industry as a whole as a yardstick by which to assess
the performance of each individual authority."28
The report noted the practical problems of controlling for
heterogeneity and the importance of minimising strategic
manipulation. Yardstick comparisons were consequently not
27 HC Debates, 31 January 1985, col 292w.
28 Littlechild (1986) para 3.14.
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the main means of regulatory control, but were to be only
one of the regulatory levers.29 The Government readily
accepted the regulatory solution. For it offered a
theoretically sound, imaginative and intuitively attractive
answer to a very difficult question. The idea was taken up
and applied in the discussions over the final privatisation
settlement.
However, the evidence suggests that whilst the final
regulatory settlement embraced the notion of yardstick
competition, at the time of privatisation the system was
not fully operable. Yardstick competition may have been the
banner headline, but the regulatory story told underneath
was very different.
The principal lever of control in the hands of the
Regulator was a price cap: RPI + K. But not a price cap
founded on any rigorous objective assessment of comparative
unit costs. Rather a price cap fixed for individual
companies after a political process of negotiation. Prices
for a basket of charges were permitted to rise on average
(in the charging year beginning in April) by the Retail
Price Index (calculated in the previous November) plus a
factor 'K' set for each company.30 The initial K values
were set by the Secretaries of State for the Environment
and for Wales; those for the ten Water Authorities in
August 1989, and those for the water only companies in
spring 1990 . Individual K settings represented assumptions
made about capital expenditure and financing requirements,
29 In a later paper, Littlechild (1988) is very clear on
this point. He states, "It is not claimed that the proposed
scheme of regulation will fully replicate the workings of a
perfectly competitive market. (Such a benchmark is scarcely
relevant anyway, since there is no practical way of achieving
it)." (p42)
30 For details of the workings of the price cap see Ofwat
Information Note No 8, revised February 1993.
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as well as potential efficiency savings. The Office of
Water Services (Ofwat) inherited the price cap limits and
had to work with them.
It quickly became clear, however, that individual settings
of K were rather generous. In the first few years following
privatisation the companies as a whole recorded very large
historic and current cost profits. The situation led the
Regulator to seek voluntary reductions in water charges
from nineteen of the thirty-two companies for the year
1993/4.31 And whilst the interim adjustments may be
attributed partly to the fall in construction prices
brought on by recession, it may be argued that the
Government erred on the side of caution when setting the
original limits. Three reasons may be given for this.
Firstly, the success of the privatisation issue depended on
attracting a sufficient number of potential investors. By
setting generous price limits profit forecasts were high
and the issue, not unnaturally, was oversubscribed.
Secondly, the success of the floatation depended crucially
on the cooperation of the incumbent chairmen and managers
of the Water Authorities. Such cooperation may have been
enhanced through the use of a generous price caps. Thirdly
there was considerable ignorance surrounding the
comparative efficiency of companies. Government advisers
resorted to assigning companies to an efficiency 'band' and
felt unable to give a more precise assessment. Overall, it
may be argued that the initial K settings owed only a
little less to political manoeuvring than economic
assessment of efficiency potential and investment needs.
But although the price cap, with its attendant provisions
for interim and periodic adjustments, was initially set
with scant regard to comparative efficiency measurement,
31 Ofwat press release 25/92, 1st October 1992.
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the principle of comparative or yardstick competition had
not been abandoned. Shleifer's system required that these
efficiency rankings would play the major part in the
setting of the regulatory instrument; in this case the
price cap. And although this did not take place in the
initial post privatisation settlement the principle was not
forgotten. Short term, a lack of technical expertise and
adequate data combined with the political imperative to
proceed quickly, ruled out the use of carefully prepared
comparators. But the signs were there that the principle of
yardstick competition had not been abandoned and would
direct much future regulatory work.
Evidence for this may be found in the statutory provisions
which amended UK competition policy for the privatised
water industry.32 Thus in connection with references made
to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) a new
'public interest' clause was added. Section 30 (3) of the
Water Act 1989 stated,
"In determining on a reference under section 29
[referral to the MMC] above whether any matter operates, or
may be expected to operate, against the public interest the
Monopolies Commission-(a) shall have regard to the
desirability of giving effect to the principle that the
number of water enterprises which are under independent
control should not be reduced so as to prejudice the
Director's ability, in carrying out his functions by virtue
of this Act, to make comparisons between different such
water enterprises."
Although Section 39 of the Competition and Service
(Utilities) Act 1992 amended the provision, removing the
32 The principal acts relating to the English and Welsh
water industry since 1989 are: Water Act 1989 (ch 15), Water
Industry Act 1991 (ch 56) , Water Resources Act 1991 (ch 57) ,
Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 (ch 60) ,
Statutory Water Companies Act 1991 (ch 58) and the Competition
and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 (ch 43) .
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reference to 'independent control'33, the reference to
'comparisons' in relation to the public interest survived
all subsequent amendments. In addition the 1992 Act
strengthened the Regulator's hand in pursuit of his
duties34 to promote economy, efficiency and to facilitate
competition. By this he was given powers to collect
information with respect to the levels of overall
performance of water and sewerage undertakers, for use in
the comparison of performance.35
Workincr the System.
But it was not only in statute that the principles of
yardstick competition were preserved. In his first
statement on the operation of the new regulatory regime,
Ian Byatt signalled Ofwat's intention to follow the same
line.
"My objective will be to achieve through regulation
the same balance as would otherwise be achieved by
competitive markets, aided by my ability to compare the
performance of 3 9 separate appointed companies.... Because
of the limited scope for direct competition, I will compare
the performance of the appointed companies. In particular
I will compare their costs, their efficiency and their
return on capital. " 36
The point was reiterated in Ofwat's first annual report,
which gave a very clear description of the whole process of
yardstick, or comparative, competition.
33 Permitting a more permissive stance with respect to
takeover and merger policy.
34 The duties of the Regulator are laid out in Section 2 of
the Water Industry Act 1991.
35 Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 s27 and s31.
36 Statement by Director General of Water Services on the
operation of the regulatory regime, Ofwat, 8/8/89, paragraph 6.
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"I shall compare the performance of the 39 appointed
companies and use the examples of the best to set standards
for the others to introduce an element of comparative
competition. Such comparisons will cover material
differences in operating cost, capital cost, levels of
service and "customer care". There will be allowances for
differences, such as geographical conditions, which are
outside the control of efficient managements. These
comparisons will help me to achieve a better deal for all
water customers in England and Wales."37
Yet although yardstick competition was one goal of the new
regulatory agency, the technical tools that the Regulator
had at his disposal were initially not equal to the task.
This was recognised and Byatt was at pains to make clear
that any comparisons made were merely indicative of
relative efficiency. All communications emanating from
Ofwat stated that any final regulatory decisions would not
be based on these comparisons.38 Nevertheless work began on
the development of suitable comparators in cooperation with
the industry. This work was not focused on the attainment
of some ideal set of comparators, but on the process of
improving those that already existed and developing new
techniques.
Initially the Charges Control Division of Ofwat was given
responsibility for developing comparative competition and
carrying out efficiency studies.39 Within the division a
'Comparative Competition' section was created; headed by
Jonathon Price. One of the early problems faced by the
section was the lack of data on the operations of companies
in the industry in sufficient quantity and of sufficient
quality. Without reliable information any comparisons
would be misleading. Consequently an early priority for the
37 Ofwat Annual Report 1989, pll.
38 Ofwat Annual Report 1990, p37.
39 Ofwat Annual Report 1989, pl3 .
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Engineering Intelligence division of Ofwat was the setting
up of information and reporting systems that would provide
the basis for effective monitoring of companies. The
importance given to this aspect of the work was emphasised
in the 1990 Annual Report which stated,
"Ofwat's strategy for regulatory reporting has been
based on three tenets...(2) Need for comparable
information." 40
Parallel work on the use to which this improved data would
be put, was carried out under the auspices of the Charges
Control Division. A starting point for this work was given
in a report prepared for Ofwat by KPMG Peat Marwick
Mclintock and published in September 1990. A 'Comparative
Efficiency Studies Working Group' (later known as the
Comparative Performance Technical Group) was established;
which in turn lead to the formation of subgroups. These
subgroups reported back to the main Group on issues such as
ratio analysis, activity costing and explanatory factors.
Progress reports and details of pilot studies undertaken by
the main Group were reported in a series of 'Dear Finance
Director' (Dear FD) letters which were distributed widely
throughout the industry.41 Industry representatives were
invited to contribute to the work by submitting written
responses to these letters as well as participating in
workshops. There was a significant level of consultation
between the industry and Ofwat at all stages in the
process.
Steady progress was made: initially in the general
acceptance of a modified system of yardstick competition by
the industry. This lead Byatt to comment in the 1990 Ofwat
40 Ofwat Annual Report 1990, p36.
41 See especially 'Dear FD' 19, 22, 33, 38, 41, 49.
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annual report,
"There is an acceptance of the value and importance of
comparative competition in the water industry. There is
also recognition that any reduction in the number of
comparators would be prejudicial to my ability to compare
performance and so to customers in general." 42
Once accepted in principle the next stage of the process
was the publication of comparative statistics. On this
Ofwat proceeded in stages, starting with non-attributable
information but announcing its firm intention to publish
more detailed figures in following reports. For example,
the 1989/90 report on levels of service43 contained non-
attributable information leaving the decision to publish
more detailed statistics by company area to the individual
firms. By 1990/1 there was a formal requirement for
companies to report on levels of service to their
customers. The first attributable information on the volume
of water delivered by individual companies and the unit
costs of that water was published by Ofwat in November
199244, based on information gathered via the 1992 July
Return. Other publications have followed; widening the
scope of detailed industry data in the public domain. These
publications have continued to attract a large amount of
publicity and press attention. The introduction of
comparative statistics has been a steady but unrelenting
process.
The Regulator appears optimistic in relation to the
progress achieved so far and the continuing development of
42 Ofwat Annual Report 1990, p8.
43 'The Water Industry in England and Wales - Levels of
Service Information 1989/90', Ofwat, Birmingham, October 1990.
44 'The Cost of Water Delivered to Customers 1991-92',
Ofwat, Birmingham, November 1992.
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this aspect of his work. The 1991 Annual Report summed up
the position in the following way,
"The new structure of the industry has provided a
powerful stimulus for taking forward work on all aspects of
the appropriate comparisons. It is essential for all
companies to provide the cost numerators, quality and
quantity denominators and such explanatory factors as are
necessary in a common format and to consistently applied
definitions. Good progress has been made demonstrating the
success of the technical working group approach that Ofwat
has developed with the industry. 1,45
As if to confirm this optimism it may be noted that in
preparation for the 1994/5 periodic review one of the six
projects being undertaken by Ofwat is titled 'Comparative
Performance'. Using the experience acquired since
privatisation the project's aims include the development of
methods of comparing cost-efficiency between companies and
looking at how such comparisons could be incorporated into
the periodic reviews. Given the evidence presented above it
is to be expected that the weight given to evidence from
comparative efficiency studies will be greater in the
1994/5 price cap review than at the initial 1989
settlement. The development of reliable comparators
continues; meanwhile the Regulator has signalled his
intention to continue work in the direction of a workable
system of yardstick competition; and to rely more heavily
on the results for future price cap reviews.
7. Conclusion.
In the space of just over four years the principle of
yardstick competition has been taken up and applied to
regulation of the English and Welsh water industry. Whilst
not being as fully developed as the Government had expected
and Littlechild had suggested at the time of privatisation,
45 Ofwat Annual Report 1991, p50.
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the present regulatory regime does bear the unmistakeable
hallmarks of Shleifer's original system.
The discussion has, however, raised some important
questions. Aside from the central question as to whether
yardstick competition can work, subsidiary questions
include: why has the Regulator drawn back from the use of
the term 'yardstick competition' in all communications,
preferring the phrase 'comparative competition'?; whilst
the Regulator may be optimistic about comparative
competition, does the industry share this enthusiasm?; what
are the views of company officials on the workings of the
system?; do they regard it as an attainable long term goal
or do they believe the initiative has run its course?; to
what extent does the operation of the Regulatory regime
inhibit collusion? Answers to these questions may be found
in qualitative rather than quantitative evidence. Evidence
gathered and presented in Chapter 7. For the moment we
content ourselves with a technical question.
The outstanding practical problem lies in the ability of
the regulator to control for company heterogeneity in
comparative efficiency measurement. And whilst considerable
progress on this question has been made by the Comparative
Performance Technical Group of Ofwat, the issue is as yet
unresolved. The matter is of great importance, for the
inability adequately to account for heterogeneity was first
pointed up by Shleifer (1985) as a fatal flaw in the
system. Very limited econometric work has been carried out
to date, yet regression techniques have great potential in
controlling for company heterogeneity. In tackling the
problem two theoretical points made above work in our
favour. Firstly, Shleifer explicitly notes that regression
techniques may be appropriate. Secondly, the point made
jointly by Shavell and Holmstrom that additional
information, despite its imperfections will lead to the
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attainment of a superior regulatory outcome. Indeed,
Holmstrom cites the use of cost accounting and similar
information systems as being useful for the task.
Therefore a perfect comparison of company efficiency, even
if attainable, would not be necessary. Imperfect
comparisons of efficiency will improve the outcome.
The following three chapters address this technical issue:
the linchpin of yardstick competition. A system of
comparative efficiency measurement (necessarily rather
imperfect) using econometric techniques is developed and
implemented with conclusions being drawn as to its
applicability in the context of the industry.
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Chapter 3.
Modelling: Theory and Evidence.
Introduction.
It has been argued that the question of comparative
efficiency measurement is the outstanding technical issue
facing a regulator seeking to implement a system of
yardstick competition. Furthermore, the originator of the
theory itself has highlighted regression techniques as
appropriate tools for the task. Finally, the context in
which the question is set is the water and sewerage
industry in England and Wales. These three points supply
the motivation, technical apparatus and context for the
following three chapters. Given the technical problem and
the tools available, how should we proceed? We begin by
considering briefly the context in which we are operating
empirically: namely the water and sewerage industry in
England and Wales.
All companies operating in the industry are charged with
meeting the reasonable demands of customers in their area.
In other words, from the point of view of the supplier,
output is an exogenous variable in the production decision.
In addition, firms may be assumed to be price takers in
factor markets, and to behave in such a way as to minimise
costs.46 These assumptions imply that a cost function
reflecting the endogeneity of factor quantities and cost
minimising behaviour is an appropriate technical device for
the study. But what are the properties of the cost function
and how may it be employed in empirical work?
46 These behavioural assumptions have been made by many




The traditional point of departure for neoclassical
production theory is the representation of a set of
physical and technological possibilities by a production or
transformation function. Restrictions on a general
functional representation are derived from behavioural,
often optimising, assumptions about the firm. In empirical
work all a priori information concerning a firm's
technological and economic environment is employed in
constructing a representation of the production decision.
Justification for the imposition of theoretically valid
restrictions is made on the grounds of improved efficiency
of the empirical estimates.
The insights of duality theory have informed more recent
work. It is postulated that because the technological
environment constrains the optimising behaviour of firms ,
an accurate representation of optimising behaviour may be
used to study the technology. Similarly, since technology
conditions a producer's response to market phenomena, an
examination of this conditioned response will enable
conclusions to be drawn about the underlying technology.
Thus a cost function, embodying the consequences of cost
minimising behaviour by the producer , and a production
function, embodying production efficiency on the part of
the producer, are equally fundamental descriptions of
production technology.
A basic paradigm of neoclassical economics concerns a firm
facing fixed technological possibilities and competitive
input markets, choosing an input bundle to minimise the
cost of producing a given level of output.47 With fixed
input prices minimum cost is determined as a function of
47 The water industry may be modelled in this way.
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output. Relaxation of this restriction means both input
prices and output enter as arguments in the cost function.
The cost function's power as an analytic tool also derives
from its computationally simple relation to cost minimising
input demand functions. Thus the function's partial
derivatives with respect to input prices give the input
demand functions, and the sum of the input demands
multiplied by price equal costs.
An early analysis of the properties of the cost function's
price derivatives may be traced to Hotelling (1935) who
presented the mathematically equivalent problem of
minimising consumer spending subject to a utility
constraint. However, the complete characterisation of cost-
minimising behaviour by the cost function was outlined by
Samuelson (1947) and rigorously developed in Shephard's
(1953) classic exposition of duality.
In a later work McFadden (1978) noted that this duality,
"establishes the cost function as a 'sufficient
statistic' for all economically relevant characteristics of
the underlying technology. 1,48
Consequently the cost function provides a natural basis for
the investigation of a producer's technological and
economic environment. It may be represented in algebraic
form as follows.
Following the terminology of McFadden (1978), consider a
firm using N inputs (n=l,2.. .N) to produce M outputs
(m=l,2,...M), with a vector of factor input quantities v,
a non negative input price vector w, and a non negative
output vector y. Let Y represent the production possibility
set of the firm, ie the technologically constrained set of
input output pairs (v,y), assumed to be non empty, closed
48 McFadden (1978) p4
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and requiring a non zero input bundle to produce a non zero
output bundle. Now define Y* as the producible output set
where:
Y* = {y |(v,y) G Y for some v) [3.1]
for each y i-n Y* let V (y) be the input requirement set
containing all the input bundles v which can produce y.
Thus :
V (y) = {v | (v,y) G Y} [3.2]
McFadden (1978) defines an 'input regular' production
possibility set Y in which Y* is non empty, V(y) is closed
for each y in the set of producible outputs, and the non
zero output bundle does not contain the zero input bundle.
The mathematical representation of the cost minimising
problem follows directly. Assume a firm has an input
regular production possibility set, a producible output set
Y* and input requirement sets V (y) for y in Y* . With
competitive input markets, a strictly positive price vector
w and the firm choosing inputs v to minimise the cost of
producing output y, the cost function may be written:
c=C(y,w)=min {w.y|v G V(y)} [3.3]
The cost function may be shown to exist for positive w and
all y in the output set, employing the mathematical result
that a continuous function achieves a minimum on a non
empty, closed, bounded set. A formal presentation of this
result and derivation of the function's properties may be
found summarised in McFadden (1978) . In the present
context a rather brief, informal statement of the cost
function's properties is sufficient to inform the
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discussion. Thus a diffsrentiable cost function C(y,w) is
assumed to exist which is: nonnegative, linearly
homogeneous in input prices w for each fixed output level,
nondecreasing in w for fixed y, concave in w for fixed y,
nondecreasing in y for fixed w and continuous from below in
y for fixed y.49 Notable is the positive linear
homogeneity property, which embodies the principle that
only relative prices enter the economic calculus of
optimising agents. Consequently, as long as input prices
vary proportionately, the cost minimising choice of inputs
will not vary.
Hedonic Cost Functions.
Whilst the specification of the neoclassical cost function
outlined above has proved to be a robust foundation for
much empirical work, one way in which it has recently been
enriched is through the application of the insights of
hedonic price analysis. This extension is of particular
relevance to the water industry as will be made clear
later.
The hedonic approach centres on the explicit adjustment of
price and quantity indices for variation in quality and
technology over time. The technique may be traced to the
work of Court (193 9) 50 who constructed a set of quality
adjusted price indices for the US manufacturer General
Motors. In this he aimed at isolating a pure price effect
adjusted for quality variation over time. His significant
methodological contribution was the hedonic regression
equation, serving as the means whereby price index
49 A fuller discussion of the properties may be found in
Chambers (1988) chapters 2 and 3
50 Waugh (1928) made an important early contribution in a
study examining the extent to which commodity price variation
reflected quality differentials.
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estimates could be adjusted for quality change. The Court
(1939) hedonic hypothesis framed heterogeneous goods as
aggregates of their characteristics ie qualities. Thus
regression analysis enabled implicit marginal prices to be
calculated as derivatives of the hedonic price equation
with respect to the levels of the characteristics.
Two decades later, Griliches (1961) revived interest in the
hedonic approach. Whilst the Court analysis of hedonic
prices had focused on the demand side, later research
envisaged hedonic prices as the outcome of shifting supply
and demand curves for characteristics.51 In addition,
hedonic insights were applied to cost and production
function specifications.
This adjustment of price indices for quality differentials
has a parallel in cost function specification. Namely, the
adjustment of generic output for quality differentials,
explicitly incorporating variation in output quality and
exogenous technical conditions. An intuitive rationale
appeals to the notion that, when physical output varies
with respect to quality or other attributes, these should
be taken into account in the estimation of the cost
function. From a technological and econometric standpoint,
the broader issue is whether quality adjustment should be
effected through regarding the firms as producing multiple
outputs or generic outputs with variable qualities.
Conventionally, quality differences have been accounted for
by specifying multiple outputs for a firm or industry.
Multiproduct cost function specifications permit a rich
analysis of the effects on costs and factor demands of the
changes in composition and level of output. Recent work
51 A more recent influential study was undertaken by Chow
(1967) .
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includes research by Caves, Christensen and Tretheway
(1981), Cowing and Holtmann (1983) and Chiang and
Friedlaender (1985). This approach, however, suffers two
main drawbacks. First, the multiple output vector quickly
becomes unwieldy and problematic for econometric
estimation. Second, the approach is appropriate to the
case of products with well defined qualities (eg microwave
ovens), but inappropriate for commodities exhibiting a
continuum of qualities (eg water supply). If quality is
truly continuous there is no convenient way to define
quality specific output. Water is a prime example.
Several water companies producing an identical quantity of
water each year are unable to guarantee identical quality.
Potable water is a surprisingly heterogeneous product with
quality determined, in part, by source and treatment. Other
attributes of output include the nature of the area served,
rainfall pattern and distribution system employed. Thus a
simple measure of generic output would fail to capture the
true relationship between cost and output. Rather than
treat specific quality levels as separate goods, effective
output may be specified as a function of a generic measure
of physical output (eg megalitres of water supplied per
day) and the qualities of the physical output (eg index of
treatment, density of population served). Hence, hedonic
functions of outputs and qualities enter as arguments in
the cost function.
The advantages of the hedonic approach now become clear.
Primarily, improved specification derives from taking
output characteristics into account. Spady and Friedlaender
(1978) presented econometric evidence to confirm this
assertion. In their examination of a hedonic cost function
for the US regulated trucking industry, they showed that
conclusions regarding potential economies of scale and
factor demands differed fundamentally between nonhedonic
and hedonic specifications. The hedonic specification was
preferred. Secondly it permits the representation of a
class of technologies unrestricted in quality - quantity
combination. Finally, it avoids the restrictive assumptions
required for hedonic inflation which are unlikely to hold
in noncompetitive cases.52
Hedonic Cost Function Specification.
The hedonic extension of the neoclassical cost function may
be developed in the following way, following Spady (1979).
Let y represent the generic output vector and q a vector of
qualities; with qA the qualities associated with the generic
output Yi- Restricting each quality to be associated with
only one output, variables zi=[yi,qi] may be defined, with
vector z= ( [y^qj , . . . , [ym,qj ) • The cost function may be
rewritten:
c(y,ct,w) = c (4>1(y1,q1),... ,<£m(ym,qJ ,w) [3.4]








1. . . m
52 Spady and Friedlaender (1978) pl60 highlight the problem
of hedonic inflation. The conventional approach of utilising a
quality adjusted price in obtaining a deflated output measure
assumes quality combinations with identical input requirements
are sold at identical prices. They argue that this is highly
unlikely in a government regulated industry where certain quality
combinations must be produced and sold at mandated prices.
50
where Czij is the partial derivative of C with respect to
the jth component of zL and i^l.
The above equivalence of partial derivatives is an
expression of the Leontief (1947) aggregation conditions
corresponding to the previous pair of equations. ( . )
represents the aggregator function, the channel through
which the elements of are aggregated to one output. It is
assumed that the continuum of different 'quality' measures
of the physical output can be consistently aggregated by
(.). Spady (1979) interprets this in the following way,
"the interpretation of [equivalence of partial
derivatives] in conventional aggregation theory is that
marginal rates of transformation (marginal cost ratios)
between components of an aggregate are independent of
factor prices, technological conditions, and outputs not in
the aggregate. Thus the mix of outputs within an aggregate
does not affect optimal factor intensities, and
technological conditions do not affect the (component)
output combinations feasible at a given level of the
aggregate. "53
The general specification C= C (0(z.),w) is a quality
separable hedonic cost function. Although being one of the
most parsimonious forms to take account of quality
differentials, quality separability implies the various
restrictive assumptions noted above by Spady (1979) . In
particular, service characteristics are assumed to have no
effect on factor intensities, technological conditions do
not affect feasible generic output/quality combinations and
factor prices are independent of marginal cost ratios
between two different (yi,qi) combinations. In terms of
water supplied, quality separability implies that the
prices of labour or capital do not affect the combinations
of highly treated, urban supplied water that can be
produced at equal cost with rural supplied water
53 Spady (1979) pl4 .
51
possessing other attributes. The property is required,
nevertheless, if unambiguous quantity comparisons of the
outputs of different firms are to be made.
One further conventional restriction may be applied through
aggregation. Namely that ^(y^qi) be homogeneous of degree
one in y. This is convenient and intuitively attractive in
the case of the water supply industry. Homogeneity of
degree one in the generic quantity implies that a doubling
of physical output at a given quality level doubles the
measure of output. Thus a specification equivalent to the
"simple repackaging" model employed by Fisher and Shell
(1971) in the context of price indices is used:
In the 'repackaging' case a quality improvement is exactly
equivalent to obtaining a larger package of the old good at
the same price, or paying less per unit for the old good.
No further restrictions need be placed on f (. ) but for
convenience, simplicity of interpretation and economy of
parameters f (q) will be taken as a simple Cobb-Douglas
function.54 Rosen (1974) raises the problem of
identification in connection with f(.). Caution is
recommended in interpreting hedonic coefficients as
reflecting either cost or demand effects, because hedonic
functions usually represent a reduced form of the supply-
demand equilibrium. The estimated cost function may not
give an unambiguous description of technology if f(.) is
endogenous to the firm. In the case of the water supply
54 Spady (1979) pl4-15 notes that interpreting Zi as generic
output and corresponding quality yields a model equivalent to
that of Fisher and Shell (1971) in the context of price indices.
The model used is simple repackaging.
= Yi-fi(qi)
ie water is 'packaged' in megalitres per day and the service
content of the package is a function of the characteristics of
the quantity ie length of mains etc
0i(Yi/qi) =yi-f (qii/ • • • ,qir) [3.7]
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industry the problem may be set aside as the quality
characteristics are largely exogenous. Each water company
has responsibility for supply within a specified area;
clearly rainfall, water abstraction and supply decisions
are outwith the immediate control of the firm. Therefore it
appears reasonable to interpret the hedonic coefficients in
the cost function as representations of technology.
Transcendental Logarithmic Cost Function.
Given this theoretical background the next question is what
particular functional form to adopt in the empirical work?
A popular choice among econometricians, and one that is
followed here is the transcendental logarithmic (translog)
form of Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). This
functional form may be envisaged as a second order Taylor
series approximation in natural logarithms to an arbitrary
(cost) function.
The unrestricted, nonhomothetic translog cost function may
be written:




w^Wj = input prices
Y = Output
a0, ayf cxyy, Yi;j, Yyi = parameters
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The function may be specified for McFadden's (1978)55
version of a cost function containing an argument
representing 'technological conditions 't', C(y,w,;t) thus:
InC = ot0 + aylnY + EiOqlnWi + Ecatlnt + ^(lnY) 2 +
^EiEjYijlnWilnWj + EiY^lnYlnWi + ^EcEso'tslnttlnts +
EgEiOiislnWilnts +Eto;ytlnYlnt
[3.9]
Where t = technological' conditions.
Criteria for the adoption of this functional specification
were suggested, informally, by Diewert (1971) and amplified
in later contributions. The translog form benefits from a
specification which is general, flexible, parsimonious,
linear and consistent.
The generality of the nonhomothetic cost function derives
from the independence of input demands from the level of
output. If a function has a sufficient number of free
parameters to be able to provide a second order
approximation to an arbitrary twice continuously
differentiable function it is 'flexible' in the Diewert
(1974) sense. Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1978) label a
functional form 'parsimonious' if it has the minimal number
of free parameters required to maintain flexibility.
Linearity in parameters is an econometric convenience, and
consistency with the theoretical properties of cost
55 If quality separability is an unacceptable assumption,
use may be made of the neoclassical cost function extension noted
by Spady (1979) as due to McFadden (1978). The cost function may
be respecified as C=C(y,w;t) where t represents technological
conditions; which may be taken to include service
characteristics.
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functions an empirical imperative. 56 The translog function
satisfies all these criteria, and consequently has been
widely used in cost and production studies.57
However, parameter restrictions must be imposed on the
translog specification to ensure certain regularity
conditions are met. Primarily, homogeneity of degree one in
input prices, given output, is imposed. The restrictions
are :
EiOq = 1, niTij = EjYji = ^iYiy = 0.
Lau (1974) has distinguished two concepts of
approximation both satisfied by the translog function. The
following is taken directly from Spady (1979).
In the first, a function H(z) provides a second order
differential approximation to G(z) at zQ providing H(z0) = G(z0)
and:
bH | _ bGIbzlz=z° bzlz=z°
r 82H , _r 52G 1
bz^Zj- z=z° L bz^Zj z=z°
Secondly, H(z) provides a second order numerical approximation
to G(z) at zQ if H(z0) = G(z0) and:
IHI") CI") kllZ~Zj31"' nir
For all z in a given neighbourhood of zD. Where || z || is the norm
of z and k is a constant depending on zQ. Thus any function H(z)
that can be interpreted as a second order Taylor Series
approximation to G(z) around zQ is a numerical and differential
approximation. The translog cost function as written can be
viewed as the Taylor expansion around the point (l,l,l,..l) and
lnl=0. The point of approximation may be envisaged as a
hypothetical firm with arguments in its cost function equivalent
to the sample arithmetic means.
57 For example see Christensen and Greene (1976) and
Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983). Chambers (1988) presents a full
discussion of this.
The 'technological variable' adds E.jait = 0
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Linear homogeneity implies that, for a fixed level of
output, total cost must increase proportionately when all
prices increase proportionately.
Additional parameter restrictions may be imposed on the
function corresponding to further restrictions on the
underlying technology. Beginning with the most general
specification, assumptions of homotheticity, homogeneity,
and unitary elasticity of substitution may be made.
Following the above notation, parameter restrictions for
the various assumptions are as follows:
homogeneity of degree one in input prices (always applied);




Yyi = 0 and Yyy = 0
unrestricted translog with unitary elasticity of
substitution;
Yij = 0
homotheticity and unitary elasticity of substitution;
Yyi = 0 and Yij = 0
homogeneity and unitary elasticity of substitution(Cobb
Douglas).
Yyi = 0 Yyy = 0 Yij = 0
Subsequent analysis of the results must be made with
reference to underlying theory. In this context, it is to
be noted that the translog function has been interpreted as
a Taylor approximation in first and second derivatives;
with the corollary that the properties of the underlying
function are inherited by the approximating function only
at a single point. For some properties, eg homogeneity and
symmetry, satisfaction at the point implies that the
property applies globally. Concavity, however, cannot hold
globally for any translog function (unless it reduces to
Cobb Douglas) as no combination of restrictions will
guarantee global negative semi-definiteness of the Hessian.
This is a significant limitation, for concavity in the
vector of input prices is an important property of any cost
function. Consequently, the analysis and interpretation of
empirical results must include explicit consideration of
their global or local applicability; bearing in mind that
the translog function remains an approximation, and not an
exact representation of a cost function throughout the
conceivable range of its arguments.58
Frontier Cost Functions: Development.
Although the theoretical apparatus discussed above
underpinned much empirical work concerned with comparative
efficiency measurement, one further technical development
should be noted. This development was the econometric
estimation of so-called 'frontier' production, cost and
profit functions.
The idea of the frontier is simple, and completely
consistent with the underlying economic theory of
optimising behaviour. A cost frontier comprises the locus
of points corresponding to the minimum cost of producing a
given level of output. (Production and profit frontiers may
be drawn in a similar way) Therefore any deviations from
the frontier may be interpreted as measures of
58 The cost function, however, has the convenient feature
that derived demand functions for the factors of production can
be easily computed. Shephard (1953) investigated this property
in the context of duality.
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inefficiency.
Although straightforward in theory, the practical
construction of frontiers proved to be a challenging
problem: two competing paradigms emerged. The first was
the mathematical programming approach, exemplified in the
technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). With its
origins in the work of Farrell (1957) , this had the
advantage of not explicitly imposing any one functional
form on the data. It did however suffer from the fact that
the frontier could be warped or pulled out of shape by
observations contaminated by statistical 'noise'.59 The
second was the econometric approach whereby frontiers were
fitted using regression techniques. This had the advantage
of being able to handle statistical noise, but did impose
an explicit and restrictive functional form for the
technology. It is this latter technique that will be
examined more closely
Pioneering work on the econometric approach to frontier
function estimation was carried out by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). They
postulated a parametric representation of technology with
an error term composed of two parts: a two sided 'noise'
component and a one-sided 'efficiency' term. This advanced
earlier work on frontier regression models by Aigner and
Chu (1968), who considered deterministic frontier models in
which error terms were constrained to be one sided. These
'stochastic frontiers' were constructed for cost,
production and profit functions and had the following
general form. Consider, for example, a stochastic cost
frontier,
59 Recent developments in the mathematical




InCi = lnC(yi,wi) + uA + [3.10]
where C represents cost, Yi the output vector, w± the input
price vector, ut the one-sided disturbance and v± the two-
sided disturbance. The error term u± + vA is in two parts.
vA is the two sided component capturing random shocks and
statistical noise and is generally assumed to follow a
normal distribution. u± is the one-sided component
reflecting inefficiency, which in the case of the cost
frontier is non-negative. As to its distribution Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) proposed the half-normal and
exponential distributions; Stevenson (1980) proposed the
truncated normal and Greene (1990) the two-parameter gamma.
In empirical work the Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977)
assumptions have been followed widely, giving:
where N represents the number of observations, $ (.) the
standard normal distribution function and where other terms
are calculated in the following way.
Vi ~ N (0 , crv 2)
u± ~ | N (0 , <7U2) |
and a likelihood function:
lnL=—In -Nino+YN. In [1-0 (-e,— ) ] -—z\
2 H o 2 azZ^i=1
[3 .11]
6i = Ui + Vi
a2 = au2 + crv2





The function may be estimated by maximum likelihood methods
or corrected ordinary least squares (COLS). This gives
information on average or mean technical inefficiency.
Hence overall technical inefficiency may be written as:
[3 .15]
where,
°u = / ^ ' v \ l+X2
[3.16]
Nevertheless this leaves the problem of the calculation of
inefficiency for individual observations. Jondrow, Lovell,
Materov and Schmidt (1982) tackled the problem and
suggested a means whereby observation-specific estimates of
inefficiency could be derived. Their solution used the
distribution of the inefficiency term conditional on the
estimate of the entire composed error term, ie the expected
value of Ui given the value of the composite error.
The expected value and mode are given as follows:
Expected value:
i?(u|e)






°uM(u|e) =e ( —- )
o2
[3 .18]
if e s 0
= 0 if e < 0
where 0 represents the standard normal density function.60
But whilst this was a significant advance, not all proved
to be pure gain. The estimates themselves are not
consistent estimates of u, since the variability of the
conditional distribution u given e is independent of sample
size. In addition, whilst it is good to have observation-
specific estimates of inefficiency, the price of the
advances is that one must impose specific distributional
assumptions on both noise and inefficiency terms. These and
other issues are discussed at greater length in an
excellent review of the literature by Bauer (1990) .
The methods of frontier function estimation continue to be
developed. Recent advances in this area include the
extension of estimation techniques to whole systems of cost
equations and frontier function estimation using panel
data. The latter will be taken up again later; but among
the leading proponents of the approach are Pitt and Lee
(1981) , Schmidt and Sickles (1984) , Battesse and Coelli
(1988), Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) and Kumbhakar
(1990). Meanwhile other problems remain. They include the
problems of dealing with the non-independence of
inefficiency and regressors, the sensitivity of results to
stochastic assumptions and the detailed examination of the
60 Values for the exponential case are also given.
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relationship between technical and allocative efficiency.61
Modelling Producer Behaviour in the Water Industry: A
Survey.
Having laid the theoretical foundations we now turn to the
empirical analysis. But before proceeding a brief
examination of the development of the econometric modelling
of producer behaviour in the water industry will be
undertaken. Not only will this set the analysis in its
proper historic and literary context, but it will also
survey ways in which the question of comparative efficiency
measurement has been addressed in the past for this
particular industry.
Early empirical work modelling producer behaviour drew its
motivation, in part, from efforts to explain average labour
productivity; and to quantify relationships between inputs
and outputs in agriculture. This led to conclusions being
drawn regarding the estimation of returns to scale and
substitution elasticities among inputs. An early discussion
of the notion of the production function may be found in
the 1890 edition of Marshall's 'Principles' which devoted
considerable attention to the theoretical relationships
among production functions and factor demands. Later,
applied work on production and cost was undertaken by Cobb
and Douglas (1928) in their attempt to test the theory of
marginal productivity using annual data 1899-1922 assuming
constant returns to scale. Walters (1963) gives a
comprehensive survey of this early empirical literature.
61 Schmidt and Lovell (1980) have done work in this area.
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However, it was the introduction of more generalised yet
empirically implementable functional forms, the insights of
duality theory and the rapid development of computer
facilities that lead to renewed interest in the area in the
late 1960's. Specifically, the work of Christensen,
Jorgenson and Lau (1971) on the general transcendental
logarithmic functional form precipitated a vast applied
literature. One branch of this, the work with cost
functions, was deemed appropriate for industries in which
output decisions were exogenous. For example, utilities in
which companies were charged with meeting all consumer
demand for a good or service at a given price. Water
utilities fell squarely under this heading. But it was the
US electricity industry that proved the most fertile
testbed for empirical researchers.62 The water industry was
largely neglected. One reason for this lay in the lack of
reliable water industry data, which limited both the
quantity and quality of the empirical work. Nevertheless,
a sufficient number of studies have emerged to comprise a
literature which reflects many of the post war theoretical
developments.
Early Work.
The earliest published econometric work for the UK water
industry was that by Ford and Warford (1969) . They employed
cross sectional data on water supply companies in England
and Wales for the year 1965-66 to estimate a series of
basic cost functions. The aim was simply to model
production, not to come to conclusions over efficiency
measurement. The functional forms taken included the
quadratic, logarithmic, semi-logarithmic and the
exponential. Output was defined in quantity terms and
assumed homogeneous, although some adjustment for non-
62 See for example Cowing and Smith (1978) and Christensen
and Greene (1976).
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homogenous production conditions was made by including
'area' and 'population' as variables in the linear
regression. Results were generally very poor and few
diagnostic tests considered beyond simple R2 and t
statistics. The authors suggested two reasons for the poor
results. First, misspecification of the dependent variable.
Second, and more interestingly, that certain
'unquantifiable' variables not included in the
specification had swamped the effects of the independent
variables used. They were unable to include other so-
called 'technological' variables for lack of data; but drew
the policy conclusion that savings in costs were possible
through the rationalisation, ie merging, of operations.
They confirmed the tentative nature of the results by
arguing that they should be seen as a qualitative not
quantitative guide to policy.
In the light of recent advances in econometric theory and
technique it would be easy to highlight flaws in the paper:
the primitive functional form employed, the elementary
criteria for assessing the estimated model, the poor data,
the complete omission of prices in the cost function. But
going beyond these criticisms credit should be given for
the attempt to break new ground and for the insight that
the poor results may - at least in part - be attributed to
the omission of unquantifiable variables. In other words,
in this study there is the early indication that a hedonic
approach of one form or another may be appropriate to the
modelling of the industry.
The industry received very little attention in the
following decade until Knapp (1978) presented results of
cost function work for the English and Welsh sewerage
industry. Using 1972/3 data he found strong and pervasive
economies of scale in the purification and disposal of
domestic and industrial sewage. But the paper had an
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importance beyond giving weight to the idea that the
industry enjoyed economies of scale.
In many ways, sewage treatment and disposal was the
'Cinderella' function of the water supply industry. Despite
being amongst the oldest and most essential of services,
researchers chose to neglect it in favour of its
superficially more alluring sister, water supply. Knapp's
contribution was and remains the only UK empirical study
published in a mainstream economics journal. Furthermore it
was innovative by taking into account the quality as well
as quantity dimensions of output. Knapp himself noted that
there were no previous UK studies that addressed the
question of economies of scale within a framework that took
account of the volume of sewage treated and the extent of
the treatment. From a technical point of view the work is
open to many of the criticisms levelled at Ford and Warford
(1969) : the omission of input prices due to a lack of data,
the parsimonious functional form dictated by 'empirical
considerations', the use of operating cost as the dependent
variable ignoring the role of capital in this capital
intensive industry. But the work is redeemed by its
innovative use of measures such as sewage strength and
purification method, which proxy the quality of output. In
addition he defended the behavioural assumption of cost
minimisation whilst admitting that the function estimated
was only that of a short run cost-output relationship. Thus
although the omission of price variables amounted to
misspecification his findings of an 'L' shaped average cost
curve, giving the industry natural monopoly
characteristics, appear sound.
Property Rights Issues.
The next notable contribution to the literature came in the
same year but concerned the water supply function. In this
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Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) set out to employ a cost
function to assess the relative performance of public and
private water companies in the US. Taking a property rights
approach to the question, using cross sectional data for
1970 on 24 private and 88 public water utilities, they
rejected the hypothesis that operating costs for public and
private utilities were equal. Private companies were found
to be more efficient. The functional form employed was
Cobb Douglas, with a physical output measure, prices for
labour and capital and dummies for public and private
companies. Although no adjustment was made for 'hedonic'
variables (those that captured the quality of output) the
paper represented an advance on Ford and Warford (1969) and
Knapp (1978). It employed a theoretically sound cost
function with well-investigated and recognised properties
and input prices were included as arguments in the
specification.
Efficiency was assessed by examining the elasticities of
output with respect to labour and capital. They found that
the marginal product of labour was higher in privately
owned firms than in their public counterparts. But the
absence of variables modelling differences in operating
conditions did raise the question of whether the results
were reliable. If further conclusions were to be drawn as
to comparisons of efficiency between different companies
the question would be serious. Given the more limited
problem of comparing public and private companies as a
whole the use of dummies would appear adequate for the
task.
Bruggink (1982) tackled the same issue but came to a quite
different conclusion. Setting out to examine the effects of
ownership on technical efficiency he specified a linear
cost function which allowed for variation in environmental,
regulatory and wage variables. An ownership dummy was
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designed to pick up residual effects that could be
attributed to different patterns of property rights. Using
1960 US cross sectional data the finding was that public
ownership led to lower operating costs. The existence of
economies of scale was also confirmed. The methodology was,
however, flawed by the use of operating cost as the
dependent variable. For this capital intensive industry,
capital costs were excluded from the regression. Taken with
the findings of Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) the picture of
the industry was becoming less and less clear. A new
approach to the analysis was needed.
By the early 1980's many researchers had taken on board the
flexible functional form literature and were applying it in
the various empirical studies. In addition hedonic analysis
enjoyed something of a revival. In a seminal contribution
to the literature Spady and Friedlaender (1978)
successfully integrated the hedonic and flexible functional
form literature in their examination of the US trucking
industry. They found that to omit variables capturing
quality variation lead to misleading results when modelling
producer behaviour. Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983)
recognised the importance of the work and applied the
insights to their analysis of the US water industry.
Following Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) and Bruggink (1982)
they addressed the property rights question of the impact
of ownership form on costs of operation. Their innovation
was to include variables as proxies for service dimensions,
but to reject the multiproduct approach used before in
favour of a hedonic cost approach. They argued that
because of the continuous nature of water supply service
dimensions a hedonic method would be preferable to a
multiproduct approach that would treat different levels of
service attributes as distinct goods. For water, a
multiproduct approach would imply the specification of a
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very large (in theory an infinite) number of outputs. This
would severely restrict the number of degrees of freedom
available for statistical estimation. They concurred with
the view of Neuberg (1977), that since the service
attributes were interdependent and could not be priced and
sold separately it would be inappropriate to employ a joint
cost model to characterise utility activities.
The paper tackled several drawbacks which appeared in the
previous studies. These included: the improper measurement
of firm output as a scalar value representing delivery
volume, arbitrarily imposed specifications of production
technology and the omission of relevant factor prices. A
multidimensional index of firm output was constructed, its
arguments being service attributes associated with
delivery. The specification assumed that 'bundles' of water
volume, quality and service attributes could be
consistently aggregated by a function Q(.) to ensure
comparability between firm outputs, and, following Spady
and Friedlaender (1978) , they specified a quality separable
hedonic cost function. This implied that a firm's service
mix was independent of relative factor prices.
The functional form employed was:
C = C(Q(Y;z1, z2....zm); rlt r2...rn) [3.19]
where C represented costs, Q the aggregated (hedonic)
output index, Y the output volume, r± the input prices and
Zi the service attributes. The function Q(.) was assumed to
be homogeneous of degree one with respect to volume Y. This
implied:
Q = Y.g(zx, z2 zJ [3 .20]
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where g(.) was the hedonic function aggregating the service
dimensions of the firm. A translog cost function was the
specific functional form employed where:
InQ = lnY + lng(z1, z2 . . . . zJ [3.21]
The hedonic term lng(.) was approximated by:
lng ( . ) = E aL lnzi [3.22]
and interaction effects in the cost function were omitted
to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.
A nonlinear maximum likelihood technique was employed in
estimating the function with three input prices and six
service attributes {zt) . US cross sectional data for 1970 on
57 private and 262 public water companies formed the
sample. Overall, in contrast to the previous studies they
found no significant difference in relative efficiency
between firms under different ownership. The pooling of the
two types of firm could not be rejected. However hedonic
and non-hedonic results were different. Non-hedonic
estimates suggested that water delivery technology was not
homogeneous, consequently a Cobb Douglas specification was
only deemed appropriate when output was defined in hedonic
terms. The point was significant since the non-hedonic
Cobb-Douglas model was the one most frequently used in
previous studies; and was the only specification that
allowed the rejection of the pooling hypothesis for private
and government water utilities. They stated,
"Our results indicate that a Cobb-Douglas production
function is an appropriate specification only if the
multidimensional nature of water delivery is incorporated
into the model"63
63 Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) p677.
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This study broke much new ground and set the course for
later work. Its primary importance came through the
application of hedonic pricing theory to the specification
of industry cost functions. But the work was not left
uncriticised. McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1986) argued that the
work was lacking in terms of its data and methodology;
biasing the results in favour of the conclusion of no cost
differences. They held that Feigenbaum and Teeples' use of
accounting data did not reflect the true opportunity cost
of resources. In addition they argued that differences in
accounting practice made the data incomparable. The second
main point was that the wrong null hypothesis had been
used. Instead of taking equal efficiency as the null,
McGurie and Ohsfeldt suggested testing whether private
enterprises were less costly than public firms. Other
points of contention included the assumption of cost
minimisation and estimation without cost share equations
leading to inefficiently estimated cost parameters.
In a reply Teeples, Feigenbaum and Glyer (1986) argued that
their study followed in the tradition of other work. The
use of accounting information and the behavioural
assumptions had all been adopted before and were a common
starting point for the work. They pointed out ways in
which they modified the accounting data to try and capture
'economic costs': by controlling for water inputs, by
constructing a capital price index, by using regional
prices for labour and energy weighted by occupational mix
and size of firm. But having done all that imperfections
persisted, and these imperfections were very difficult to
remove. It does indeed appear that McGuire and Ohsfeldt
were being unduly harsh in singling out this one particular
study for criticism. And whilst their criticisms had some
substance as they related to public and private sector
efficiency comparisons they had less to say about the
hedonic specification itself.
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As if to compound the rebuttal and confirm the original
approach taken, Teeples and Glyer (1987) presented a
revised set of results confirming their original
conclusions on the insignificance of efficiency differences
between public and private water utilities. Taking a
general second order translog cost function they compared
the three cost models of water delivery systems,
replicating the results of Crain and Zardkoohi and
Feigenbaum and Teeples. These emerged as special cases of
the general functional form. Cross sectional data for 1980
on 119 Southern Californian water delivery systems was
employed, and yielded enough information to permit the
estimation of cost share equations. The usual behavioural
assumptions were made and a hedonic function constructed
with 'z' variables and ownership dummies once again. The
results indicated that as the model specification became
more complete the efficiency differences between public and
private operations were reduced to insignificant levels.
This may explain why apparently contradictory results were
previously obtained. The function met all the regularity
conditions including linear homogeneity in input prices,
concavity and downward sloping factor demands.
But whilst this reestimation addressed the methodological
criticisms of McGuire and Ohsfeldt quite clearly, the
question of data deficiencies remained. For although
certain adjustments were made in the accounting numbers, it
remains the case that they are a poor proxy for economic
measures of opportunity cost. They are, however, the best
available at present. It remains the responsibility of the
researcher to recognise these deficiencies.
Other Approaches.
For completeness, three other pieces of empirical work must
be included in this brief review. The first by Clark and
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Stevie (1981) incorporated spatial features in the
mathematical modelling of a total cost function for water.
The cost function was assumed to be separable; comprised of
the costs of water treatment, and the cost of transmission
or distribution. Using US data a function was constructed
which assumed circularity and radial symmetry of demand,
with the population density falling exponentially with
distance from the treatment source. In contrast to the
other papers reviewed, the relationship was deterministic
rather than statistical with the results reliant on the
particular, rather restricted set of assumptions made for
the service area and pattern of demand. Although
adjustments may be made for non-circular service areas and
different population distributions the algebraic operations
involved quickly became intricate. Results of the work
suggested that there was a trade off between economies of
scale for the production and treatment of water, and
diseconomies of scale in transporting it to its point of
use.
Fox and Hofler (1986) offered a different approach to the
measurement of water utility efficiency by estimating
homothetic composed error frontiers. This is one of the
earliest pieces of work on the industry to apply the
insights of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt on frontier
estimation. Before this paper, published work had not
considered the explicit testing of efficiency, but had
looked at the question of whether cost structures differed
between firms in the public and private sectors. By using
frontiers, Fox and Hofler were able to judge the actual
cost or production performance against the corresponding
potential for individual firms.
They employed a dual production function to account
separately for the production and distribution roles of
water utilities. Essentially, this was a multiproduct
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analysis with the different operations being specified as
different outputs. A system of equations was estimated with
US cross sectional data for 1981 on 156 public and 20
private utilities. It was found that overall the pooling
hypothesis could not be rejected, in line with the results
of Teeples and Glyer (1987). But on this point they offered
more discrimination. For whilst overall efficiency was
generally similar, private companies proved to be more
allocatively efficient than their public counterparts.
Relative technical efficiency was more evenly balanced. So
although the study was innovative in its use of frontier
function estimation and confirmed many earlier findings it
was flawed in two ways. First in its use of a production
function to model an industry in which output was largely
exogenous. Second in its use of a multiproduct rather than
a hedonic function.
Another multiproduct analysis of water was given by Kim and
Clark (1988), who specified residential and non-residential
services as their two outputs. A translog multiproduct cost
function was estimated jointly with cost share equations.
This included operating variables (such as capital
utilisation and service distance) and input prices with a
carefully defined price of capital (interest rate on long
term debt plus an allowance for depreciation) . Again
American cross sectional data was used for 60 water
utilities in 1973. And whilst no economies of scale were
found in the overall operation, there were significant
economies for non-residential water supply and diseconomies
for residential water supply. Predictably they found
economies of scope associated with the joint production of
the two services.
The paper, although not presenting the results of frontier
estimation or hedonic work did offer some new insights. An
innovative approach was taken to defining outputs, a well
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specified cost function was employed with a price of
capital as one of the arguments
Recent Work.
It is appropriate to end the review by returning to the
initial point of departure: the English and Welsh water
industry. Two papers, one by Lynk (1993) and the other by
Price (1993), have broken the silence of nearly two decades
on econometric studies of the domestic industry. And for
that, credit must be given.
Lynk's (1993) study attempted to measure the efficiency of
the statutory water companies and the Regional Water
Authorities (RWA's) in the pre-privatisation industry.
Multiproduct, frontier cost functions were specified and
estimated using data for the RWA's for 1979/80 to 1987/8,
and for the statutory companies for 1984/5 to 1987/8. He
argued that the cost function needed to be sufficiently
general to admit all influences upon costs, including the
impact of joint production, yet avoid over-sophistication
in the use of interaction terms, since these might induce
harmful multicollinearity. For this reason a simple log
linear cost function was specified. In other words, the
functional form owes little to the flexible functional form
literature discussed earlier.
For the RWA's a multiproduct rather than hedonic approach
was adopted; the drawbacks of which have already been
discussed. Three outputs were used, corresponding to water,
sewerage and environmental services. Operating cost was the
dependent variable with only one input price (labour)
entering as an argument. Firm and time dummies allowed the
estimation of a 'fixed effects' model with the panel data.
One innovation was the use of quality adjusted output
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measures. Results suggested that the RWA's enjoyed
economies of scope; ie the benefits of joint production of
water supply and sewerage, and water supply and
environmental services. Reductions in service quality were
found to reduce the degree of benefit of joint production,
whilst there were noticeable regional and time effects.
For the statutory companies a single output cost function
was estimated in the similar way with panel data, regional
and time dummies. Once again regional and time dummies were
significant.
The study's most interesting results however are those
reported following frontier function estimation by
corrected ordinary least squares. The results were
interpreted for models of the RWA's with and without
quality adjustment, and for the statutory water companies.
They suggested that relative to its own efficiency frontier
the publicly owned companies operated at significantly
lower levels of inefficiency than privately owned
companies.
Given the strong assumptions made for the purposes of
modelling the conclusions are presented boldly by Lynk.
Although he breaks new ground in reporting frontier
function estimation results there are several deficiencies.
The lack of any rigorous appeal to economic theory for the
cost function's specification is clearly a drawback. The
omission of all prices except that for labour must cause
some concern in any empirical study of such a capital
intensive industry. Little is made of the data as a panel
and the number of observations is fairly small. Finally,
the companies are studied over different time periods. So
all these factors must temper the enthusiasm with which the
results are received.
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The work of Price (1993) concludes this chapter. The paper
containing the results was the first research paper
published under the auspices of the Office of Water
Services (Ofwat) . It summarised work by the regulatory body
on the issue of comparative efficiency measurement in the
English and Welsh water industry from 1989 to 1993.
Technically the paper was primitive, reminiscent of the
work of Ford and Warford (1969) . Operating cost is the
dependent variable for linear equations estimated by
ordinary least squares. No prices were included in the
equation, but instead there was an attempt to employ
hedonic variables such as pumping head and average size of
borehole in the regression. These were used to correct for
differences in company costs that may not be attributable
to variations in other operating conditions. For
comparisons of company efficiency no frontier results were
offered. Instead companies were ranked according to their
position with respect to the fitted line. Residuals were
used to capture the differences between actual and
predicted performance.
Given the primitive econometric techniques employed, Price
pointed out that the modelling could, at best, merely
suggest the position of companies with respect to their
efficiency. But more may be said in the paper's favour. It
may be argued that the data used in the estimations is the
most reliable ever to emerge from the industry. Thanks to
the efforts of Ofwat, backed up by legislation, companies'
reporting conventions have been harmonised to an
unprecedented degree since 1989. Many resources have been
invested in the process and this has brought in data of the
very highest quality. There remains great potential to use




With the theory in place and with past empirical work as a
guide, the way now lies open to undertake comparative




Comparative Efficiency Measurement: Water Supply in England
and Wales.
Introduction.
We now turn from the theory of modelling producer behaviour
to the practical implementation of a system of comparative
efficiency measurement for the water supply industry in
England and Wales. For this purpose the tools of
regression analysis proposed by Shleifer (1985), discussed
in the literature review, will be used. However, they are
employed as a means to an end. The end being the drawing
of comparisons pertinent to implementing a system of
yardstick competition. Significantly this implies that
ordinal rather than cardinal measures are required. The
work is 'ring-fenced' by the need to derive an efficiency
ranking for the firms, rather than absolute measures of
firm efficiency. In this, the work differs from many of
the previous studies, except perhaps Price (1993), and does
not set out to answer questions concerning the relative
efficiency of public and private companies, and other
related property rights issues. This chapter develops a
series of comparative efficiency measures that are robust
enough in their ordinal rankings of companies, and that may
be adopted by the water industry's regulator.
The chapter is structured in the following way. It begins
with a discussion of the physical processes involved in the
supply of water. Institutional development and database
construction are then outlined followed by an introduction
to the modelling techniques used, and the results of the
econometric analysis. The chapter ends with conclusions.
Physical Attributes and Processes.
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At a global level, the earth's water resources are governed
by the hydrological cycle. A system in which precipitation
leads to further cloud formation by processes of
evaporation and transpiration. But although vast quantities
of water move through the system every year only a small
percentage of that water is available for human use. It is
this scarcity that underpins the economics of water supply.
Essentially, water resources and their use are separated in
time and space. Consumers require a reliable and continuous
supply, but rainfall is unpredictable and intermittent.
Therefore water companies set up to meet the space-time
mismatch by collecting, storing, treating and distributing
water.
In England and Wales approximately half of all rainfall is
lost to the atmosphere by evaporation or transpiration from
vegetation. The balance, residual rainfall, goes to
replenish rivers, lochs, reservoirs and groundwater storage
regions.64 The latter comprise water bearing strata which
receive the water that has percolated through from the
surface. Recent estimates of resources available for
abstraction suggest that overall only 15% of residual
rainfall is used for abstraction. This implies that England
and Wales as a whole enjoy abundant water resources.
Regionally, however, there is considerable variation.
Residual rainfall is highest in the North West and Welsh
areas, and lowest in East Anglia. Abstraction as a
proportion of residual rainfall is highest in the South
East of England and lowest in the South West and Wales.
64 This discussion is based on information presented by UBS
Phillips and Drew (1989), Table 5, Rainfall and Abstraction
1987/8.
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This pattern of abstraction has emerged because, spatially,
the areas of highest rainfall are not necessarily the areas
of highest demand. Consumer and industrial demand are
concentrated around the main conurbations which are not all
located in the wettest regions. So the companies must seek
to meet the demand given the resources available. And these
are determined, to a large extent, by the geological
characteristics of the region.
For the purposes of classification a useful distinction may
be drawn between underground or 'groundwater' sources
(recovered from aquifers via wells, boreholes and adit
systems) and 'surfacewater' sources (drawn off from
reservoirs,lakes, canals and rivers). Nationwide, a similar
proportion of water is abstracted from upland reservoirs
(surfacewater), rivers (surfacewater) and groundwater. But,
once again, there is considerable regional variation
reflecting the geological characteristics of the different
areas. Most groundwater abstraction occurs in the central,
south and east areas, through which run the two major
aquifers: the Upper Cretaceous aquifer running through East
Anglia and points South West and the Permo-Triassic
Sandstone aquifer running up from central England towards
the North West. Hence companies in the South East of
England draw much groundwater from the Chalk Downs; those
in the North West rely upon the reservoirs of the Lake
District and Penines for their surfacewater.
But this is not to say that groundwater and surfacewater
sources are unconnected. They are interdependent parts of
the complex hydrological cycle. Reservoirs may be used to
regulate river flow, and rivers loose water which will
percolate down through layers of rock to groundwater
reservoirs. Both sources are replenished by rainfall, with
the aquifers not only acting as direct sources of water,
but also providing a natural baseflow for many major river
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systems.
Abstraction is the first task of the water company; whether
from groundwater or surfacewater sources. The second task
is treatment. Consumers demand water of a certain minimum
quality; consequently firms must invest to bring abstracted
water up to this standard. Treatment methods are again
determined by the raw material. So, as a general rule,
groundwater requires less treatment than surfacewater
before being put into the public supply. The process of
percolation is in itself a process of filtration by which
many of the impurities are removed. However, typical
processes for surfacewater treatment include: storage,
screening, aeration, clarification (coagulation and
flocculation), sedimentation, filtration, the use of
granular activated carbon, pH adjustment and
disinfection.65 Groundwater may only require disinfection
with a compound of chlorine but it is common for the
processes of softening and aeration to be applied.
Once treated, the water must be delivered to consumers. Two
issues arise here. First, continuity of supply. Some means
of storage is required to guard against temporary
interruptions in supply or brief spells of dry weather. For
companies extracting groundwater the problem is less
pressing. The aquifer acts as a storage reservoir of high
quality water. Consequently the rate of supply is
determined by the rate at which water may be pumped to the
surface and treated. But, for those treating surfacewater
it means heavy capital investment in storage capacity at
surface level. Nevertheless the advantages do not run in
just one direction. If groundwater is drawn off at a rate
greater than the natural rate of replenishment then there
may be a lowering of the water table. This may impose
65 See 'Water Treatment' (1990), and information leaflet
published by the Water Services Association, London.
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negative externalities on those depending on good river
flows. On the other hand, expensive storage lagoons for
surfacewater allow sunlight to penetrate the water and kill
off many harmful bacteria.
The second issue is distribution; the spatial problem of
how to deliver water resources to their point of use. In
Roman Britain, the problem was solved through the use of
aqueducts for bulk, and pipes for small scale transmission.
In modern times aqueducts linking Manchester to supplies
from the Lake District were commissioned in 1894.
Birmingham's solution was to draw water from the Elan
reservoirs in Wales. Other more sophisticated water
management solutions have included the regulation of river
flow to bring water from reservoirs over long distances to
the point of abstraction. Then, once abstracted and
treated, the water is fed to individual consumers through
large distribution mains from service reservoirs branching
into smaller mains which eventually reach individual
houses. The distribution systems are designed to
accommodate diurnal and seasonal variation in demand, so
typically operate below capacity. Mains water is delivered
under pressure to ensure an adequate supply to buildings of
normal height and also to avoid the possibility of
contamination through infiltration by foreign bodies.
All this means that a substantial capital investment is
made in the distribution system. Given that the water is
supplied under pressure, leakage often occurs but unless
catastrophic, this is difficult to detect. Indeed, in
practice the effort and cost of locating and repairing the
fault frequently outweigh the water saving. This is
particularly true for mains laid at some depth along main
roads.
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To summarise, the costs of the physical processes of
abstraction, treatment and distribution are frequently
determined by the geological profile of a region.
Groundwater, being of high quality, requires little
treatment; and natural storage in the aquifer reduces the
need for the capital intensive facilities required of
surfacewater outlets. Fluctuations in consumer demand may
be met by additional pumping time. Surfacewater often
requires elaborate treatment plant and large storage
facilities, although variable costs of surfacewater
abstraction may be less than groundwater, with stations
being supplied under gravity. Setting to one side for the
moment a discussion of the idiosyncratic nature of many of
the plants and sources, and a discussion of the capital
investment issue, a broad ranking of the costs of
abstraction and treatment may assist an intuitive
appreciation of the problem. Thus as a first
approximation; groundwater abstraction with no treatment
works ranks as the lowest total cost operation, followed by
surfacewater abstraction with treatment works but no
reservoir and surfacewater abstraction with treatment works
and reservoir.
Institutional Development.
Various institutions have delivered these different water
services to the population of mainland Britain over the
last century. Historically, the industry in England and
Wales was dominated by three categories of organisation;
water undertakings, sewerage and sewage disposal
authorities and river authorities. Legislative innovations
reinforced a process of concentration, consolidation and
movement towards a system of integrated river basin
management that culminated in the current integrated
institutional structure. Each branch of the industry
enjoyed several unique characteristics in terms of its
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organisational evolution, however for the purposes of the
current analysis attention will be confined to water
undertakings.
At the turn of the century there were approximately 2000
separate water undertakings in England and Wales variously,
abstracting, distributing and treating water. Some were
private companies or local authority waterworks operating
under private Acts of Parliament. Others were local
authority waterworks operating under 19th century public
health acts or joint water boards formed by the combination
of two or more local water undertakings. By 1950 the number
of individual suppliers had fallen to 950, the figure was
276 in 1968, and of the. 187 suppliers on the eve of the
1974 reorganisation 100 were water boards, 57 local
authority undertakings and 30 private companies. The main
legislative initiatives over the period were the 1936
Public Health Act which laid down duties regarding the
sufficiency and quality of water, and the 1945 Water Act
which recodified and consolidated all the relevant
provisions of former legislation into one structured
'Waterworks Code' covering the duty to supply, the
compulsory purchase of land etc. Significantly, the Act
also encouraged the amalgamation of water suppliers to form
water boards aimed at increasing efficiency and exploiting
economies of scale. As indicated by these statistics, the
process gathered momentum in the two decades following the
Act.
The most significant institutional development in the
industry came about with the 1973 Water Act which
established ten Regional Water Authorities (RWA's) in
England and Wales66. In order to achieve economies of scale
and scope and a higher level of pollution control the three
66 The Water Authorities came into existence on 1st April
1974.
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main branches of the industry were amalgamated on a
regional basis under the general principle of 'Integrated
River Basin Management'. The new authorities inherited a
bundle of operational, environmental and regulatory
functions including responsibility for water supply,
sewerage, sewage disposal, water resource planning,
pollution control, fisheries, flood protection, water
recreation and environmental conservation. Their role was
to plan and control all uses of water in each river
catchment area. Whilst the organisational developments
brought about by the 1973 Act have a parallel in the
nationalisation of the electricity and gas industries,
nationalisation was not complete with the new authorities
retaining a majority of local government representatives on
their boards, and only a minority of central government
appointees including the chairman. This arrangement was
modified and nationalisation completed67 by the 1983 Water
Act which stipulated a maximum board size of fifteen,
consisting of members appointed by central government
ministers. The new authorities were chiefly responsible to
the Department of the Environment (Welsh Office for Welsh
Water) except on matters of land drainage and fisheries
where they reported to the ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food. Other bodies established under the Act
were the National Water Council ( an advisory body and
industry association) and the Water Research Centre.
Of prime importance to the study is the fact that the
private statutory companies survived reorganisation largely
intact, under sl2 Water Act 1973, even though the RWA's
assumed responsibility for the supply of water in all
areas. Where a statutory company operated within the area
of the water authority, the authority was required to
discharge its water supply and distribution functions
67 Vickers and Yarrow (1988) p391 make the point concerning
incomplete nationalisation.
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through the company. Close cooperation was required as
responsibility for water resource development lay with the
authority, however in many operations the company acted as
agents of the authority. Twenty nine of these statutory
water supply companies operated between 1974 and 1989 under
tight regulatory control. These controls concerned methods
whereby capital could be raised, the rate of dividends, the
amount of accumulated surplus carried forward etc.
Supplying approximately one quarter of England and Wales's
total water meant their combined contribution was
significant throughout the period. Thus private and public
suppliers of water co existed from 1974 to 1989.
The Water Act 1989 further altered the institutional
framework transferring the functions of the water
authorities relating to water supply and sewerage services
to water service companies. A new body, the National
Rivers Authority, responsible for river management was
established and shares in the ten water service companies
were offered for sale on 22nd November 1989. The statutory
companies retained their areas of supply but several
converted to PLC status as restrictions on the raising of
capital were relaxed.
One of the most significant institutional changes brought
about by the 1989 Act was the root and branch reform of
regulatory arrangements covering the industry.68 The water
and sewerage companies, which took on the mantle of the
Regional Water Authorities, lost their regulatory functions
to new organisations set up under the Act, and thereby
ceased to be both poacher and gamekeeper in terms of
environmental regulation.
The original legislation has been modified and
consolidated by the Water Industry Act 1991, Water Resources Act
1991, Statutory Water Companies Act 1991, Land Drainage Act 1991,
Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 and
Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992.
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At first sight the reforms appeared further to complicate
the already complex regulatory arrangements. The following
organisations all had a regulatory role under the new
regime: the Department of the Environment and the Welsh
Office, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), the National
Rivers Authority (NRA), the Drinking Water Inspectorate
(DWI) , the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) , the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission (MMC), HM Inspectorate of Pollution
(HMIP), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food. Unsurprisingly the relationships between the various
agencies were complex and often the source of some
conflict.69 However, three core regulators now take a
leading role in the day to day regulation of the industry.
They are: Secretaries of State (drinking water quality) the
National Rivers Authority (environmental regulation) and
Ofwat (economic regulation).
The economic regulator, Ofwat, under its Director General,
Ian Byatt, was assigned three main tasks; to ensure
reasonable prices, satisfactory standards of service and
adequate consumer representation. The levers of policy at
Ofwat's disposal included the price cap (RPI+K), the
service standards which it monitored and the Consumer
Service Committees, appointed by the Director General to
champion the interests of the consumers in their areas.
Ofwat's use of comparators for economic regulation has been
discussed in Chapter 2. However, it should be noted that
the economic regulatory reforms of the 1989 Water Act
provide part of the motivation for comparative efficiency
measurement.
The new freedoms and opportunities opened up by the 1989
Water Act have meant that institutional development has
continued. Companies have pursued their objectives in many
69 A discussion of the relationships between regulators is
given in Byatt (1991).
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different ways. To date, several water companies have
diversified their operations and some of the original
statutory companies have been taken over by larger British
or French concerns. The process of consolidation continues.
At 31st March 1993 only 32 of the original 39 companies
were still in existence as individually licensed operators.
This number will be reduced during the year as Severn Trent
Ltd completes the takeover of East Worcester Water Pic.
Background to the Work.
We now turn from a description of the physical and
institutional aspects of the water supply industry in
England and Wales to the presentation of a method of
comparative efficiency measurement. For the purposes of
modelling, water companies are assumed to be price takers
in factor markets minimising costs whilst delivering a
level of output set exogenously. In line with the various
econometric studies surveyed in Chapter 3, the proposed
methodology involves the econometric estimation of a series
of cost functions. Theoretically, their use is in harmony
with the behavioural assumptions of cost minimisation and
exogenous output. Practically, the unit cost function has
a natural interpretation in terms of efficiency, with a
crude first approximation of firm efficiency being given by
the level of unit cost.
The econometric estimation of the theoretical model
requires the adoption of a particular functional form that
does not contravene the theoretical postulates. The
transcendental logarithmic (translog) functional form of
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973), outlined above, is
selected as it imposes very few restrictions on the data
and allows a very rich initial specification. The models
with homogeneity, homotheticity and unitary elasticity of
substitution may be nested in this general form and testing
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may proceed down towards a basic Cobb Douglas
specification.
The key extension to the simple cost function is made
through the adoption of various hedonic forms. Hedonic
variables are included in the unit cost function in the way
outlined in Chapter 3 in order to model the
multidimensional nature of output in some way.70 The
continuous nature of the water service dimensions implies
that an aggregation approach is preferable to a
multiproduct approach which would treat different levels of
service attributes as distinct goods. The choice of hedonic
variables reveals implicit judgments as to which physical
or operational aspects of company activities are
significant in the cost minimisation decision.
The main technical extensions to the existing UK studies
concerning the efficiency of the water industry, lie in the
use of a new dataset and the application of the insights of
research into stochastic frontier functions. And, in
contrast to much previous work, the main aim is to derive
an ordinal efficiency ranking; not to derive cardinal
measures, or to draw conclusions regarding the relative
efficiency of private and public companies.
A classical econometric testing strategy is followed,
whereby a testable model is constructed on the basis of
economic theory with a view to the available information,
estimated and analysed. This general approach in the
Hendry/LSE vein owes much to the work of Sargan (1964) but
has applicability beyond the confines of time series
analysis. The general principles of the approach are
reflected in a methodology that involves the formulation of
a general model consistent with the postulates of economic
70 Following Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983)
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theory. Reparametrisation follows in an attempt to obtain
explanatory variables that are near orthogonal and
1interpretablex in terms of the final equation(s).
Simplification and model parsimony are assumed desirable as
an initial rich specification is tested down in a general
to specific modelling strategy. However, lest the
impression be given that the approach is totally
prescriptive and mechanical, it should be mentioned that
the modelling process often proceeds in a less rigid
manner.
So, with the general modelling strategy outlined, attention
may be turned to the data which will be employed in the
estimation. The process of database construction and an
evaluation of its properties is the subject of the next
section.
Database Construction and Evaluation.
Prime facie, database construction would appear to be a
straightforward exercise for an industry which, since 1974,
has comprised integrated regional operators. In fact the
position is quite different. Before the 1989 Water Act the
picture was one of chaos and confusion. In their
outstanding review of statistical sources for the UK water
industry Penning-Rowsell and Parker (1983) made the point,
"Taken as a whole, the data series on water services
in the UK are both chaotic and generally very inaccessible.
They pose innumerable problems for the researcher
attempting more than a superficial analysis of spatial and
temporal trends. In addition it should be stressed that
the accuracy and appropriateness of much of the data may
well be less than it appears, not least owing to irregular
or inconsistent sampling, and that a most careful
evaluation is necessary of any data used."71
71 Penning-Rowsell and Parker (1983) pl91.
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But what are the reasons for this 'chaotic' situation and
the lack of any national database? Two points may be made
here. The first concerns the regionalisation of the
industry.
Whilst the reforms of the 1973 Water Act72, led to a
devolution of powers and responsibilities to Regional Water
Authorities, attempts were made to maintain a national
perspective through new institutions such as the Water Data
Unit and the National Water Council (NWC) . Both had
national data gathering and dissemination roles. The Water
Data Unit was closed in 1981, the NWC disbanded in 1983.
Both closures deprived the industry of important national
integrating organisations. Furthermore, in the run up to
privatisation, RWA's faced an incentive structure which
encouraged the cultivation of exclusive individual
interests and the loosening of national ties. For, after
1989, partners in the industry were to become competitors.
The second reason for the 'chaotic' national picture was
the process of institutional reform itself, mentioned
above. The life cycle of the Water Data Unit illustrates
the point well.
As part of the 1973 reforms the Water Data Unit came into
being in 1974 under the control of the Department of the
Environment.73 Its main functions were to advise on the
standardisation of water data collection, to collect and
process water data required for project planning and to
72 Under the Act, ten Regional Water Authorities were
established. The principle of 'Integrated River Basin Management'
was enshrined in the final settlement.
73 Under si of the Water Act 1973 the Secretary of State for
the Environment was given the statutory duty to collate and
publish information relating to water resources and their use.
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provide a computer processing service for the water
industry. The unit sponsored research into data gathering
and published several series of water statistics. In 1981
the unit was dismantled and a variety of agencies took over
its responsibilities; including the Department of the
Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food and the National Environment Research Council. Whilst
the Department of the Environment was the nominal clearing
house for data, no other national database was established
for that period. Only in 1989 did Ofwat begin work on
devising such a database for its own comparative efficiency
studies.
The lack of a coherent national database for the period
1974-89 severely inhibited empirical research in the UK.
The situation may be contrasted with that in the US, in
which comprehensive statistics published by the American
Water Works Association enabled the studies outlined in
Chapter 3 to be carried out. Consequently, in undertaking
original research for England and Wales it was necessary to
construct an entirely new database suited to the work in
hand. Given the complexity of the industry's institutional
structure and the intricate division of functional
responsibilities, this proved to be a non-trivial, labour-
intensive task.
I took a systematic approach to the work. Rather than
setting out to gather all available data that came to hand,
I began by organising two field trips. These enabled me to
gather information on the physical processes and the
institutional framework of the water supply industry
quickly and efficiently. This knowledge was used throughout
the study to inform decisions made in database
construction. An appreciation of the activities of
abstraction, purification and distribution also meant that
I was aware of the extent to which assumptions made, for
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the convenience of modelling, departed from reality.
The first field trip was to Yorkshire Water's Tophill Low
Water Treatment Works near Driffield in East Yorkshire. The
trip took place on Friday 13th December 1990 and I was
guided by the Chief Engineer, Mr D Roberts. The second was
to the Water Services Association, 1 Queen Annes Gate,
London, for an interview with Mr Peter Hall (Assistant
Secretary Finance and General Policy) on 18th March 1991.
The Water Services Association as an industry body
representing the water companies gathers and publishes data
for the industry as a whole. Consequently it was an
appropriate opportunity to acquire background information
on the institutional structure and development of the
industry.
The next stage was to trace the published material in
University, National and Corporate libraries. As this
proceeded a 'data inventory' was drawn up, listing the
individual data sources, their contents and location. (A
abridged list of these is given in Appendix 2. ) Primary
sources included: the annual reports and accounts of the
RWA's and statutory water companies, the Digest of
Environmental Pollution and Water Statistics (Department of
the Environment), and publications of the Water Authorities
(Services) Association. Secondary sources included: the
Annual Report and Accounts of the National Water Council
(dissolved in 1983), publications of the Water Companies
Association and various reports of the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission. Individual figures were then
transcribed to standard tables and committed to computer
spreadsheet, checked at every stage and backed up by full
handwritten documentation.
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In data gathering the aim of the study - ie the estimation
of a hedonic cost function - determined the data to be
acquired. But the rule was not followed rigidly. Where
information was available but did not appear to have
immediate relevance its location was noted. Often these
sources would be returned to, once other avenues had been
explored and proved fruitless. Revision and updating were
essential parts of the whole process as more reliable or
more comprehensive sources of data were discovered.
Throughout, the importance of consistency, continuity and
reliability in the data series were borne in mind. This
often resulted in a long but inconsistent time series being
replaced by one that was apparently more reliable but
shorter. Where series differed the reasons were
investigated and the more reliable adopted.
Table 4.1, below, lists the variables comprising the final
dataset used for empirical testing.
























Area of supply (square kilometres).
Population (thousands).
Length of mains (kilometres).
Total number of employees.
Rainfall (mm per year).
Output (megalitres per day).
Surfacewater (proportion of total water





Operating cost (thousands of pounds).
Historic cost capital expenditure (thousands of
pounds).
Total staff cost (thousands of pounds).
Fixed assets historic cost net book value
(thousands of pounds).
Fixed assets current replacement cost
(thousands of pounds).
Price of capital (public works loan board
average rate of interest on new advances).
Price of electricity (average net selling value
per kilowatt hour sold for waterworks etc ,
pence).
Price of rates ( average non domestic rate
poundage for English authorities, pence).
Price of labour (average hourly earnings for
manual men in other energy and water supply
industries, pence).
Price of other materials (retail prices index).
Although the simple variable definitions appear fairly
unambiguous, in many cases they conceal several rather
sweeping assumptions. Therefore the use of this data in
empirical analysis must be informed by knowledge of the
heterogeneous collection methods, definitions and reporting
conventions employed by the different water suppliers.
Consequently the main features of each will be outlined to
ensure their interpretation and use is better informed.
Area (AREA) represents the area of water supply operations.
For the statutory companies this will be straightforward.
For the RWA's this is often considerably less than their
total administrative area because of the presence of the
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smaller companies acting as agents in their region.
Population (POPU) is taken to be the population of the
water supply area. In general over 95% of the resident
population is connected to the public water supply. This
rises to over 99% in many regions. Where there is the
choice of winter or summer resident populations, the figure
for winter is chosen. The higher summer populations reflect
only the temporary influx of holidaymakers. Resident
population rather than 'equivalent population' is used, for
whilst 'equivalent population' is available for the Water
Authorities, the statutory water companies seldom report
this figure.
The length of mains (MAIN) is estimated in kilometres.
Companies vary considerably in the reliability of their
estimates and the completeness of their records. RWA's, for
example, inherited assets from many small operators; some
of whose records were incomplete or lacked precision in
terms of the location of the mains network. Often the
figures offered are highly subjective, based on an
engineer's best estimate. As replacement and renewal
occurs, records are updated. Consequently the reliability
of this measure continues to improve over time.
The total number of employees (EMPL) was taken to be the
average number of full time equivalent staff. However, for
water authorities this statistic was not generally broken
down by function, therefore this represents employment for
the whole of the operation. Rainfall (RAIN) is reported for
each area. Where statutory companies did not report the
figure it was proxied by using the value for the
corresponding Water Authority area. The locations of
statutory companies within Water Authority areas are set
out in Appendix 3.
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Output (WATE) is measured in megalitres per day.74 It
usually represents the total amount of water put into the
supply per day. This differs from the quantity of water
consumed or demanded for consumption by the amount of water
lost in the distribution system as a result of leakage.75
It should be noted that for this variable there are some
differences in the way in which water authorities and
statutory water companies collect the figures. However the
series obtained showed a good degree of continuity within
companies over time.
The proportions of total water resources abstracted from
groundwater and surfacewater sources were recorded as
percentages (GDWT, SRWT). These were variously defined in
the source documents as volume of water abstracted or
volume of water put into supply. For individual companies
the figure showed little variation over time. Where gaps
existed in the dataset for individual years they were
plugged using an extrapolated figure.
Operating cost (OPCT) was a key variable derived from the
accounts with great care. For the RWA's the figure was
taken from the subjective analysis of turnover and
operating costs which they reported on a functional basis.
This was convenient and meant that figures for the RWA's
excluded any element of cost of water resources or sewerage
work. The data was therefore broadly comparable across the
public / private company divide. Further work was conducted
on the raw data to ensure that an operating cost was taken
which excluded any element of capital cost. This was a
74 One megalitre is equivalent to a million litres or a
thousand cubic litres.
75 Estimated leakage is reported in 'Business Monitor -
Quarterly Statistics' of the Business Statistics Office, HMSO
(PQ603). Estimated wastage from public mains as a percentage of
water supplied to own customers for 1980,1981 and 1982 was 20%,
21% and 22% respectively.
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difficult process but necessary to preserve the integrity
of the data. So, from the cost figure were excluded:
depreciation, interest payments, taxes, contributions to
the National Equalisation Fund, contributions to the
National Water Council and the Water Resource Centre. Items
included were, operating, maintenance and administration
costs; together with other charges of a similar nature.
Some discrepancies were unavoidable. For example, the
figures for York Waterworks include some elements of
chargeable services that are difficult to disentangle. Some
discrepancies were undetectable: considerable variation was
permitted under accounting conventions in the assigning of
items of expenditure to revenue or capital accounts.
Nevertheless the final figures may be taken to be a
reasonable proxy for operating cost over the period.
Capital expenditure on the water supply function was
recorded as CAPE. This was the figure for the additions to
the stock of tangible fixed assets at their historic cost
level. The RWA's conveniently recorded water supply figures
separately from other functions. Again figures were
comparable between statutory companies and RWA's. Total
staff cost (TSCT) represented wages and salaries for both
manual and non-manual workers.
In this capital intensive industry, two measures of capital
stock were recorded. The first was the historic cost net
book value of fixed assets (FIXA). Once again the figure
for all RWA's was broken down by function. For statutory
companies the figure was purged of any element referring to
the issue of redeemable preference shares and loan capital
in the early years. The second measure of capital stock was
CCFA, a measure of the current gross replacement cost of
tangible fixed assets. No depreciation was deducted and
figures were available for the water supply function only.
However information on this variable was only reported by
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RWA's and statutory companies from 1980/1 onwards.
Furthermore, although water authorities continued to report
the variable throughout the period of study many of the
statutory companies discontinued the reporting of this
series in the middle of the decade. To overcome the problem
missing values of the data were calculated using the Public
Works Non Roads Index Annual Multiplier. This was applied
to the figure for Historic Cost Capital Expenditure leading
to figures going back to 1977/8 for all companies, and
going forward to 1986 for the statutory companies.
Five price terms were employed. The price of capital (PK)
was the Public Works Loan Board average rate of interest on
new advances. This was considered appropriate as,
throughout the period, RWA's had obtained all their long
term sterling borrowings from the National Loans Fund.
Governments pursued this borrowing policy for all statutory
corporations in order to preserve flexibility in its own
borrowing operations. The prices of power (PE) and rates
(PR) were straightforward. The first was the average net
selling value per kilowatt hour sold for waterworks etc,
and the second was the average non-domestic rate poundage
for English Authorities.
The price of labour (PL) was the price term with the
greatest amount of cross sectional variation. Figures were
taken from the New Earnings Survey (NES) on the average
hourly earnings for manual men in other energy and water
supply industries. The data for manual workers are used as
it may be argued that, at the margin, it is the wage rate
for manual workers that determines decisions regarding the
appropriate labour / capital mix. Appendix 4 lists the
classification of the various companies into NES regions.
Finally, PP represented the price of all other materials.
A finer subdivision of input prices was not feasible given
the data available from primary sources. Therefore the
Retail Prices Index was considered an appropriate fifth
price.
Of the variables in the database the price of capital and
the measurement of capital stock are most important and
most difficult to deal with. Table 4.2 gives some
indication of just how capital intensive the industry is.
Consequently, in such a capital intensive industry
variation in the procedures adopted for capital valuation
will have a profound effect on any results derived. The
whole question has been tackled recently by Farber (1989)
in the context of utility regulation. Farber (1989)
conducted tests of whether various measures of the price of
capital and capital stock influenced measures of electric
utility allocative efficiency. By employing a theoretically
'correct' Jorgenson-type price for capital services he
showed that the method for measuring capital stock did not
have as large an effect on the efficiency conclusions as
the method of price measurement. The point is made that the
treatment of capital is one of the linchpins of any
modelling exercise.
The point is noted, but data availability conditions the
response that can be made to the issue. However, in an
attempt to address the problem the two methods of capital
stock valuation used in the database contribute to two of
the three unit cost definitions used in the econometric
work.
Unit cost is defined in three ways: as operating cost per
unit of output (OPC/Y), as historic valuation operating
cost per unit of output (CHC/Y) and as current valuation
operating cost per unit of output (C/Y). The numerator of
each of these unit cost terms - OPC, CHC and C - will now
be discussed in more detail. The denominator (Y)
representing output is the same in each case.
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The first measure (OPC) reflects a 'pure' operating cost
excluding, as far as possible, any cost of capital or
charge for the capital stock employed. Hence the variable
is purged of any measure of depreciation before it is
employed.76
The second measure (CHC) adds into the operating cost a
proxy for the working cost of capital. This proxy is a
charge based on the historic net book value of physical
assets. The capital charge is obtained by multiplying the
net book value of fixed assets at their historic cost
(FIXA), by the price of capital (PK - the Public Works Loan
Board average rate of interest on new advances). Using the
above notation the capital charge is simply (FIXA x PK) .
This figure is then added to the operating cost OPC, to
give CHC.
The third measure (C) is compiled in a similar way. This
time a current cost capital charge is added to the
operating cost. The capital charge is obtained by
multiplying the price of capital (PK) by the current gross
replacement cost of tangible fixed assets, with no
depreciation deducted (CCFA). The figure for the current
gross replacement cost of tangible fixed assets is derived
from reported current cost accounting statements, and where
data is missing an imputed value is used as discussed
above. Hence the current cost capital charge may be written
(CCFA x PK); and is added once again to the operating cost
OPC, to give C.
However, it should be made clear that all these attempts to
account for the price of capital and the value of the total
stock have imperfections. The measurement of capital stock
- under both accounting conventions - and the use of only
76 OPC is merely another name for the variable labelled OPCT
above. Its derivation was discussed earlier.
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one price are approximations. In terms of capital stock
valuation it is clear that much capital stock goes
unrecorded by the companies (eg mains) or has been fully
depreciated over its life (eg Victorian pumping stations).
If this is the case no record of the stock will appear on
a company's historic cost balance sheet; consequently any
measure of capital stock derived from this source of
information will be flawed.
The current cost measure of stock is an improvement;
offering an approximate, but satisfactory, current value
for the replacement cost of assets77. However, even this
approach can do nothing to mitigate the problem of
unrecorded assets. No national database exists with
information concerning the differing vintages of capital
equipment, and the useful lives of many of these assets are
uncertain. Whether current cost valuation gives a more
accurate representation of the stock of capital compared
with historic cost procedures is a moot point. It is hard
to dispel the lingering impression that capital stock
valuation in this industry has a certain arbitrariness.
Renewals accounting is the latest methodological innovation
under consideration to deal with the problem, in which the
infrastructure assets are considered to have infinite lives
with the operating capability being maintained, by
incurring renewals expenditure, at a constant level in real
terms. Clearly the results of the analysis will be affected
directly by the accommodation made for capital measurement.
By employing only one price of capital the database is
deprived of another source of cross sectional variation.
Again the approximation is flawed to the extent that
77 The Office of Water Services (Ofwat) currently (1993) use
this current cost information in regulating the domestic water
industry.
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different companies and authorities were able to obtain
funds at different rates of interest. The proxy (Public
Works Loan Board average rate of interest on new advances)
is, however, appropriate given the fact that over the
period of the study the Government's general policy was
that borrowing in sterling by statutory corporations other
than for temporary purposes would be obtained from the
National Loans Fund. Information concerning the rates at
which individual water suppliers borrowed during this
period was not in the public domain, and could not be
obtained for the purposes of this research.
Given all these reservations it may still be argued that
the treatment of capital, and the inclusion of proxies for
capital cost in the various models is an appropriate way to
proceed. Specifically, care is taken in the study to
abstract from the capital problem in the first instance,
and then to deal with it in line with two currently
accepted accounting procedures. Alternative approaches were
available and could have been used in this context. For
example the capital charge could have been proxied either
by the depreciation charge for capital stock in the year,
or by a figure representing additions to stock (tangible
fixed assets). Both are unsatisfactory compared with the
approach explained above and adopted.
The depreciation figure is flawed as water companies and
authorities had not harmonised accounting policies at the
time of the study. Consequently there were substantial
differences in depreciation adjustments employed by the
various organisations. Furthermore, many large assets with
long useful lives did not appear on historic cost balance
sheets, having been fully depreciated. Thus any historic
cost depreciation figure would be very misleading. Use of
a figure representing additions to tangible fixed assets
may also be criticised as being a poor proxy for capital
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cost. Although it may be argued that, over the period of
the study, capital expenditure was chiefly replacement
investment this is clearly a strong assumption. In addition
by using this figure, only one capital charge is obtained.
Under the alternative approach adopted, both a historic and
a current charge are employed. This enables a preliminary
assessment of the sensitivity of the results to the
particular capital accounting treatment to be made.
Despite these obvious difficulties over accounting for
capital and the compromises made in constructing the
database much may be said in its favour. Primarily it is
the first of its kind: new work which, however imperfectly,
sets about controlling for the cost of capital in this
capital intensive industry. It should also be noted that
financial data on the industry contained in publications
such as company reports are consistent and reliable. In
contrast to the physical measures reported, the financial
statistics have undergone an audit process in every case.
And despite the format of both statutory water company and
Water Authority accounts being changed by the Companies Act
1985 and the Water Act 1983 respectively 78 these
publications remain easily accessible and reliable sources
of information.
In addition comparable figures for the multifunctional
water authorities and unifunctional statutory water company
operations were available. Water authorities invariably met
their obligation over the period to report key variables on
a function by function basis. Hence data on water supply
operations is distinguished in the annual reports from data
on water resources, sewage treatment and disposal
78 Under the provisions of the Water Act 1983 the format of
Water Authority accounts changed between 1982/3 and 1983/4. Pre
1985 the format of accounts for Statutory Companies was governed
by the Companies Act 1948 S149A schedule 8a.
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operations.
Given this wide trawl for data what factors finally
determined the shape and size of the database used in
econometric work?
For the purpose of modelling it may be argued that a period
of institutional stability alleviates many problems
inherent in time series or cross sectional analysis. For
with data on only thirty-nine individual water suppliers,
some time series element would be necessary to provide
sufficient degrees of freedom. Against this the ongoing
process of institutional reform meant that data at this
level of aggregation was only available for just over a
decade for each supplier. Consequently cross sectional work
would enter the analysis. From the point of view of time
and industry configuration the period 1974-89 stood out
clearly as a period of unmatched institutional stability in
the English and Welsh water industry. Interestingly it was
a time during which public and private companies undertook
many similar functions in different geographical areas.
Also, current cost data became widely available for the
first time at the turn of the decade.
But even over this period records were incomplete or
unavailable. Data series were often reported fitfully by
companies responding to new external pressures and
incentives. The consideration of data availability
eventually lead to the selection of a working database
comprised of observations from twenty companies over the
ten year period 1977-86. In other words, a panel of two
hundred observations. Appendix 1 lists the companies
comprising the sample.
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The choice of time period should not be seen in a purely
negative light. The period 1977-86 was one in which the
reforms and institutional flux induced by the 1973 Water
Act had largely worked through the industry. Equally,
preparations for privatisation leading to the setting up of
water service companies in 1989 were only in their
infancy79. The choice of water supply companies was equally
appropriate. The sample comprised the ten Regional Water
Authorities and ten statutory private water companies.
These exhibited good geographical, geological and
meterological variation.
Summarising, the database used in the empirical analysis
was comprised of a sample of twenty water suppliers for the
period 1977-86. Table 4.2 reports basic descriptive
statistics for each variable.
79 It is notable that information reported by water
suppliers declined in scope and detail following the 1983 Water
Act and in the run up to privatisation. See for example the
Annual Report and Accounts of Northumbrian Water. Statutory water
company data contained in its 1983/4 report no longer forms part
of the 1988/9 report.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics.
VARIABLE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD DEV
AREA 104 22710 6700 7383
POPU 131 7315 2114 2305
MAIN 853 38350 12122 12112
EMPL 100 12061 3065 3509
RAIN 572 1483 888 229
WATE 40 2720 692 775
GDWT 0 100 40 33
SRWT 0 100 60 33
OPCT 927 140121 28795 32013
CAPE -127 66142 12009 14321
TSCT 348 135419 27032 33356
FIXA 3160 464668 91836 101189
CCFA 23147 2857600 622545 679689
PK 9 . 13 14 . 63 11. 54 1 . 61
PE 1. 95 3 . 89 3 . 17 0 . 74
PR 79.4 212 . 6 143 . 5 44 . 9
PL 163 . 0 506 . 7 335 . 7 113 . 4
PP 47 . 5 99 . 3 76 . 2 17 . 5
Before leaving this discussion the question of hedonic
variables should be addressed. Once again scope for
discussion is limited by the availability of data; but
guidance may be sought for their specification in the work
of Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) and their innovative
modelling of the water industry.
In their study of the US water industry Feigenbaum and
Teeples (1983) selected six service characteristics as
hedonic variables. Some of their data was derived from
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subjective estimates by employees in the industry.80 UK
data is again found wanting in comparison, being uneven and
even more limited in scope and depth. However, five service
dimensions are derived from the variables above and
employed in later testing. They are labelled as follows:
zl = % surfacewater abstracted,
z2 = resident population/area of supply,
z3 = resident population/length of mains,
z4 = length of mains/area of supply,
z5 = length of mains/resident population.
zl may be regarded as a proxy for water treatment,
surfacewater being more expensive to treat, hence more
capital intensive in recovery, but cheaper in terms of
variable costs of supply. The other variables are
different attempts to proxy population density. Note that
z3 and z5 are merely the inverse of one another.81
This concludes the discussion of the database. But before
any modelling is attempted one other issue should be
addressed. The issue arises as a consequence of the limited
size of the database and is the question of panel data.
Panel Data.
A database comprising annual observations on a total
population of 39 companies for the period 1974-89 clearly
presents sample size problems for time series or cross
sectional econometric work. When this is further
80 For example Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) use zl to
represent a treatment index derived from subjective cost weights
supplied by a district water engineer and a water facility design
engineer.
81 Note that many may be collinear, therefore careful
functional form specification and interpretation will be
required.
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restricted to 20 companies over a 10 year period as in the
present case, statistical analysis is severely impaired
through the limited degrees of freedom available. The
conventional way to proceed is through the use of a panel
data set recording multiple observations on individual
units over time. The principal advantages of this approach
derive from the enlarged set of data points available to
the researcher, increasing degrees of freedom, reducing
collinearity among explanatory variables and hence
improving the efficiency of econometric estimates. In
addition, a wider group of more complex problems may be
analysed.82
The present comparative efficiency study seeks to model
heterogeneity across the sample of companies, in such a way
that idiosyncratic attributes outwith the control of
individual companies are accounted for. Informally, the aim
is to construct a 'level playing field', enabling fair
comparison. The more completely the exogenous
idiosyncrasies are controlled for, the better the
comparison. Panel data is employed in the estimation of
specific functions to complete this task. The two most
widely used approaches to modelling with panel data will be
discussed briefly: the 'fixed effects' and the 'random
effects' models. A fuller presentation may be found in
several standard econometric texts. 83
82 A comprehensive discussion of the panel data issue is
given in a monograph by Hsiao (1986) .
83 For example Judge et al (1982) and Greene (1990).
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For the purpose of illustration consider a model of the
form
Yit = Qfi + £'2£it + vit [4.1]
with N firms i=l...N and T time periods t=l...T. There are
k regressors in Xit not including the constant term; yic is
the dependent variable and cq represents the effect peculiar
to the individual cross sectional unit i but constant over
time. The error vit is a classical disturbance term with
E [vit] = 0 and var [vit] = av2 . In effect this is a classical
regression model, in which ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of a and jB will be consistent and efficient.
The fixed effects or least squares dummy variable model
(LSDV) works on the assumption that the different cross
sectional units provide natural partitions in the sample
for which different functional representations may exist.
The model is a special case of the Zellner 'seemingly
unrelated regression model' and assumes identical
coefficients on all variables except the intercepts. This
is in effect a classical regression model with differences
across units captured in the constant term. The natural
development is to specify dummy variables corresponding to
each firm in the following way,
y = Da + XJ3 + ¥ [4.2]
Estimation may proceed by OLS giving results which are best
linear and unbiased . Theoretically the estimation
procedure is straightforward and its interpretation clear
with the classical properties and results carrying over
directly. Some numerical problems may be encountered if the
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number of parameters is large, although these may be
overcome by straightforward partitioning. Ordinary least
squares has the advantage of simplicity, and when applied
to the unit cost function in the context of a fixed effects
model has a straightforward economic interpretation. As
the unit cost schedule shifts so the intercept changes ie
differences in unit costs and hence efficiency between
firms may be characterised as parametric shifts of the
regression function. Initial testing must establish whether
there is evidence to suggest that the different companies
had different intercepts or whether the model would be
adequate with all intercepts identical. In the latter case
a straightforward pooling of data to give NT observations
would be appropriate. An F test is used in this case.
Estimation proceeds with n dummies and no constant or n-1
dummies and a constant.
The random effects or error components model employs the
notion that individual specific constant terms are more
appropriately viewed as randomly distributed across cross
sectional units. This is relevant if it is believed that
the sampled cross sectional units are drawn from a large
population. The random effects model is a generalised
regression model with generalised least squares yielding
best linear unbiased estimates. The general model specified
above may be reformulated,
Yit = Qf + Mit + Ui + vit [4.3]
with k regressors in addition to the constant term. uA is
the random disturbance component characterising the ith
observation and is constant over time. Generalised least
squares may be conducted in two stages, firstly estimating
the variance components by using the OLS residuals, and
then computing feasible GLS estimates using the estimated
variances.
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In empirical studies a choice may be made as to which model
to pursue. In this the relative sizes of the cross section
(N) and time series (T) may be considered; for as T tends
to infinity for fixed N, the dummy variable estimator and
the error components estimator become identical. When N is
large and T small the two estimators can differ
significantly with the fixed effects estimator being
consistent but not asymptotically efficient. No absolute
choice rules may be applied here but several criteria
suggest the appropriate model. Judge et al (1982) frame the
discussion in terms of conditional and unconditional
inference. They argue that if individuals can be regarded
as a random sample from some larger population that we are
concerned to make inference about then the unconditional
inference implicit in the random effects model is
appropriate. Conversely, if the sample may not be
considered as randomly drawn from some larger population
then conditional inference carried in the fixed effects
model appears appropriate. Mundlak (1978) goes further
to suggest that this distinction between fixed and random
effects is an incorrect and arbitrary one and the
conditional inferential approach should always be
employed.84
For the present study, the conditional or fixed effects
approach would appear appropriate, for it would be hard to
maintain that the sample was a random drawing from a large
population. This is an institutional point. The fixed
effects model also leads naturally to the derivation of
efficiency rankings. Meanwhile the random effects model
labours under the assumption that the individual effects
are uncorrelated with the other regressors. Inconsistency
due to omitted variables may result. Thus, once again, the
fixed effects model is favoured.
84 See Hsiao (1986) for a fuller discussion.
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Hausman (1978) presented a statistical test which
contributes to the analysis. The chi-squared statistic can
be employed to test whether the GLS estimator of the random
effects model is an appropriate alternative to the least
squares dummy variable estimator of the fixed effects
model. The test is essentially one of othogonality between
the random effects and the regressors. Under the
hypothesis of no correlation both OLS in the fixed effects
model and GLS are consistent but OLS is inefficient. Under
the alternative OLS is consistent but GLS is not. Hence
under the null the two estimates should not differ
systematically and a test can be devised based on the
difference. It should be noted that the test may be
inconclusive; in which case one may tentatively favour the
fixed effects model in terms of ease of economic
interpretation, and the avoidance of bias induced by
omitted variables.
Given this information, the weight of evidence would appear
to favour, a priori, the use of fixed effects models in the
estimation of cost functions for this industry.
With a time series element present the possibility of
autocorrelated error structures may arise. Structural
equations for fixed effects model may be written as
follows,
Yit = + HX'it +vit [4.4]
vit = P -VL.t-i + Vit [4-5]
Adjustment for first order autocorrelation may be made with
the estimation proceeding in two stages. Firstly the model
is estimated ignoring possible autocorrelation, this gives
a consistent estimate of the parameter p. This is then
employed in the second GLS step. This Cochrane Orcutt
transformation of data implies
Zit = Zit + P Zi,t-1
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[4.6]
consequently the first observation in each group is lost.
For the fixed effects model the transformation is
Yit " PYi.t-i = P' (xit - px+ oq(l-p) + T]it [4.7]
Frontier Estimation with Panel Data.
The use of panel data also has implications for the
techniques and assumptions underlying the econometric
estimation of frontier functions. Whilst several
improvements can be made to the estimation methods for
stochastic frontiers outlined in Chapter 3 (and employed
later in Chapter 5) there remain some shortcomings.
The improvements, when panel data is employed, include the
ability to drop the assumption of normality and the
avoidance of the problem of non-convergence when
calculating inefficiency for individual observations using
the techniques of Jondrow et al (1982) . The chief drawback
is that with fixed effects models the analyst must revert
back to what is essentially a deterministic rather than a
stochastic frontier model. Consider once again a simple
stochastic cost frontier model similar to that discussed in
Chapter 3. The only difference now lies in the addition of
both firm (i) and time (t) subscripts. As before, v
represents the two sided random error and u the term
capturing the effects of inefficiency.
lnCit = a + InC (yit, wit) + uit + vit [4.8]
If uit and vit are independent over time as well as across
individuals then the panel nature of the data set is in
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effect irrelevant. Frontier estimation may proceed as
before. But new possibilities open up when the panel
dataset is acknowledged and turned to good advantage. These
new insights may be gained if one is willing to make a
further assumption about the nature of inefficiency. So,
assuming uit is constant over time85, the model may be
rewritten,
lnCit = a + InC (yit, wit) + uL + vit [4.9]
Under this assumption the u± terms may be treated as firm-
specific constants and the model estimated by ordinary
least squares as a 'fixed effects' model.86 To extract
estimates of the individual effects the set of firm-
specific constants (cq) are derived using the least squares
dummy variable estimator. These are then used in the
following way to extract the estimated firm-specific effect
(uj .
ui = &i - mini (&i) [4.10]
This results in one firm reaching the frontier or benchmark
value of zero and the remaining firms being ascribed
positive inefficiency estimates.87 For this model, no
assumption of normality is needed and the estimates of u±
are consistent. Estimation is also consistent in T±. Great
care should be taken, however, over the specification of
functions and the interpretation of results. Outliers may,
as with all deterministic frontiers, exert a
85 This assumption is made by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) in
their discussion of frontier functions and panel data. It will
be followed throughout the rest of the chapter.
86 The point is discussed by Greene (1993) .
87 Greene (1993) notes the proof of the proposition that
shifting the estimated regression up or down so that exactly one
residual is zero produces a consistent estimate of the constant.
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disproportionate influence on the final results. In
addition, the ever-present danger is that variation in firm
attributes is picked up in the term designed to capture
inefficiency. The implication is that hedonic models are
more reliable in taking this effect into account.
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) published early work on this
question. They noted that the consistency of the estimates
improved asymptotically with N and T and that this
consistency did not hinge on the uncorrelatedness of the
regressors and the individual effects. Adapting the
argument of Greene (1980) for the single cross sectional
case, they said that provided the density of Uj. is nonzero
in some neighbourhood (0,e) for some e>0, the efficiency of
the most efficient firm in the sample will indeed approach
100% as N->oo. Asymptotically it was possible to separate
the overall intercept from the one-sided individual
effects, which allowed the measurement of efficiency
relative to an absolute standard.
When demonstrating the workings of the system they assumed
Cobb Douglas technology but made the telling point that the
small number of firms in their sample (N = 12) meant that
the normalisation of the most efficient firm as 100%
technically efficient was questionable. However, whilst
they rejected these figures as absolute measures of
inefficiency they had more faith in the relative efficiency
rankings.
With a panel of only 20 companies over 10 years all the
Schmidt and Sickles caveats apply. But whilst there is no
consistent way of separating the overall intercept from the
one sided effects it is possible to derive consistent
estimates of the intercept for each firm. Thus, in line
with their work it is possible to compare efficiencies
across firms, ie derive an ordinal ranking, but not to
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assess efficiency relative to an absolute standard88.
Clearly the use of panel data raises many technical
problems in the estimation. However, without these
techniques results of time series and cross sectional
models would be highly suspect given the rather limited
dataset.
Modelling Results and Diagnostics.
Having discussed, briefly, many of the technical issues at
stake in devising a system of comparative efficiency
measurement - based on the econometric estimation of a
series of cost functions - we are now in a position to
report the results of the model building undertaken.
Models Employing the Translog Cost Function.
To recapitulate, the panel dataset used for modelling
consisted of 200 observations on twenty English and Welsh
water supply companies over the ten year period 1977/3-
1986/7. Cost functions, taking the flexible translog
functional form were employed within the two most common
frameworks for pooling time series and cross sectional data
- fixed and random effects.
A general to specific testing strategy was adopted
beginning with the translog unit cost function subject to
the standard regularity conditions. Models with
restrictions implying homogeneity, homotheticity and
unitary elasticity of substitution were nested in the
general model and F tests used to asses the validity of
88 Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) relax the strong
assumption of time invariant inefficiency by including time terms
in the regression. This technique is too demanding in terms of
degrees of freedom to be employed with the panel of 200
observations. The superiority of this technique remains
unproven.
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restrictions in testing down towards more parsimonious
functional forms. Unit cost was defined in the three ways
discussed above, namely: operating cost purged of the cost
of capital divided by output (OPC/Y), operating cost with
a historic cost of capital element divided by output
(CHC/Y) and operating cost with a current cost of capital
again divided by output (C/Y). Hence the three dependent
variables, average cost per unit output normalised on the
price of labour. Successive specifications used four, three
and two input prices together with the various hedonic
variables, singly and in combination.89 Diagnostic testing
completed the work.
The potential problem of endogeneity exists in all work of
this sort, causing bias and inconsistency in OLS estimates.
For the supply of water in England and Wales the problem is
present but it may be argued that the problem is probably
not chronic. Companies are price takers in the labour and
capital markets and must endeavour to supply all water
demanded at a price. Furthermore, in a ten year panel the
marginal additions to capital stock made by companies will
be overshadowed by the vast stock of inherited fixed
assets. In other words the assumption is that the stock of
capital is exogenous.
Six preferred models corresponding to the hedonic and non-
hedonic versions of equations with the three dependent
variables are reported in Table 4.3 below. These were
arrived at through the process of general to specific
testing which began with the most general translog models.
Estimation results from the most general models were,
without exception, very poor. The models exhibited
symptoms of degeneracy with almost identical dummy variable
coefficient estimates and corresponding standard errors.
89 Avoiding possible collinear combinations.
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Coefficients were frequently incorrectly signed and
parameter estimates were unstable. The results were
unsurprising, given the amount of cross sectional variation
in the data and the fact that translog functions were very
demanding in terms of degrees of freedom.
Having rejected these as unsatisfactory the process of
testing down began. This had its own difficulties. Tests
were generally ill defined, inconclusive or contradictory
in some cases. The process was compromised to such an
extent that, in order to cut the Gordian knot, a strategy
was adopted that proceeded on the basis of deriving a well
defined model with parameter estimates broadly consistent
with economic theory.
The results for six preferred models are given in Table 4.3
below. A non hedonic and hedonic version of models with
each of the three dependent variables. Models numbered with
the suffix 'h' represent hedonic specifications. Variables
D1 - D2 0 represent firm dummies and p represents the
autocorrelation coefficient. Appendix 1 identifies the
firms corresponding to each of the dummies.
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Table 4.3 One Way Fixed Effects Models Adjusted for First
Order Autocorrelation.
Models 1.1 and 1.lh Dependent Variable = Ln(OPC/Y)-LnPl
Models 1.2 and 1.2h Dependent Variable = Ln(CHC/Y)-LnPl
Models 1.3 and 1.3h Dependent Variable = Ln(C/Y) -LnPl
MODEL

















































0 . 5541 +
(0.1376)
D1 0.3581 2.1551+ 7.3231+ 4.0509+ 8.5509+ 5.3175+
(0.3147) (0.4701) (0.4675) (0.6428) (0.5524) (0.7718)
D2 0.2871 2.1579+ 6.3220+ 3.4162+ 7.7629+ 4.8709+
(0.2909) (0.4308) (0.4272) (0.5782) (0.5041) (0.6943)
D3 -0.2019 1.9294+ 7.2151+ 3.8824+ 8.5743+ 5.3646+
(0.3312) (0.4809) (0.5185) (0.6464) (0.6134) (0.7766)
D4 0.1209 2.1407+ 7.2320+ 3.9773+ 8.6569+ 5.5218+
(0.3206) (0.4728) (0.4969) (0.6276) (0.5877) (0.7540)
D5 0.3054 2.1772+ 6.8786+ 3.9649+ 7.9696+ 5.1434+
(0.2916) (0.4263) (0.4273) (0.5606) (0.5042) (0.6734)
D6 0.4257 2.0924+ 6.9247+ 3.8669+ 8.5307+ 5.4383+
(0.2819) (0.4360) (0.4027) (0.6067) (0.4746) (0.7282)
D7 0.0998 2.3212+ 6.4565+ 3.3928+ 7.8914+ 4.9925+
(0.3325) (0.4746) (0.5200) (0.6031) (0.6152) (0.7248)
D8 0.5413 § 2.3405+ 7.1633+ 3.9426+ 8.6045+ 5.4113 +
(0.3013) (0.4655) (0.4542) (0.6301) (0.5365) (0.7565)
D9 0.5316 § 2.1341+ 6.8363+ 3.8442+ 8.3775+ 5.3989 +
(0.2779) (0.4257) (0.3899) (0.5770) (0.4593) (0.6928)
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D10 0.3313 2.3049$ 7.3368$ 4.1503$ 8.5829$ 5.4913$
(0.3115) (0.4613) (0.4782) (0.6181) (0.5651) (0.7424)
Dll 0.7406$ 2.6199$ 6.1568$ 3.9498$ 7.6659$ 5.5539$
(0.2697) (0.3669) (0.3487) (0.4356) (0.4098) (0.5232)
D12 1.1372$ 2.4664$ 6.0639$ 3.6227$ 7.7839$ 5.3451$
(0.2619) (0.3582) (0.2785) (0.4662) (0.3254) (0.5596)
D13 0.7560$ 2.7085$ 6.6687$ 4.1875$ 8.3613$ 5.9706$
(0.2827) (0.4015) (0.4012) (0.4989) (0.4725) (0.5992)
D14 1.1557$ 2.6712$ 6.6772$ 4.0682$ 8.1069$ 5.5135$
(0.2671) (0.3852) (0.3324) (0.5045) (0.3901) (0.6057)
D15 0.6461$ 2.5236$ 6.1532$ 3.6619$ 8.6533$ 6.2420$
(0.2781) (0.3945) (0.3896) (0.4941) (0.4587) (0.5935)
D16 0.9873$ 2.8402$ 6.8113$ 4.5842$ 7.9944$ 5.8051$
(0.2663) (0.3594) (0.3322) (0.4520) (0.3898) (0.5426)
D17 1.3142$ 2.8919$ 6.3625$ 4.2113$ 8.1966$ 6.2239$
(0.2645) (0.3454) (0.2819) (0.3849) (0.3293) (0.4627)
D18 0.5212$ 2.0402$ 5.1319$ 2.8104$ 7.1193$ 4.6696$
(0.2640) (0.3712) (0.3012) (0.4936) (0.3525) (0.5921)
D19 1.4086$ 2.8040$ 5.7524$ 3.5966$ 8.7143$ 6.4444$
(0.2627) (0.3527) (0.2621) (0.4628) (0.3056) (0.5549)
D20 0.7648$ 2.3062$ 6.1515$ 4.2868$ 7.5366$ 5.6399$
(0.2616) (0.3391) (0.2668) (0.3994) (0.3112) (0.4791)
Adj R2 0.716 0.794 0.897 0.918 0.872 0.892
F 22.525 31.084 74.894 87.997 58.939 65.011
p 0.021 0.006 -0.125 0.015 -0.035 -0.004
Returns to
Scale 0.848 0.941 1.377 0.997 1.209 0.927
§ denotes statistical significance at the 90% level
$ denotes statistical significance at the 95% level
$ denotes statistical significance at the 99% level90
The preferred specifications are all one-way fixed effects
models (ie those with firm dummies alone). Two way models
with firm and time dummies were initially specified and
likelihood ratio tests conducted to assess whether these
90 Note that this labelling convention will be adopted in
all following tables. Critical values for 90%, 95% and 99%
significance are 1.645, 1.960 and 2.576 respectively.
121
were more or less appropriate than one-way specifications.
However, these tests were inconclusive. Other factors
influenced the selection of one-way models.
Firstly, it was recognised that two way models were very
demanding in terms of degrees of freedom. This was an
important consideration with a panel of only 200
observations. Data quality was recognised to be fairly
uneven and the view was taken that there was a danger in
using highly sophisticated technical tools on rather
inadequate raw material. In this context the likelihood
ratio tests give some guidance on the matter but they are
persuasive rather than decisive. Consequently, the
inclusion of both firm and time dummies was ruled out.
This had the additional advantage of avoiding the potential
problem of multicollinearity between time dummies and price
terms. The point will be taken up later.
Secondly, in the context of yardstick competition, the
primary analytical concern must be to model cross sectional
variation rather than timewise evolution. In one sense the
sacrifice is great, for it requires the strong assumption
that influences that would have been captured in time
dummies affect all firms in a similar way. Nevertheless,
the key issue of comparative efficiency measurement for
yardstick competition must drive the analysis, so it is
most important to model cross sectional variation. Thirdly,
it is arguable that one way models are more understandable
to potential user groups, such as the regulator's office,
than their two-way counterpart. Transparency is a
subsidiary argument; but one that has a bearing on the
adoption and implementation of any system by practitioners.
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The arguments in favour of fixed rather than random effects
models are more clear cut. From a theoretical point of view
it is clear that a sample of 20 out of a total population
of 39 cross sectional units (firms) cannot be regarded as
a random sample from some larger population. This suggests
that a fixed effects model, with its shift parameters,
implying inference conditional on the cross sectional units
in the sample, is more appropriate. Statistical
confirmation of this was sought in the Hausman test for the
orthogonality of random effects and the regressors. The
statistic is distributed as x2/ with rejection of the null
hypothesis suggesting that the error components model is
inappropriate. At the 95% level only models 1.2 and 1.3h
fail (marginally) to reject the null. Consequently given
the strong institutional argument for fixed effects and the
need for comparability and transparency, fixed effects are
reported in every case.91
All six models reported in Table 4.3 are reported following
a Cochrane Orcutt adjustment for first order
autocorrelation. In unadjusted models autocorrelation
coefficients, p92, strongly indicated the presence of
positive autocorrelation which in turn implied inefficiency
of parameter estimates invalidating R2 , t and F values.93
The remedial action taken was conducted in two stages.
First, estimation by OLS to give a consistent estimate of
p; then generalised least squares (GLS) with a Cochrane
Orcutt transformation of the model. This resulted in the
91 The fixed effects model also does not require the strong
assumption of random effects models that individual effects are
uncorrelated with the regressors.
92 Values of p for the six unadjusted models were 0.462,
0.453, 0.484, 0.459, 0.457 and 0.462 respectively.
93 See Greene (1990) Chapter 15 for a full treatment of the
serial correlation, its diagnosis and suggested remedial action.
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loss of one observation in each group.94 Consequently,
coefficient estimates reported refer to transformed data
with the fixed effects dummy variable coefficients being
ctid-p) . Obviously the loss of the first observation in each
set through the Cochrane Orcutt procedure is a drawback in
a model using a dataset comprised of just 200 observations.
Nevertheless t, F and R2 statistics are more reliable and
for this reason the transformed model is retained.
All six models display adjusted R2 values upwards of 70%,
whilst F values lead to the decisive rejection of the
pooling hypothesis. More importantly the autocorrelation
coefficient (p) approaches zero in each case suggesting the
problem of first order autocorrelation has been dealt with
adequately. All models are Cobb Douglas in specification:
1.1, 1.2, 1.3 representing nonhedonic forms and l.lh, 1.2h,
1.3h the hedonic counterparts. The assumptions implicit in
the Cobb Douglas specification may be reiterated to
highlight their unrealistic nature. Thus results imply
homogeneity of degree one in factor prices with constant
elasticity of substitution between inputs and returns to
scale which are the same for all levels of output. The last
restriction rules out the possibility of increasing returns
at low levels of output and decreasing returns at higher
levels.
Throughout, the price of labour was chosen for all
normalisations as, of all the price terms, it exhibited
most cross sectional variation. With Pp (the retail price
index) included in the specification, coefficients on other
price variables became less well defined and behaved
unpredictably. Multicollinearity is one possible reason for
this. When prices of capital and electricity were specified
in the same equation the effect was magnified. One
94 See Greene (1990) p433.
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explanation that may be offered in the context of a
regulated industry is that companies have the ability to
increase prices broadly at the rate of inflation, in
contrast to costs which do not necessarily track the RPI.
Only when the RPI was removed did the source of chronic
multicollinearity disappear and the specification improve.
The constant term was omitted from every equation to allow
the inclusion of twenty firm dummies and to avoid perfect
multicollinearity.
As discussed above, the three dependent variables dealt
with capital cost in radically different ways. The capital
intensity of the industry ensures that for models including
any measure of the cost of capital, this element threatens
to swamp total cost. The effect is less pronounced in the
case of historic rather than current cost but the
consequences are clear in terms of model performance. Thus
models 1.1 and 1.lh have ln(Pe/Pl) as their significant
price term. This is supplanted by ln(Pk/Pl) for the
remaining models. All price terms were correctly signed95
and significant at the 99% level, but in no case were more
than two prices present in the preferred model.
The output term entered each preferred specification being
positively signed in model 1.1 and negatively signed in 1. 2
and 1.3. In all cases the coefficient was significant at
the 99% level. It entered singly rather than in
multiplicative combination with itself or other terms. On
addition of hedonic variables to models 1.2 and 1.3 its
sign changed, thus all hedonic models had the output term
entering positively but insignificantly. It may be
concluded that some of the 'output effect' was picked up by
the term InZl although potential multicollinearity did not
appear so serious a problem to invalidate the results.
95 An essential result for a theoretically consistent model.
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The addition of hedonic variables did nothing to change the
preferred specification; l.lh, 1.2h and 1.3h remained two
price Cobb Douglas models. InZl took a negative sign
suggesting surfacewater sourcing had some depressing effect
on unit cost although this may in part reflect the
realisation of economies of scale in the larger operations.
lnZ2, an imperfect proxy for density, appeared only in the
operating cost specification carrying a significant
negative coefficient. This adds weight to the assertion
that more densely populated areas have a lower unit cost of
service. Addition of this variable controlled for
differences in observable costs between water companies
serving a broad rural/urban mix (usually the water
authorities), and those located in areas of high population
density (usually statutory companies).
The variable lnZ5 may be viewed as an imperfect proxy for
capital assets, in its measurement of length of mains. A
priori the expectation was that it would perform well in
models 1.2 and 1.3. This proved to be the case, and it had
no comparable discernable effect on model 1.1, which was
set up explicitly to exclude capital cost. As a ratio it
also proxied density and took a positive sign indicating
that the higher the capital stock per head of population
the higher was unit cost. The results are again consistent
with a priori expectations which suggest that scattered
rural communities may be more costly to supply because of
their need for comparatively large investment in mains
laying.
Returns to scale for each model were calculated. All models
except 1.2 and 1.3 had near constant or decreasing returns
to scale. In this it may be argued that economies of scale
in the English and Welsh water supply industry have been
largely exhausted at the current size and scale of
activities. Although clearly increasing returns are
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expected up to a point in the storage, treatment and
distribution of water.
Efficiency: The Translog Approach.
We may move on now to consider the end for which these
models were built. The end of comparative efficiency
measurement for yardstick competition. As was noted
earlier, this requires an ordinal rather than a cardinal
ranking of firms; from the most efficient to the least.
Employing this information a regulator would be in a
position to encourage all firms to perform as well as the
leading one.
For this purpose a first approximation of firm efficiency
may be derived from the intercept or firm dummy terms of
the fixed effects model. Each dummy may be seen as
capturing the idiosyncratic aspects of that firm's
operations, including some efficiency element. The
efficiency element is, however, inseparable from other
influences picked up by the dummies. Hence the hedonic
specification is employed to assist in the teasing out of
some of these other effects. Intuitively, the greater the
number of characteristics outwith the control of the firm96
that may be removed from the dummy terms by their explicit
specification in the estimating form, the more accurately
the dummies reflect idiosyncratic efficiency decisions by
the firm. The technique is necessarily crude, but not to be
rejected simply on those grounds; and as a first
approximation remains suggestive of efficiency rankings.
At this point the cost 'frontier' may be considered. As
discussed earlier, the use of panel data with fixed effects
models allows a frontier - deterministic in appearance - to
96 ie Exogenous variables such as rainfall, population
density etc.
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be derived. Equation [4.9] illustrates the set-up. The
firm dummies D1 - D20 correspond to variables ui; the firm
specific effects. By suitable manipulation, shown in
equation [4.10], one firm may be deemed to lie on the
frontier whilst the remaining firms take positive values of
Ui lying above the efficient cost boundary. The absolute
values of these adjusted residuals do give some indication
of inefficiency in a cardinal sense; however, following
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) more faith might be put in them
as an ordinal ranking, given the limited number of
observations.
Conveniently, no additional procedures, beyond simple
arithmetic, need be gone through to derive frontier
results. For panel data in fixed effects models OLS
results carry over from the non-frontier to the frontier
functions. Consequently residuals are identical and the
comparative efficiency results will be the same for both.
Inconveniently, the use of panel data in fixed effects
models effectively means the abandonment of many of the
well investigated properties of cross sectional stochastic
frontier models. For the moment we work within these
restrictions.
For completeness the adjusted frontier residuals are





1.1 1. lh 1.2 1. 2h 1. 3 1. 3h
ui = <Xi - mini (^i)
1 0.5600 0 .2257 2.1912 1 .2405 1.4316 0.6479
2 0.4890 0.2285 1.1901 0 .6058 0 . 6436 0.2013
3 0 . 0000 0 . 0000 2.0832 1 . 0720 1.4550 0 .6950
4 0 . 3228 0 .2113 2.1001 1 .1669 1. 5376 0 . 8522
5 0.5073 0 . 2478 1.7467 1. 1545 0 . 8503 0 .4738
6 0.6276 0 . 1630 1.7928 1.0565 1 .4114 0.7687
7 0.3017 0.3918 1.3246 0.5824 0 . 7721 0.3229
8 0.7432 0 .4111 2.0314 1.1322 1 .4852 0.7417
9 0.7335 0 .2047 1.7044 1. 0338 1 . 2582 0 . 7293
10 0.5332 0 .3755 2.2049 1.3399 1 .4636 0.8217
11 0.9425 0 . 6905 1.0249 1.1394 0 . 5466 0 . 8843
12 1.3391 0 . 5370 0.9320 0.8123 0 . 6646 0.6755
13 0.9579 0 . 7791 1 . 5368 1.3771 1.2420 1.3010
14 1.3576 0 . 7418 1.5453 1.2578 0.9876 0 . 8439
15 0.8480 0 . 5942 1.0213 0 . 8515 1.5340 1.5724
16 1.1892 0 . 9108 1.6794 1. 7738 0.8751 1.1355
17 1.5161 0.9625 1.2306 1.4009 1.0773 1.5543
18 0.7231 0.1108 0 .0000 0 . 0000 0 . 0000 0 . 0000
19 1.6105 0 . 8746 0 . 6205 0 .7862 1.5950 1. 7748
20 0.9667 0 .3768 1.0196 1 .4764 0.4173 0 . 9703
For all twenty firms an adjusted residual derived from the
estimated firm dummy (intercept) term is reported. For
models 1.1 and l.lh, firm 3 is the benchmark firm. For the
other four models firm 18 is the benchmark. The higher the
intercept value the higher the unit cost is assumed to be
for each firm. The figures may be interpreted as measures
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of inefficiency relative to the 100% efficient firm. Thus
for model 1.1 firm 1 is 56.00% less efficient than firm 3.
Clearly the results are widely spread and rather
implausible in many cases. This was predicted earlier. The
problem may have been exaggerated as we are dealing with
what is essentially a deterministic frontier model. Results
of these are very susceptible to outliers and there is some
evidence to suggest that firms 3 and 18 may be just that.
Some sort of correction to omit these readings would
undoubtedly improve the results. However the purpose of the
study is not to assess by what amount any one firm's
efficiency exceeds another's, but to rank the firms
according to efficiency.
By ordering these intercept terms from the lowest to the
highest, each firm is given a rank for each model. Table
4.3R below reports these rankings. Rankings are one to
twenty within each model; one represents the lowest unit





1. 1 1. lh to 1. 2h 1 . 3 1. 3h
RANK
1 7 6 19 14 14 5
2 4 7 7 3 4 2
3 1 1 17 9 15 7
4 3 5 18 13 19 13
5 5 8 14 12 7 4
6 8 3 15 8 13 10
7 2 11 9 2 6 3
8 11 12 16 10 17 9
9 10 4 13 7 12 8
10 6 9 20 16 16 11
11 13 15 6 11 3 14
12 17 13 3 5 5 6
13 14 17 10 17 11 17
14 18 16 11 15 9 12
15 12 14 5 6 18 19
16 16 19 12 20 8 16
17 19 20 8 18 10 18
18 9 2 1 1 1 1
19 20 18 2 4 20 20
20 15 10 4 19 2 15
Lowest cost rank = 1
Highest cost rank =20
Before proceeding the point must be made, once again, that
these are not pure 'efficiency rankings'. These rankings
represent the various idiosyncrasies of the firms, 'firm
effects' picked up by the firm dummies in the econometric
model. Clearly, the terms will pick up efficiency effects;
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but in a limited way. With that caveat we may proceed to an
interpretation of the results.
On first inspection the results appear almost random. On
closer examination a pattern emerges. The ranking obtained
from model 1.1 appears similar to that of l.lh. Also 1.2
mirrors 1.3 and 1.2h reflects 1.3h. To formalise these
results Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation (r) may
be calculated for pairs of rankings.97 r lies between +1
and -1. +1 indicating perfect positive correlation, -1
indicating perfect negative correlation and 0 indicating
zero correlation. Spearman coefficients for various pairs
of models are reported below.
Table 4.3S Spearman's Coefficient of Rank Correlation.
Models r
1.1 and 1.lh 0.7744
1.2 and 1.2h 0.3925
1.3 and 1.3h 0 .4120
1.1 and 1.2 -0.5398
1.1 and 1.3 -0.0782
l.lh and 1.2h 0.3835
l.lh and 1.3h 0.6857
1. 2 and 1.3 0.5083
1.2h and 1.3h 0.5053
The first three values indicate, unsurprisingly, that there
is a degree of positive correlation between the nonhedonic
97
Spearman, C. (1904) 'The Proof and Measurement of
Association Between Two Things'. American Journal of Psychology,
vol 15, pp 72-101. r is a non parametric statistic given by:
r=l- 6Sd2
n(n2-1)
where d = difference of rank and n = number of observations.
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and hedonic versions employing the same definition of the
cost of capital. Within the hedonic and nonhedonic testing
frameworks models employing some cost of capital exhibit a
positive degree of correlation ie 1.2 / 1.3 and 1.2h /
1.3h. A significant difference arises in correlation
between 1.1 and 1.3 as compared with 1. lh and 1.3h. The
first two have almost no correlation according to
Spearman's r, yet 1.lh and 1.3h are very highly positively
correlated. The conclusion may be drawn that the hedonic
specification gives a greater degree of consistency in
terms of ranking across definitions of cost and is
therefore to be preferred.
The point may be made in another way. The maximum
difference in ranking for any one firm between non-hedonic
models 1.1 and 1.3 is 16 for firm 4. This may be compared
with a maximum difference of 8 between hedonic models 1.lh
and 1.3h. The total differences in positions between models
1.1 and 1.3 amount to 144, whilst those between 1.lh and
1.3h are 78. Again in terms of ranking differences or
'dispersion' hedonic models appear more concentrated than
those of the nonhedonic counterparts. It may tentatively be
concluded that rankings derived from the hedonic approach
exhibit a greater consistency and therefore are of greater
utility in assessing relative performance.
From a capital valuation point of view the historic cost
specifications 1.2 and 1.2h are most open to the criticism
of arbitrariness. Other models are perhaps better
representations of the company's financial orientation,
consequently less weight may be given to the rankings
implied by the historic cost models. Nevertheless these
results do not appear to be completely out of line with
those having the current cost specification of the
dependent variable.
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Again the point must be made that these are rough
approximations. Careful interpretation is everything. Over
this time period firms displayed some variety in accounting
treatments of various items. The rankings almost certainly
include an 'accounting effect' and the individual
circumstances and policies of the companies must inform the
analysis. An example of this is firm 18 which appears to be
an outlier in terms of modelling when a cost of capital is
included in the specification of a dependent variable. Re¬
examining the raw data there is no obvious reason for this
result. The accounting practices of firm 18 are clearly in
line with other statutory companies. No error is apparent
in scaling the data. One may with some justification draw
the conclusion that firm 18's results reflect positively on
firm efficiency. But the observation is clearly an outlier.
But despite this battery of caveats, the danger remains
that a false impression of precision may be carried away by
the user of this information. To counter this and to soften
some of the finer distinctions a cruder 'banding' of firms
is suggested. Consider the three hedonic specifications
l.lh, 1.2h and 1.3h. Firms which appear in positions 1-10
ie the lowest cost consistently may be assigned to Band 1
(low cost). Those appearing in positions 11-20 may be
assigned to Band 3, and the remainder to Band 2. The
picture is then as follows.
Table 4.3B. Efficiency Banding for Models l.lh, 1.2h and
1. 3h.
Band 1 Firms (low cost): 2, 3, 6, 9, 18.
Band 2 Firms (intermediate) : 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19,
20 .
Band 3 Firms (high cost): 11, 13, 14, 16, 17.
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Only one comment will be made concerning the banding
results. It is that, apart from the outlier - firm 18 - all
other firms identified as 'low cost' in band 1 are RWA's.
Furthermore no RWA's appear in the highest cost band.
Whilst all the usual caveats apply, and whilst it may be
argued that the pattern picks up an institutional,
accounting or ownership effect the finding remains. The
result appears to support the work of Lynk (1993) in
finding that the RWA's operated at lower levels of
inefficiency than privately owned companies.
Overall then, this approach may serve to further attenuate
the effects of differences between the accounting regimes
at the cost of less precise rankings. Nevertheless the
methodology is indicative of an approach that may be
pursued in the practical implementation of yardstick
competition. Specific relative efficiency conclusions would
however require further investigation of the asset
structure and accounting policies of the company.
A Rudimentary Modelling Approach.
The results for the theoretically consistent model are
disappointing in the sense that the preferred Cobb Douglas
functional form implies rather strong assumptions about
producer behaviour. And although hedonic variables augment
explanatory power the preferred specification is
essentially unchanged. One conclusion that may be drawn is
that the quality of the data is insufficient to support the
heavy weight of econometric technique being laid on it.
In an attempt to address this problem the second part of
the analysis presents an approach which may only be
described as 'rudimentary'. In this the strict constraints
of duality theory were set aside in the specification of a
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cost function. Three definitions of average cost (as
outlined above) were used as dependent variables without
being normalised on the price of labour: OPC/Y operating
cost per unit of output per day, CHC/Y operating cost and
historic cost of capital per unit of output per day and C/Y
operating cost and current cost of capital per unit of
output per day. The same panel data was employed in the
specification and estimation of one way and two way fixed
and random effects models. But this time explanatory
variables were allowed to enter and leave the regression in
additive and multiplicative combination according to
whether or not they had a significant influence on the
overall fit of the equation.
Table 4.4 records the new results.
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Table 4.4 One Way Fixed Effects Adjusted for First Order
Autocorrelation
Model 2.1 Dependent Variable = OPC/Y
Model 2.2 Dependent Variable = CHC/Y
Model 2.3 Dependent Variable = C/Y


























































































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.883 0.749 0.659
F 54.785 22.325 15.412
p 0.008 0.003 -0.133
As before all three specifications are one way fixed
effects models. Two way models were rejected decisively in
this case on the basis of the chronic multicollinearity
that was induced when both time and firm dummies were
employed. The previous arguments concerning transparency
and the focus on cross sectional variation rather than time
series evolution do still hold.
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For the reasons given for previous models fixed effects
were again preferred. This time the Hausman test statistic
confirmed the choice more clearly. Table 4.4 presents
models adjusted once more for the effects of first order
autocorrelation. The autocorrelation coefficient, p, for
unadjusted models suggested that a Cochrane Orcutt
adjustment should be made98 so degrees of freedom were
traded for improved diagnostic statistics.
Many parallels may be drawn between the above and Table
4.3. Diagnostic statistics are satisfactory, in particular
the problem of first order autocorrelation appears to have
been mitigated. The output term (Y) in entering
significantly in model 2.1 notably takes the opposite sign
to that in models 1.1 and l.lh. However price terms
included are in line with a priori expectations, correctly
signed and significant. Multicollinearity again becomes a
problem with two or more price terms. Of the hedonic
variables employed before, Z2 enters 2.1 correctly signed,
and Z5 enters 2.3 as it did 1.2h and 1.3h.
Of the other variables, length of mains raises average cost
whilst area has a depressing effect presumably due to the
reduced infrastructure maintenance involved in sparsely
populated, sparsely served areas. The curious coefficient
estimate is that attached to total number of employees. For
model 1.1 the term enters as expected, but this is reversed
in 1.2 and 1.3. This counterintuitive result may be partly
explained by noting that the inclusion of capital cost in
average cost, effectively swamps the total wage bill. It
may be argued that some substitution effect is being picked
up here. Consequently the addition of labour units may
reduce capital input, and as this comprises the
overwhelming part of average cost the coefficient takes the




Efficiency: The Rudimentary Approach.
All the techniques and caveats discussed for the
theoretically sound models carry over to this more
rudimentary approach. Table 4.4F represents the adjusted
intercepts terms for fixed effects panel data frontier
estimation. For model 2.1 firm 4 lies on the frontier; for
models 2.2 and 2.3 it is again firm 18 that apparently has





2 .1 2 . 2 2 . 3
Ui = or - mi^ (Qfi)
1 4 . 7422 1592.8090 12735 . 6891
2 14 . 3487 638 . 1729 3760 . 5386
3 7.4635 75.5707 5343 . 5287
4 0.0000 1068.6353 16563 . 5419
5 8.1228 1428 .4155 10524 . 8516
6 8.0991 1435.3981 28113.0860
7 16.7451 1896.1067 5392.1454
8 17 . 5122 2355.8524 13393 . 4449
9 12.5722 1694.5502 11760 . 4849
10 15.0525 1014.1409 13096 .8725
11 27.6840 558.7591 11931.739
12 27.1378 1071.7760 9600 .4798
13 31 . 4371 965.3369 17739 . 2050
14 36.4111 1686.9854 12077.4155
15 25 . 9864 87.6342 22961 .1940
16 34 . 0602 2169.2233 15541.7141
17 45.6011 1805.2795 24478 . 7455
18 3.6782 0.0000 0.0000
19 37.2234 995.0247 28744 .4750
20 9.5666 1729.8684 11740 . 9812






2 .1 2.2 2.3
RANK
1 3 13 12
2 9 5 2
3 4 2 4
4 1 9 16
5 6 11 6
6 5 12 7
7 11 18 3
8 12 20 14
9 8 15 9
10 10 8 13
11 15 4 10
12 14 10 5
13 16 6 17
14 18 14 11
15 13 3 18
16 17 19 15
17 20 17 19
18 2 1 1
19 19 7 20
20 7 16 8
Lowest cost=l
Highest cost=20
Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation may be derived
from the results as before.
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Table 4.4S Spearman's Coefficient of Rank Correlation.
Models r
2.1 and 2.2 0 .2361
2.2 and 2.3 0.1699
2.1 and 2.3 0.5293
1.lh and 2.1 0.9368
1. 2h and 2 . 2 0.4015
1. 3h and 2 . 3 0.8647
Notable here is the fact that models 2.1 and 2.3 show good
positive correlation, whilst the historic specification
appears to be more idiosyncratic. Of greater interest is
the comparisons that may be drawn between these rankings
and those obtained from the theoretically sound models.
Rankings from models 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 appear to have
remarkably high degrees of positive correlation with l.lh,
1.2h and 1.3h. The result appears to confirm the inclusion
of hedonic terms in the cost function specification.
Indeed, setting aside the niceties of duality theory does
not appear to be as disruptive of ranking as might be
assumed. The difficulties of working in a theoretical
vacuum remain, as do all previous caveats, and should not
be minimised. Nevertheless the results are encouraging from
the point of view of achieving some consistency in the
rankings. One may tentatively conclude that these results
suggest that comparative efficiency measurement using
regression techniques is feasible and does give results
which are moderately robust in terms of econometric
technique.
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Banding the firms as before the results are as follows.
Table 4.4B. Efficiency Banding for Models 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
Band 1 Firms (low cost): 2, 3, 18
Band 2 Firms (intermediate): 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 15, 19, 20.
Band 3 Firms (high cost): 8,14,16,17.
To confirm our contention that the results from this
analysis are fairly robust we would desire very few changes
in the bandings for the firms. In fact firms 6, 8 and 9
drop one band, whilst firms 11 and 13 rise.
Conclusions.
In summary, we may conclude that employing the tools of
econometrics it is indeed possible to arrive at an ordinal
ranking of companies that, however imperfectly, gives some
indication of the comparative efficiency of firms.
Moreover, the results appear to be moderately robust with
respect to the particular estimation method employed. And
although some changes in ordering are observed when
theoretically sound specifications are given up, these are
not generally so great as to distort the overall picture.
The second conclusion is that price factors are not the
crucial element in determining the specified cost
functions. In modelling production, the effects of price
seem to be swamped by the effects of physical conditions
which are captured by the hedonic variables. In this we
may be picking up merely the effect of greater cross
sectional variation in hedonic as against price terms,
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although this seems unlikely given that PI does exhibit
some variation; certainly as much as other non price
variables which appear in the reported functions. When the
RPI price index is included models suffer from severe
multicollinearity. This may be due, in part, to firms under
public ownership being allowed to let prices track the
index rather than be tied rather more closely to cost.
Clearly, from a policy point of view it would be
appropriate to break or weaken this link in some way. For
whilst the costs of water companies do track the RPI to a
certain extent the relationship is not perfect.
The first set of (theoretically sound) results also appear
to confirm the view that operational economies of scale in
the English and Welsh water industry are largely exhausted
at the current level of activity. This is in line with
previous studies (discussed in Chapter 3) which have noted
that economies of scale are exhausted at a fairly low level
for the collection and treatment functions. The policy
implication is that there should be no general presumption
in favour of the further merger of companies in the
industry. This would appear to imply that consumers are not
at any significant cost disadvantage by virtue of the fact
that they are served by statutory companies. The reverse
may be the case; although we are unable to come to firm
conclusions for public and private companies in this study.
Unsurprisingly, the cost of capital and valuation of
capital stock have arisen as key determinants of overall
cost. Under both the historic cost and current cost
accounting conventions, the cost of capital swamps any
measure of operating cost. However it is clear that
historic cost measures of capital stock are at best
unreliable, and at worst completely misleading. Therefore,
in interpreting the results for regulatory purposes this is
an issue which should command the closest attention.
145
In general, the methods presented above appear to be
tractable for a regulator operating a system of yardstick
competition. By giving more information on comparative
efficiency the presumption is that the final regulatory
arrangements will be improved in and through this work. In
general terms, if the work were to be applied to industries
such as electricity and gas the analysis has shown that
capital cost provides the greatest challenge to the system.
Agreement over the conventions to be adopted and the
acquisition of reliable data are important prerequisites.
Furthermore, the question of 'explanatory factors' or the
modelling of heterogeneity has profound implications for
any regulatory solution. Accurate modelling of these
appears to be rather more important than the modelling of
the various price terms.
Overall, the analysis presented in this chapter has gone
some way to answering the initial question 'Can Yardstick
Competition Work?' in the affirmative.
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Appendix 1.Water Supply Companies in England and Wales
1974-89.
Regional Water Authorities: Identification
* Anglian 1
* Northumbrian 2
* North West 3
* Severn Trent 4
* Southern 5










* Colne Valley Water Company 11
East Anglian Water Company
East Surrey Water Company
* East Worcestershire Waterworks Company 12
Eastbourne Water Company
* Essex Water Company 13
Folkestone and District Water Company
Hartlepools Water Company
Lee Valley Water Company
* Mid Kent Water Company 14
Mid Southern Water Company
Mid Sussex Water Company
Newcastle and Gateshead Water Company
North Surrey Water Company
Portsmouth Water Company
Rickmansworth Water Company
* South Staffordshire Water Company 15
* Sunderland and South Shields Water Company 16
* Sutton District Water Company 17
Tendring Hundred Waterworks Company
* West Hampshire Water Company 18
West Kent Water Company
* Wrexham and East Denbighshire Water Company 19
* York Waterworks Company 20
Cholderton and District Water Company
* = indicates companies included in the sample.
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Appendix 2. Data Sources.
Primary data sources:
Annual reports of the companies, the Digest of
Environmental Pollution and Water Statistics (Dept of the
Environment), various CSO publications and 'Water Data', a
publication of the discontinued Water Data Unit.
Secondary data sources:
Annual reports and accounts of the National Water Council
(dissolved on 30th September 1983 under the terms of the
Water Act 1983), 'Waterfacts' ( the annual statistical
digest of the Water Authorities Association 1984-1989) (
Subsequently the Water Services Association 1989-)and the
Water Industry Reviews of 1978 and 1982, CSO Guide to
Official Statistics, 1990 Edition, Sources of Unofficial UK
Statistics, 2nd Edition 1990, Eurostat Index, 4th Edition.
CIPFA 'Water Supply and Sewage Treatment and Disposal
Statistics 1979-80 Actuals', CIPFA 'Water Services Charges
Statistics 1979/80, 80/1, 81/2, 82/3, CIPFA (1984) 'The
Water Industry: United Kingdom Service and Costs 1984.',
CIPFA, London.CIPFA (1985) 'The Water Industry: United
Kingdom Service and Costs 1985.', CIPFA, London, CIPFA
(1986) 'The Water Industry: United Kingdom Service and
Costs 1986', CIPFA, London, CIPFA (1989) 'The Water
Industry: United Kingdom Services and Costs 1988 and
Charges for Services 1989/90' CIPFA, London.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission Reports:
1981: Severn Trent Water Authority, East Worcestershire
Waterworks Company and South Staffordshire Waterworks
Company (HC 339)
1982: Anglian Water Authority and North West Water
Authority (CMnd 8726)
1984: Yorkshire Water Authority (Cmnd 9392)
1986: Southern Water Authority, The Eastbourne Waterworks
Company, Folkestone and District Water Company, The Mid
Kent Water Company, Mid Sussex Water Company, Portsmouth
Water Company and West Kent Water Company. (Cmnd 9765)
1988: Welsh Water Authority (Cmnd 366*)
1990: General Utilities PLC and The Mid Kent Water Company
(Cmnd 1125)
1990: General Utilities PLC, The Colne Valley Water Company
and Rickmansworth Water Company. (Cmnd 1029)
1990: Southern Water PLC and Mid Sussex Water Company (Cmnd
1126)
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Cambridge, East Anglian, Essex,
Tendring Hundred
Colne Valley, East Surrey, Lee
Valley, Mid Southern, North Surrey,
Rickmansworth, Sutton.
Eastbourne, Folkestone, Mid Kent, Mid





Appendix 4. Classification of Water Suppliers according to














Colne Valley, East Surrey,
Eastbourne, Essex, Folkestone, Lee
Valley, Mid Kent, Mid Southern, Mid
Sussex, North Surrey, Portsmouth,
Rickmansworth, Tendring Hundred,West
Hampshire, West Kent. Thames WA. Southern
WA.
Bournemouth, Bristol,














Chapter 4: Technical Appendix.
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This appendix contains regression results obtained by re-
estimating the models presented in Chapter 4 using the real
rather than the nominal rate of interest. Throughout, the
real rate of interest is designated PRK, and was calculated
by adjusting the original nominal rate of interest, PK
(Public Works Loan Board average rate of interest on new
advances), by the Retail prices index (PP).
Theoretically, it may be argued that this approach is more
satisfactory. It is the real rate of interest that plays an
important part in any large commercial organisation's
investment decision. However the results obtained using
this adjustment, and the conclusions derived from those
results were left broadly unaltered after the change.
Consequently they are presented as a Technical Appendix to
Chapter 4. It may be argued that, in this case, the nominal
rate of interest is an acceptable proxy for the real rate.
Apart from its inclusion in the models as a price term,
PRK, the adjustment also affected the dependent variables
employed. Unit cost was again defined in three ways: as
operating cost per unit of output (OPC/Y) , as historic
valuation operating cost per unit of output (CHRC/Y) and as
current valuation operating cost per unit of output (RC/Y).
As before, the denominator in each of these terms
represents output. The numerators differ.
OPC represents a 'pure' operating cost, excluding any
element of capital cost, and is unaffected by the switch
from using a nominal to a real rate of interest. CHRC adds
into the operating cost a proxy for the working cost of
capital. This capital cost is obtained by multiplying the
net book value of fixed assets at their historic cost
(FIXA) by the price of capital, which we proxy by PRK. The
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capital charge is simply (FIXA x PRK) and this is added to
OPC to give CHRC. The third measure RC is obtained by
adding to OPC a capital charge of (CCFA x PRK) ; ie the
current gross replacement cost of tangible fixed assets
multiplied by the real interest rate. Hence, instead of
working with dependent variables (OPC/Y), (CHC/Y) and
(C/Y), we worked with (OPC/Y), (CHRC/Y) and (RC/Y).
The two approaches to testing adopted in the chapter were
repeated: the modelling strategy employing the translog
cost function and its variants, and the 'rudimentary'
modelling strategy.
Models Employing the Transloq Cost Function.
As before, a general to specific testing strategy was
adopted. A translog unit cost function in four input prices
was constructed and restricted in the ways discussed
earlier, to test for homogeneity, homotheticity and unitary
elasticity of substitution. As before, tests of the
restrictions were ill defined, inconclusive and
contradictory. Thus reported models were arrived at by
accepting only well defined models with parameter estimates
broadly consistent with economic theory. As before, Cobb
Douglas functions in two input prices gave the most
satisfactory results. These are reported below in Table
4 . 3T.
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Table 4.3T One Way Fixed Effects Models Adjusted for
First Order Autocorrelation.
Models 1.2T and 1.2hT Dependent Variable = Ln(CHRC/Y) -
LnPl


































































































































































































































































































D16 18.8919 t -44.5049* 26.4178* -47.6362*
(9.5379) (13.0118) (10.3000) (15.3566)
22.3098* -36.8831* 30.2772* -38.5019*
(8.0089) (11.5318) (8.6713) (13.6323)
20.1139* -31.5959* 28.0745* -33.0576*
(8.5831) (12.1392) (9.2834) (14.2610)
22.9567* -29.6629* 31.5738* -30.2529*
(7.4091) (11.5093) (8.0319) (13.5521)
22.7884* -24.7433* 30.2865* -25.6296*

























§ denotes statistical significance at the 90% level
* denotes statistical significance at the 95% level
* denotes statistical significance at the 99% level
This table gives results for four models 1.2T, 1.2hT, 1.3T
and 1.3hT. They correspond to models 1.2, 1.2h, 1.3 and
1.3h of Table 4.3 in the main text. The only alteration in
terms of data is that the real rate of interest (PRK) is
employed instead of PK. The dependent variables as well as
the price terms are affected by the change. It should also
be noted that no models corresponding to models 1.1 and
1.lh of Table 4.3 are reported here. These were models in
which the dependent variables reflected only a 'pure'
operating cost. Unsurprisingly the new price term, PRK, did
not enhance the explanatory power of these models in any
way. Rather than reproducing models 1.1 and 1. lh in the
above table, these results are omitted.
All the models reported in Table 4.3T are one way, fixed
effects models adjusted for first order autocorrelation. As
before, two way models suffered multicollinearity and
proved too demanding in terms of degrees of freedom. In
addition, first order autocorrelation proved to be a
serious problem, and was dealt with, using a Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation. Once completed, the diagnostic
statistics suggested that the problem had been dealt with
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in a satisfactory way.
But despite the very similar preferred functional forms,
some minor revisions to the models were made. Whilst the
non-hedonic models 1. 2T and 1.3T had the same functional
form as their counterparts 1.2 and 1.3 (Table 4.3), the
preferred hedonic models 1.2hT and 1.3hT differed from 1.2h
and 1.3h in including the term LnZ2 in preference to LnZl.
The change leads us to reexamine and compare the new
results with the old, and to make minor amendments to the
analysis.
In both models 1. 2hT and 1. 3hT the term LnZ2 enters
positively and significantly. This suggests that as
population density increases the cost of supply increases.
This is consistent with the observation that more densely
populated areas require more extensive capital
infrastructure and hence capital maintenance. There are, of
course, large costs associated with the installation,
repair and maintenance of water supply infrastructure in
densely populated, urban areas.
The other difference in the results that may be noted is
that the output term now takes a positive and significant
sign throughout. This is a reversal of its position in
models 1.2 and 1.3. The implication is that the industry is
in a region of decreasing returns to scale and confirms the
assertion made previously (and later in Chapter 7) that it
is possible that economies of scale have largely been
exhausted in the industry at the current size and scale of
activity.
The final comment on these results confirms their
similarity with those derived earlier. Namely that the
price terms are correctly signed and significant at the 99%
level as before. Diagnostic statistics are also
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satisfactory, despite a slight deterioration in the
adjusted R2.
The following two tables now extend the analysis. Table
4.3FT reports the adjusted residuals derived from the
estimated firm dummy (intercept) terms. Again, a higher
intercept value suggests a higher unit cost. Table 4. 3RT
orders the intercepts giving a rank for each model.
Rankings are one to twenty; one representing the lowest




3.1 3 . lh 4 .1 4 . lh
Ui =ai - mini
1 3.6745 11.1945 3 . 6485 11.9377
2 5.7173 9.2683 5.6009 10.1341
3 0.2351 4.8973 0.1689 5.2227
4 1.6843 10.9664 1.6338 11.9784
5 6 . 2600 10.7048 5.9279 11.5513
6 7 . 6307 11.3856 7.5589 12.3681
7 0.0000 10.4045 0.0000 11.5991
8 4.4063 15.0507 4.3389 16.3760
9 8.3767 15.7350 8.2815 17.2365
10 2.9397 10.0583 2.7415 10 . 8260
11 10.9270 6.6462 10.8434 7.7228
12 15.4445 15.9125 15.3404 17.7764
13 7.9117 12.0427 8.0116 13.6693
14 12.4053 16.7866 12.2455 18.5276
15 8.0923 11.9432 8.6747 14.0683
16 12.3637 0.0000 12 . 0348 0.0000
17 15.7816 7.6218 15.8942 9.1343
18 13.5857 12.9090 13.6918 14.5786
19 16.4285 14 . 8420 17.1908 17.3833





3 . 1 3 . lh 4 .1 4 . lh
RANK
1 5 10 5 9
2 7 5 7 5
3 2 2 2 2
4 3 9 3 10
5 8 8 8 7
6 9 11 9 11
7 1 7 1 8
8 6 16 6 15
9 12 17 11 16
10 4 6 4 6
11 13 3 13 3
12 17 18 17 18
13 10 13 10 12
14 15 19 15 19
15 11 12 12 13
16 14 1 14 1
17 18 4 18 4
18 16 14 16 14
19 20 15 20 17
20 19 20 19 20
Lowest Cost Rank = 1
Highest Cost Rank = 20
The most obvious difference from the results in the main
text is that firms lying on the frontier are now firms 7
and 16 rather than 3 and 18. But to analyse the results
further, Spearman coefficients for various pairs of
rankings are reported below.
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As in Table 4.3S there is a degree of positive correlation
between the nonhedonic and hedonic versions employing the
same cost of capital. In addition models 1. 2T / 1.3T and
1.2hT / 1.3hT are very highly correlated. When considering
models 1.1 and l.lh (models with operating cost forming
part of the dependent variable) the nonhedonic version
(1.1) is highly correlated with nonhedonic models 1.2T and
1.3T. The pattern does not, however, hold for hedonic
versions. Clearly there, the cost structure is explained in
a very different way in the equations including and
excluding capital cost. Thus hedonic variables in equations
1. 2hT and 1.3hT proxy capital stock in a slightly different
way from those included in l.lh. However, given the fact
that there has been a slight change in specification these
minor differences do not radically alter the overall
conclusions of the models, as can be seen below.
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Table 4.3BT Efficiency Banding for Models l.lh, 1.2hT and
1. 3hT
Band 1 Firms (low cost) : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10.
Band 2 Firms (intermediate) : 6, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18.
Band 3 Firms (high cost) : 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20.
Table 4 . 3BT corresponds to Table 4.3B in the main text,
banding firms according to their relative efficiency in
three hedonic models. Despite the change in specification
the overall pattern remains the same. Specifically, the low
cost band is completely occupied by the Water Authorities,
and the high cost band's composition is mainly drawn from
the statutory companies. Some movements have taken place,
but at most companies have moved one band between tables
4.3B and 4.3BT. No company has moved from the low cost band
to the high cost band or vice versa. One movement is,
however of note. Firm 18, which was a clear outlier in
table 4. 3B now joins other statutory companies in the
intermediate band.
Overall, the results again confirm the finding of Lynk
(1993), that the RWA's operated at lower levels of
inefficiency than privately owned companies.
A Rudimentary Modelling Approach.
Again setting aside the strict constraints of duality
theory in the construction of the cost function,
reestimation occurred with the rudimentary modelling
approach. This time variables entered or left the
regression according to whether or not they had a
significant influence on the overall fit of the equation.
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Using panel data with one and two way, fixed and random
effects models, the following preferred specifications were
obtained.
Table 4.4T One Way Fixed Effects Adjusted for First Order
Autocorrelation
Model 2.2T Dependent Variable = CHRC/Y














EMPL -0.0852 t -0.6292
(0 . 0389) (0.2352
GDWT -1.9956 2.5063
(3 . 7660) (20.7500
D1 91. 9561 -1905.2499
(611.1365) (3790.4234























































The preferred models are one-way fixed effect models; two
way models were again rejected on the basis of chronic
multicollinearity. First order autocorrelation was also
diagnosed, and remedial action taken in the form of a
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation.
Comparing equations 2 . 2T and 2.3T with their counterparts
in the main chapter (2.2 and 2.3) the similarities are
striking. Excluding dummies, all variables have the same
sign, and all those significant at or above the 90% level
are the same in both cases. The only exception to this rule
is Z5, which was significant at the 99% level in equation
2.3 but was not in equation 2.3T. In general the adjusted
R2 terms have improved, from 0.749 in model 2.2 to 0.873 in
model 2.2T; and from 0.659 to 0.818 for models 2.3 and
2.3T. These results mean that all the comments for models
2.2 and 2.3 carry over directly. So we may again note that
all the price terms are correctly signed and significant,
and that as before the coefficient on the term EMPL is
negative.
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Table 4.4FT reports adjusted intercept terms for fixed





3 . 3 3.4









9 1260 . 8460 2796.4840
10 450 .2085 2924.8170
11 865.1976 2941.2960
12 1056 .2540 1781.6780
13 684.5086 3886 . 6830
14 1132 .2040 2503 . 6610
15 661.6952 5483 . 5260
16 1022.0370 3762.1740
17 1239 . 9520 6018.5240
18 625.0897 0.0000
19 856.7934 6592 . 0150



























Lowest Rank = 1
Highest Rank = 20
Model 2.3T, like model 2.3, has firm 18 lying on the
frontier. But model 2.2T replaces firm 18 with firm 3.
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Table 4.4ST Spearman's Coefficient of Rank Correlation.
Models r





2.1 and 2.2T 0.4211
2.1 and 2.3T 0 .4541
1.2h and 2.2T 0 .1263
1.3h and 2 . 3T 0.7985
The Spearman coefficients highlight the high degree of
correlation between the results obtained in models 2.2 /
2.3 and those in models 2.2T / 2.3T. Other patterns are
repeated. For example: as 2.2 and 2.3 showed very little
positive correlation so do 2.2T and 2.3T; 1.3h and 2.3T are
strongly positively correlated as were 1.3h and 2.3.
The extent to which the results are similar may be
confirmed by examining the efficiency banding for models
2.1, 2.2T and 2.3T.
Table 4.4BT Efficiency Banding for Models 2.1, 3.3 and 3.4.
Band 1 Firms (low cost) : 2, 3, 18.
Band 2 Firms (intermediate): 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20.
Band 3 Firms (high cost): 8, 16, 17.
Comparing the results of Table 4.4B with 4.4BT the only
difference is that firm 14 has moved from band 3 to band 2.
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Conclusion.
By using the real rather than the nominal rate of interest
and reestimating the various cost functions, it has been
demonstrated that the new results obtained are very much in
line with those presented before. The database lacks cross
sectional variation in terms of the key price variables,
and this modification is unable to meet that deficiency.
Consequently, the conclusions of Chapter 4 remain largely
unaltered; and it confirms that this change in a key
variable has only a modest effect on the results.
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Chapter 5.
Comparative Efficiency Measurement: Sewage Treatment and
Disposal in England and Wales.
Introduction.
The second context for comparative efficiency measurement
is the sewage treatment and disposal industry in England
and Wales. An industry which has aroused little interest
among economists, despite delivering one of society's
oldest and most essential services. Its subordinate
position to water supply on research agendas is well
illustrated in the work of Ofwat. For although both water
and sewerage functions fall within the regulatory remit,
research on comparative efficiency measures is considerably
more advanced for the former."
This chapter complements the previous one, by presenting
results of the econometric estimation of a series of cost
functions for sewage treatment and disposal in England and
Wales: the other primary function of the Water Authorities
(since 1989 the Water and Sewerage Companies) . But, as
before, the physical processes of sewage treatment and
disposal will be discussed first; followed by an outline of
the institutional development of the industry and the
process of modelling and estimation. Conclusions and policy
implications round off the chapter.
Physical Attributes and Processes.
The health hazards attached to water borne pollution and
the noxious qualities of effluent create the need for the
collection, transport, treatment and disposal of foul
99 See for example Price (1993) 'Comparing the Cost of Water
Delivered', Ofwat Research Paper Number 1.
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flows. The water industry is concerned chiefly therefore
with just one component of general waste matter. A
component labelled by Downing (1969) as sewage; and said to
include organic waste material and used water including
storm sewage and overland run off from rainfall.100
Sewage may be characterised in terms of its volume and
pollutional strength. Volume is straightforwardly measured
as sewage flow. But a two-dimensional classification of
pollutional strength is adopted; biochemical oxygen demand
(BOD) and suspended solids (SS). Biochemical oxygen demand
is a measure of the biodegradable organic matter contained
in sewage. The breakdown of organic matter by biological
organisms uses up oxygen from the water. Reductions in the
level of dissolved oxygen in water below critical levels
will damage many micro-organisms, kill off fish, and
generally upset the ecological balance. Consequently a
higher level of BOD indicates a higher level of pollution. 101
Suspended solids, is a measure of particulate matter found
in sewage. This picks up pollutants such as fine grit,
insoluble metal precipitates and other solid matter in
liquid suspension not entering the BOD measure. In total
this is the raw material that water companies must deal
with.
As mentioned above, their dealings involve collection,
transmission, treatment and disposal. And whilst the focus
of this chapter is on treatment and disposal alone, some
100 Other categories of waste matter defined by Downing
(1969) include rubbish (general inorganic, solid wastes) and
garbage (food wastes of home or industry).
101 The measure was used in the work of the Royal Commission
on Sewage Disposal (1912) who suggested that rivers could be
classified according to BOD.
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mention should be made of the preceding stages.102
Over 96% of households in England and Wales are connected
to public sewers. Therefore this network of pipes and
conduits is the primary means of sewage collection and
transmission. 103 Foul flows and stormwater-run-of f enter
dedicated or combined sewers designed to accept some
multiple of 'dry weather flow' (DWF)104. Following storms,
large sudden extraordinary flows are encountered, thus
sewers designed to receive up to six times their dry
weather flow are quite common. Sewerage systems generally
work under gravity flow, being laid deeper than water mains
and having outfalls and treatment works at the lowest point
in the system. Where this is not possible, or the cost of
laying sewers at a great depth becomes prohibitive , sewage
pumping stations are constructed to maintain the flow.
Problems of toxicity and the risk to public health quickly
multiply when sewage is transported over long distances or
stored for any length of time. This, combined with the
ability to discharge effluent into many river and coastal
locations has reinforced the tendency towards localised
sewerage and sewage operations. This contrasts with potable
water which can be transported for long distances and
stored for long periods without the risk of septicity. A
final problem with a sewerage system working under gravity
at below capacity is that structural decay takes longer to
emerge for sewers than for water mains. But potentially the
effects are more hazardous with the risk of groundwater
102 Much of this discussion is based on information supplied
by the Water Services Association.
103 Table 5A, Waterfacts 1992, Water Services Association.
104
Dry weather flow (DWF) is the average daily volume
calculated from the total sewage flow reaching the works on any
working day following seven successive dry days. A dry day is
a day in which less than 0.01 of an inch of rain falls.
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supply contamination.
The vast majority of sewage put into sewers is taken to
sewage treatment works105, however there remains some
variation in the sophistication and extent of this
treatment. Generally, works operate below capacity being
designed to handle sudden large increases in flow due to
surfacewater run off and infiltration. The general pattern
of treatment is one in which physical separation (the
removal of suspended solids) is combined with the
augmentation of natural processes to reduce harmful organic
and chemical substances (reduction in BOD) . The first stage
of treatment is generally a preliminary screening to remove
large debris and grit. In this, untreated sewage passes
through a screen which collects rags, paper, wood and
plastic. These gross solids are usually burnt in
incinerators or buried in appropriate landfill sites. By
reducing the speed at which sewage passes through the
various channels and tanks various suspended solids may be
removed. In this primary sedimentation they fall to the
bottom forming a sludge which is collected for disposal.
The remaining 'settled sewage liquor' may be discharged or
sent on for further treatment.
Secondary biological filtration, or activated sludge
treatment, reduces the BOD/SS count by aerobic digestion
and further settlement. Both methods make use of naturally
occurring bacteria to break down organic substances and
remove ammonia. The familiar round ponds at sewage works
are the site of bacteria bed filtration where the settled
sewage liquor is passed over a deep bed of small stones and
other materials from either fixed or moving arms. The
organisms living in the gaps between the stones feed on the
sewage as it passes through. The activated sludge method
105 Table 5A, Waterfacts 1992, Water Services Association.
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involves sewage liquor being piped into tanks containing
micro-organisms that feed on waste particles. Air is forced
into the tanks by compressors to maintain an adequate
oxygen supply. Secondary treatment often reduces the BOD
measurement by over 90%, although there is a good deal of
variation in the level of treatment. The effluent is then
discharged or passed on to the tertiary filtration and
final sedimentation stage. Although most harmful organisms
have been removed, this tertiary treatment involves further
settlement, chemical operations to remove nutrients (such
as phosphates and nitrates) and continued action of the
activated sludge. The liquor may be recycled back to the
previous stage to be used again or discharged.
Sewage liquor and sludge are the two main products of these
treatment processes. Both must be returned to the natural
environment at some point. Sewage liquor, in its several
forms, may be discharged into rivers, estuaries or at
sea106. The sea in particular has large dilution capacity
and there is good bactericidal action of sunlight and salt
water. With well designed long sea outfalls no harmful
pollutants should be washed back to shore.
Sludge is the generic term given to treatment residue. Its
composition varies depending on area and population
reflecting local dietary habits, household and industrial
activities. At the works it is commonly over 90% water; but
of the dry matter approximately 50-75% is organic, 5-10%
grease and the remainder a cocktail of nitrates, phosphates
and trace metals. Sludge retrieved from the various stages
of treatment has slightly different qualities. Thus,
primary sludge is solid matter settled out at the primary
106 EEC environmental directives such as 76/160/EEC Quality
of Bathing Water, have lead to long sea outfalls becoming the
preferred method of sea disposal. See also Tables 5N and 50,
Waterfacts 1992, Water Services Association, on discharge
statistics.
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sedimentation stage of sewage treatment, humus sludge
consists of solid matter settled out in special
sedimentation (humus) tanks from the treated effluent, and
activated sludge is the microbe-rich effluent used to treat
incoming sewage in the secondary treatment process by
digesting organic matter. Raw sludge being only 2-3% dry
solids may be treated further. Thickening reduces the
volume by removing much of the water, digestion involves
the action of bacteria in anaerobic conditions reducing
smell and the number of harmful organisms present. Cold
digestion takes two to three years in tanks or lagoons,
heated digestion reduces this time to about a month. Final
dewatering produces a cake of dried sludge which can be
bagged and sold. According to 198 9 figures of the dry
sludge disposed, approximately 51% was used in agriculture,
22% disposed of at sea, 11% in landfill sites and 7% in
incineration.107 The balance will alter somewhat as sea
disposal is phased out.
Institutional Development.
So much for the physical processes. But what of the
institutional arrangements used to deliver sewerage
services? How did they develop?
The industrial revolution in England and Wales brought with
it a rapid increase in the urban population and problems of
public health. Frequent outbreaks of cholera and other
water borne diseases made the improvement and extension of
sewerage and sewage disposal systems a legislative
priority, once the cause of the problem had been
identified.108 Various nineteenth century health acts
107 Table 5B, Waterfacts 1992, Water Services Association.
108 Chadwick's (1842) report was influential in prompting
sanitary legislation.
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addressed the problem109 but improvements came about
slowly, and at the turn of the century many streams and
rivers were little more than open sewers.
A significant advance was made in the 1936 Public Health
Act which consolidated and extended the previous provisions
and made it,
"...the duty of every local authority to provide such
public sewers as may be necessary for effectually draining
their district for the purposes of this Act, and to make
such provision, by means of sewage disposal works or
otherwise, as may be necessary to effectually dealing with
the contents of their sewers."110
Thus over 1400 local authorities in the form of county
boroughs and district councils became responsible for the
collection, transport, treatment and disposal of sewage
waste in their area. Whilst a few subsequently combined
their treatment facilities and operations the movement
towards consolidation was much slower than for potable
water suppliers. On the eve of the 1974 reorganisation
there remained 134 local authority operations, 27 joint
sewage authorities, the Greater London Council and the City
of London. No privately owned sewerage companies offered a
local public service in any area.
The 1973 Water Act radically altered the face of the
industry with the ten newly established Regional Water
Authorities taking over responsibility for sewerage, sewage
treatment and disposal in their area. Under section 15 of
the Act it was open for the various local authorities to
act as agents of the Water Authorities in continuing to
operate and maintain the sewerage system. Many did;
however certain trunk sewers, pumping stations, all sewage
109 Public Health Acts and amendments 1848, 1872, 1875, 1890,
1907, 1925.
110 Public Health Act 1936 sl4 [ch49 plO]
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treatment works and coastal outfalls became the direct
responsibility of the water authorities who also operated
and maintained sewerage systems where local authorities
chose not to do so. Throughout the following decade the
scope of environmental legislation directly impinging on
the Water Authorities widened, as UK statutory requirements 111
were supplemented by EEC directives.112 In addition the
deterioration of the sewerage infrastructure began to
surface as an issue; the result of sustained
underinvestment in an ageing capital stock during the mid
1970's and early 1980's.
Privatisation of the ten English and Welsh Water
Authorities in 1989 again altered the industry's
institutional structure. Under the terms of the 1989 Water
Act, sewage arrangements existing at vesting continued to
have effect and could only be varied or brought to an end
by agreement or by either party giving reasonable notice.
The ten privately owned water and sewerage companies were
prohibited from giving such notice with expiry before 1
April 1992, and in many cases agency arrangements with
local authorities remained in place. Whilst the private
companies' functions were licensed and continued under the
regulatory auspices of Ofwat, another statutory body the
National Rivers Authority (NRA) was established. It took
over many of the regulatory functions of the Regional Water
Authorities in respect of the maintenance and improvement
of the water environment, responsibility for the issue of
consents to discharge into rivers and the independent
monitoring of river quality. Consequently the water and
111 For example in 1984 The Control of Pollution Act Part II
was implemented, allowing public access to information about
discharges and allowing private individuals to prosecute water
authorities if they broke the conditions of the consents.
112 For example EEC directive 80/78/EEC (drinking water) and
76/160/EEC (bathing water).
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sewerage companies were no longer both 'poacher and
gamekeeper' in terms of the issue of pollution consents.113
To date, pressure for environmental improvements from
Europe and Westminster has continued to increase. The water
companies are engaged in substantial programmes of
investment to meet these requirements.114 However the
Director General of Water Services continues to be
concerned at the impact these more stringent requirements
will have on prices. Press announcements have made it clear
that he is concerned the quality/price tradeoffs being made
by European legislators do not represent those of UK
consumers.115
Background to the Work.
We now move from a description of the background to the
heart of the study itself : a tractable means of comparative
efficiency measurement. The proposed methods again involve
the econometric estimation of a series of cost functions.
A formal presentation of the theory appeared in chapter
three and will not be repeated. There are, however, several
issues to be considered in applying the theory to sewage
treatment and disposal.
At a technical level, the cost function is to be preferred
to its dual, the production function. The assumptions of
113 Helm (1991) argued that the old system displayed elements
of regulatory capture, a consequence being the deterioration of
river water quality.
114 Details on the scale and scope of the industry's
investment programme are given in '1990/91 Report on Capital
Investment by the Water Companies in England and Wales' OFWAT
March 1992.
115 Ofwat Press Release 20/93, 17th June 1993.
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exogenous output and input prices are again deemed
appropriate for the following reasons. Firstly sewage works
must endeavour to treat all matter sent to it. Companies
have very clear responsibilities in this respect; output is
considered to be largely outwith the control of management.
Secondly, companies are price takers in the factor markets.
None is of sufficient size to determine the costs of labour
or capital. Cost minimisation is held to be a reasonable
behavioural assumption. Under price cap regulation such
behaviour is rewarded by the retention of larger profits.
Under the pre-privatisation regulatory regime there was a
downward pressure on plant costs exerted through a
succession of ministerial directives to Water Authorities.
It may be argued that these were weak in comparison to
post-privatisation pressures, nevertheless they did exist.
In addition, substitute sewage treatment and disposal
facilities have always existed. In contrast to the case of
water supply where the choice of suppliers is very limited
indeed, companies and individuals can make other
arrangements relatively easily by setting up septic tanks
and contracting out disposal services. This reinforces the
cost minimising behaviour of sewerage firms.
The choice of the cost function as an analytical device for
the study is confirmed by what little econometric
literature exists. As mentioned in chapter three, Knapp's
(1978) paper remains virtually unique among published work
in explicitly modelling the UK sewage treatment and
disposal industry. Studies of pollution in general have
been more common116 giving evidence on issues which are
only loosely related to the whole question of sewage
treatment.
Knapp (1978) employed 1972/3 cross sectional plant level
116 See for example Storey (1978), Epple and Visscher (1984)
and Pittman (1981).
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data, fitting a statistical cost function to a sample of
172 works by ordinary least squares. He drew the conclusion
that strong and pervasive economies of scale existed in the
operation of the works. Knapp saw his contribution as an
early attempt to dispel some of the ignorance surrounding
the economic conditions of the production and supply of the
service. But the drawbacks to the study were clear. In the
specification of the cost function he was driven, through
lack of data, to omit input prices, and consequently laid
to one side the insights of duality theory linking cost and
production functions. Instead average operating cost was
the dependent variable regressed upon terms which entered
or left the regression on the basis of whether they exerted
a significant influence on average cost. The omission of
prices and capital costs in the modelling of such a capital
intensive industry is clearly a specification error.
This chapter emulates Knapp (1978) in employing more recent
sewage treatment and disposal statistics containing the
same level of detail. But in many important respects it
takes the analysis forward.
Two quite distinct approaches to cost function estimation
are taken. The first is the 'data mining' approach of
Knapp. He had justified this by arguing that duality
results were seldom employed in the early stages of
empirical analysis of an industry. Explanatory variables
entered and left his cost function on the grounds of
whether or not they exerted a significant influence on
total or average costs. Using a linear in parameters
framework, testing proceeded in seeking an overall 'best
fit' in terms of R2 which was consistent with individual
regression coefficients registering some level of
statistical significance. A large number of variables were
employed in additive and multiplicative combination leading
to the derivation of preferred models.
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But in this chapter a second approach is taken. In an
attempt to set the analysis on a sound theoretical footing,
the classical econometric testing strategy used in the
previous chapter is adopted once again. In other words, a
general model consistent with the postulates of economic
theory is formulated and then tested down, in an attempt to
achieve model parsimony. All available information is
employed where possible.
Both approaches raise concerns expressed by Knapp (1978).
The first is that in econometric studies of this kind,
endogenous regressors are a problem. They result in biased
and inconsistent OLS estimates. However, this may not be so
serious in the case of cross sectional estimation, as the
cost function itself may be regarded as short run. The
volume of sewage treated, capital stock, population served
and treatment method may be assumed to be exogenous:
inherited from the previous time period and outwith the
control of managers. But endogeneity may indeed arise in
the context of treatment methods, the degree of treatment
being a decision endogenous to the firm.
Since Knapp's study this problem may have receded. The
quality of influent is largely exogenous, save where
treatment works may refuse trade effluents of exceptional
strength. With approved river standards to be met by the
discharging plant, the decision over what quality of
effluent to discharge has also been taken out of their
hands. In short, the problem of endogeneity is reduced to
the extent that influent quality is given and effluent
quality must meet certain prescribed standards.
The second issue is that of the dependent variable. In
this the debate as to whether average or total cost
functions should be used remains unresolved. Griliches
(1972) and Casson (1973) both pointed to the possible
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pitfalls in regressing ratio variables as is done in
average cost functions; where errors of measurement in the
deflating variable may lead to inconsistent parameter
estimates. Against this, Feldstein (1967) argued that
average cost was less susceptible to undesirable problems
of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. In the
present context, it may be held that the deflating
regressor - total daily sewage flow - is measured fairly
accurately and that errors would not be expected to be more
than a very small proportion of total flow. However, the
arguments for and against are inconclusive and both average
and total cost functions will be worked, testing for
heteroscedasticity where necessary.
Data.
The construction of a database for use in econometric
testing was a relatively trivial task compared with the
work undertaken for a water supply database in Chapter 4.
Data were drawn from the sewage treatment and disposal
statistics 1979/80, published by the Chartered Institute of
Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
In general terms , the database contains information on the
operating cost of individual treatment works, the quantity
and quality of average daily sewage flows with other
features of 150 sewage treatment and disposal works in
England and Wales classified by Regional Water Authority
area. The outstanding feature of the CIPFA database is its
rich detail in terms of quantity and quality of output and
other potential determinants of operating cost. (A full
list of variables is given in Appendix I.)
Despite this, the database is flawed in two main respects:
firstly in terms of missing observations and secondly in
terms of bias. Missing observations on gross works costs
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and average strength of BOD influent for individual plants,
led to the removal of eight observations at the outset.
These variables were considered so central to the analysis
that their omission rendered the observations inadmissible.
But the need to retain observations , and hence degrees of
freedom, for statistical purposes meant other missing
observations on peripheral variables were proxied rather
than omitted. Obviously there is a trade off here; but the
view was taken that the absence of data on peripheral
variables should not lead to its automatic exclusion,
particulary if a suitable proxy was available. Thus, where
1979/80 observations were missing, 1978/9 CIPFA figures on
the same works were used as a proxy. Other missing values
for age of plant, dry weather flow, strength and method of
treatment were completed with reference to other works in
the same water authority area. In this way the final
sample of 142 was arrived at.
The second problem of bias arises because the database
includes observations on only the largest operational works
of each authority in terms of 'dry weather flow' and
'population served'. This is a two-edged sword. Whilst
biasing the sample towards those works of greater capacity,
it has the advantage of allowing representation from each
authority. This would not have occurred if the survey were
based only on the largest operational works nationally.
This in turn has implications for the mitigation of
heteroscedasticity.
In scope and detail the data available for the cost
function analysis mirrors, almost exactly that used by
Knapp. Consequently, discussion of variables as potential
regressors will draw on this earlier work. Beginning with
cost, the dependent variable, two main options are
available namely average operating cost per cubic metre of
total daily sewage flow in pence, or alternatively total
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cost over the year. Both these specifications have at
their heart operating cost, which includes the costs of
labour, power, rent and rates but excludes capital charges
such as debt and depreciation. The choice was discussed
above.
For output, a central explanatory variable, a wealth of
information on volume and quality is available. Volume is
represented as total sewage flow per day, which includes
measured domestic and trade sewage and storm run off.
Quality indicators are even more detailed with treatment
level given as the difference in strength between influent
and effluent, 5 days BOD at 20 degrees centigrade, COD
(Chemical Oxygen Demand) and SS all measured in mg/litre.
Lack of data meant the COD measure was dropped, however
there is good reason to suppose that there is some degree
of overlap between all three measures; and that BOD and SS,
in representing important dimensions of domestic and
industrial sewage, should be sufficient to indicate the
level of treatment. Other dimensions of output influencing
cost include the rate of flow and loading factor. Rate of
flow is well proxied by the ratio of average daily dry
weather flow to average daily total sewage flow, whilst
loading may be given, either by the ratio trade effluent to
total sewage flow or total sewage flow per head of
population.
Finally turning to capital, this is the area in which the
database is most woefully deficient. The database contains
no explicit measure of capital stock or depreciation. That
being said, the problem is mitigated in several ways.
Firstly, with cross sectional analysis of the industry,
capital stock may be assumed a fixed exogenous variable
outwith the control of works management. Given long fixed
asset lives the assumption is reasonable. The ratio of
capital to operating costs is also very high in such a
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capital intensive industry, and in excluding the capital
component a finer scalpel may be taken to the dissection of
industry operating costs. Secondly, information is
available as to the age of equipment and type of treatment
process, both of which affect operating costs per unit
volume of total sewage flow and the amounts of variable
inputs used in treatment. The database has information on
the date of commencement of operation of works or the date
of any major reconstruction. This may be used as a rough
capital vintage proxy, capturing part of the influence
capital stock has on operating cost. In addition works are
classified by method of treatment. Whilst all these
measures are not mutually exclusive and it is not possible
to identify the treatment load at every stage, dummy
variables may be used in combination to assess their
influence on operating cost.117
Knapp (1978) employs all these variables in combination but
by specifically omitting input prices and meteorological
data invites the charge of misspecification. Consequently
other information is added to the CIPFA dataset: data on
annual rainfall (mm) by water authority area and the prices
of labour (by area), electricity, rates and the retail
prices index.118 All proxies go some way mitigating the
misspecification.
For both estimation methods the base variables listed below
were used as regressors separately, in combination and
following transformation.
117 Appendix II contains a list of purification methods and
the dummies assigned to each.




AC Average operating cost per cubic metre of total daily
sewage flow (pence).
Q Total sewage flow (cubic metres per day).
BODI Average strength of BOD influent (mg per cubic metre)
BODE Average strength of BOD effluent (mg per cubic metre)
BOD Proportion of BOD removed in treatment.
SSI Average strength of SS influent (mg per cubic metre)
SSE Average strength of SS effluent (mg per cubic metre)
SS Proportion of SS removed in treatment.
DWF Ratio of dry weather flow to average sewage flow.
TE Ratio of trade effluent to total sewage flow.
POP Total sewage flow per head of population.
YR Years since works were built or underwent major
reconstruction.
DA-DM Treatment dummies (Appendix II)
Proxy Variables.
RAIN Annual rainfall (mm) by Water Authority area.
PL Price of labour.
PE Price of electricity.
PR Price of rates.
PP Retail prices index.
To give a clearer picture of the variables being employed
simple descriptive statistics were calculated and are




VARIABLE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD DEV
AC 0 . 034 13 . 805 2 . 941 1. 693
Q 3228 379850 41574 47316
BODI 0 . 098 0 . 700 0 .272 0 . 108
BODE 0 . 002 0 . 674 0 . 033 0 . 068
BOD 0 . 000 0 . 994 0 . 881 0 . 177
SSI 0 . 085 0 . 887 0 .330 0 .146
SSE 0 . 004 0 .310 0 . 035 0 . 040
SS 0 .324 0 . 992 0 . 884 0 . 119
DWF 0.465 2 . 158 0 . 810 0 . 179
TE 0 . 001 1.498 0 . 133 0 . 179
POP 0 . 042 0 . 927 0 .374 0 . 155
Table 5.3.
Proxy Variables.
VARIABLE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD DEV
RAIN (mm) 640 1389 963 246
PL (pence) 278 . 2 304 .1 294 . 0 7 . 1
PE (pence) 2 . 872 2 . 872 2 .872 0
PR (pence) 95 .3 95 . 3 95 . 3 0
PP (index) 69 . 5 69 . 5 69 . 5 0
Descriptive statistics give a much clearer picture of the
raw data used in the analysis. What is immediately clear is
the dichotomy between CIPFA data (Table 5.2) and the proxy
variables used (Table 5.3) . The first set of variables
show considerable heterogeneity compared with the latter.
Overall, however, the measures of pollution show a striking
degree of similarity. From this we may predict then, that
cross sectional variation is fairly limited in many ways,
and the regression results should reflect this.
Modelling Results and Diagnostics.
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The two basic approaches taken to modelling the cost
structure of the sewage treatment and disposal industry
will be labelled 'rudimentary' and 'advanced'. The former
is similar to that adopted by Knapp (1978) in which
variables enter and leave the regression according to their
impact on goodness of fit and the statistical significance
of individual coefficients. The latter attempts to draw on
the various functional forms specified in the literature as
being consistent with the basic postulates of economic
theory. Under both headings the results of ordinary and
frontier cost function estimation are recorded and
interpreted.
A Rudimentary Approach.
Proceeding in a similar way to Knapp (1978) a linear
average cost model was constructed and estimated by
ordinary least squares. The preferred specification is
reported in Table 5.4 below. Estimated coefficients are








































Breusch Pagan LM 74.40
§ denotes statistical significance at the 90% level
t denotes statistical significance at the 95% level
* denotes statistical significance at the 99% level119
119 Note that this labelling convention will be adopted in
all following tables.
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The estimation procedure was straightforward. Variables
having little influence on average cost in terms of t and
R2 were excluded. Most notably the price terms did not
enter the equation. Given the structure of the data
heteroscedasticity was identified as a potential problem.
In order to detect this the Breusch-Pagan LM statistic was
calculated (distributed as x2)120- The value of 74.40
indicated rejection of the null of homoscedasticity and
implied that OLS coefficient estimates would be unbiased
but not efficient. Remedial action was taken. Consequently
corrected results are reported in Table 5.4, where White's
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix121 gives
identical coefficient figures but lower standard errors.
The possible problem of multicollinearity was also
addressed by considering the classic symptoms: small
changes in data giving large swings in parameter estimates
despite good F and R2 statistics and the coefficient
estimates having large standard errors. Given the relative
magnitudes of R2 and t multicollinearity was not considered
sufficiently problematic to merit remedial measures such as
ridge regression or principal components work.
An adjusted R2 of 62.2% was encouragingly high and slightly
better than Knapp's figure of 60.75%. In testing the joint
significance of regressors an F (9,132) of 26.76 was enough
to reject the null that coefficients were jointly zero. All
reported coefficients were of the expected sign. All
except the constant were significant at the 95% level; five
were significant and the 99% level. In terms of output,
RECQ (the reciprocal of output) was positively signed and
significant indicating an 1Lv shaped average cost curve and







of output. The inclusion of higher powers of output did not
improve the fit.
Price variables were consistent bad performers, wrongly-
signed and insignificant. Consequently they were omitted
from the final specification. This could have been
predicted by examining the raw data and noting the lack of
cross sectional variation. As a measure of the degree of
treatment SS (the proportion of suspended solids removed in
treatment) persistently outperformed BOD (the proportion of
BOD removed). The tentative conclusion may be drawn that
regulation may be more vigorous for works that discharge
visibly unsightly effluent to a greater extent than those
which discharge equally polluting but less visible effluent
with high BOD levels.
In line with a priori expectations the proportion of trade
effluent to total sewage flow had a positive effect on
average cost, as did the ratio of dry weather flow to total
sewage flow (DWF). The latter loading factor indicated that
the higher the dry weather content of operations the higher
was average cost. Surface water run off may have a
diluting effect, consequently works handling large
quantities of this particular form of effluent may enjoy
reduced costs of operation. In addition, with storm
conditions effluent with a higher than normal BOD may be
discharged. This may not be reflected accurately in the
data reported. The negative coefficient attached to POP
(total sewage flow per head of population) reinforces the
conclusion of economies of scale in treatment and disposal.
Of the treatment dummies only DC (diffused air activated
sludge) and DM (mechanical dewatering by pressing and other
methods) enter singly and in multiplicative combination
with RECQ and BOD. These particular techniques raised
costs, DM being employed more usually in the larger works
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where there was perhaps a greater diversity of treatment
methods. There may be a certain 'water authority' effect
being picked up in these dummies for whilst the DM process
is used in some plants within all authorities only three
share the process represented by DC. However an attempt to
pursue this line of reasoning employing three dummy
variable terms representing primary, secondary and tertiary
treatment, met with little success.
Having examined the results, mention must be made of the
battery of caveats, only slightly less daunting than those
given by Knapp (1978). Clearly the omission of capital
cost, price and technology measures are all serious
drawbacks; but for price an attempt was made to proxy the
variables, incorporate them in the estimation and only
reject them once they had been judged insignificant.
However, in estimation it was still not possible to take
account of weekly, daily and hourly fluctuations in sewage
flow. Nevertheless the estimated function as a short run
relationship does represent an approximation to the
underlying operating cost function and demonstrates the
existence of strong and pervasive economies of scale over
a range of output values. This suggests that sewage
treatment and disposal may have the characteristics of a
local natural monopoly. 122
Before drawing out comparative efficiency conclusions the
analysis is extended in one important way. Following the
work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) , a stochastic
frontier function is estimated. The theory was outlined in
Chapter 3. Using the available cross sectional data a
stochastic cost function with a non-normal asymmetric
122 It is a separate question as to whether there are
diseconomies of scale in the collection and transmission of
sewage ie sewerage. As yet there is insufficient sewerage data
to test the hypothesis.
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disturbance is specified. As before the assumption is made
that the error term comprises a symmetrical component,
normally distributed and a one-sided component with a
truncated half normal distribution. Deviations above the
cost frontier reflect the sum of both random factors and
the firm's inefficiency. This measure may be decomposed to
give a value for overall technical inefficiency and
technical inefficiency by observation. Thus in contrast to
Chapter 4 cardinal measures of inefficiency may be derived
for the sample of firms as a whole and on a firm by firm
basis.
The conventional testing strategy was followed, with a
frontier function specification giving a preferred model as
set out in Table 5.5 below.
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Table 5.5.























The maximum likelihood estimation converged quickly for a
model similar in specification to the one reported in Table
5.4. The difference being that the two multiplicative dummy
terms did not feature. All coefficients were correctly
signed as before with five variables significant at the 90%
level, three at the 95% level and two at the 99% level.
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Again RECQ and DWF performed well. In the process of
arriving at the preferred specification SS outperformed BOD
as an output measure. Overall, economies of scale in sewage
treatment and disposal were confirmed. Additional
information was given for this regression in the reporting
of frontier parameters X and cr are reported. These are used
in the calculation of efficiency measures.
Efficiency: The Rudimentary Approach.
With the preliminary estimation completed the question of
comparative efficiency may be addressed. This may be done
by exploiting one of the strengths of the dataset: its
presentation of plant level information with national
coverage. This implies in turn that the individual works
with costs deviating markedly from the level expected, on
the basis of volume treated and processes used, may be
identified.
The natural choice of comparative efficiency measure for
the first model (Table 5.4) is the regression residual.
This has two components; statistical 'noise' and
'inefficiency', jointly assumed normally distributed. The
two may not be disentangled and consequently the absolute
size of the residual has little significance. Nevertheless
observations may be ranked according to the absolute size
of their residual: positive residuals indicating a higher
observed .average cost than predicted (suggesting
inefficiency), negative residuals the reverse (suggesting
greater efficiency). The information contained in an
ordinal ranking of this sort is all that is needed in order
to construct a set of yardstick comparators.
Observations on the 142 works in the sample are ranked in
Table R1 (see appendix). Ranking runs from those with the
largest negative residual (the most 'efficient') to those
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with the largest positive residual. Clearly, given the
vagaries of data quality and estimation procedures, a
cardinal interpretation of the list is fraught with
difficulty. An ordinal interpretation is to be preferred.
The technique may be repeated for the estimated frontier
function. But in this case a more satisfactory inefficiency
measure may be derived. Setting aside the assumption of
normally distributed disturbances, estimates of overall
technical inefficiency and technical inefficiency by
observation may be derived. At this point, however, the
fragility of estimation and the dangers of working in an
theoretical vacuum must be borne in mind. Given values of
X = 5.81194 and a = 1.66485 , overall mean technical
inefficiency may be calculated at 130.9%; remarkably high.
Given X, the ratio of the error term standard deviates, the
inefficiency component swamps the two sided component
leading to the very high figure. But in contrast to the
previous use of residuals to assess comparative
inefficiency the cardinal measure of Jondrow et al (1982)
is available. Table R2 (see appendix) presents sewage
works ranked according to the size of their predicted one
sided disturbance.
On inspection, an overall mean technical inefficiency level
of 130.9% appears reasonable given results including
outliers such as Halifax North Dean, Aycliffe and Leek.
However the use of the results as cardinal measures of
inefficiency is questionable. And whilst the pressing
requirement is merely for ordinal measurement, attention
should be paid to these outliers.
Again, on inspection, both models with slightly different
specifications and radically different estimation methods,
appear to give similar rankings. If this were indeed the
case the results would be desirably robust. One formal way
of assessing this correlation is by the use of Spearman's
rank correlation coefficient r.123
For Rank 1 and Rank 2 r = 0.8852 indicating a very high
degree of positive correlation. If there is little to
choose between models in terms of ranking, the obvious
choice would be to follow the frontier model in
constructing a workable system of comparative efficiency
measurement. From a theoretical point of view the frontier
model appears to have slightly more to recommend it.
An Advanced Approach
In answer to one of the more serious criticisms of the
Knapp (1978) data-mining approach, a second methodology was
employed. Estimation proceeded following the specification
of a theoretically sound cost function. To maintain as
general a specification as possible, in common with earlier
chapters, the transcendental logarithmic cost function was
employed.
Beginning with the most general specification further
assumptions of homotheticity, homogeneity and unitary
elasticity of substitution were made, the appropriate
parameter restrictions applied and tested.
A general to specific modelling strategy was used, testing
down from the most general translog cost function with four
input prices. Two dependent variable specifications were
123
Spearman, C (1904) 'The Proof and Measurement of
Association Between Two Things'. American Journal of Psychology,
vol 15, pp 72-101. r is a non parametric statistic given by:
r=l- 6Srf2
n(n2-1)
where d = difference of rank and n = number of observations.
193
adopted: an average cost per cubic metre of total daily-
sewage flow and total cost per year, both normalised on the
price of labour. Non-hedonic124and
hedonic125specif ications were employed at every stage,
treatment dummy variables entered in linear and
multiplicative combination. Model parsimony was assumed
desirable, and results indicating wrongly signed price and
output coefficients were rejected as inconsistent with
received theory.
Several general observations emerged from the process of
estimation. Firstly estimates of the general translog model
appeared degenerate. Secondly, the average cost
specification performed very badly, suffering severe
problems of multicollinearity especially in terms of input
prices. This was clearly going to be the case when PL was
the only price variable enjoying any cross sectional
variation. Thirdly, total sewage flow as a measure of
output performed equally badly.
As a result of these early observations the total cost
specification (normalised on the price of labour) and three
output variables were employed: total BOD removed annually,
total SS removed annually and total BOD+ SS mg/litre
removed annually. Of these total SS removed outperformed
the other two in line with earlier results. However,
general to specific testing was not straightforward and the
results often contradictory. The outcome was that both the
non-hedonic and hedonic preferred specifications were found
to be Cobb Douglas in two input prices126.
124 Specifications including only cost, output and price
terms.
125 Specifications including 4technologicalv conditions,
physical attributes etc.
126 Note that the function, being Cobb Douglas, is globally
concave.
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Four preferred models are reported below. These correspond
to non-hedonic and hedonic ordinary cost function estimates
followed by non-hedonic and hedonic frontier estimates.
195
Table 5.6.
Dependent Variable = Ln Cl/Pl ie Gross works cost per year
(pence) normalised on price of labour.
















Table 5.6 presents the best non-hedonic specification. The
model is clearly rather unsatisfactory. Although after
correcting for heteroscedasticity, the output coefficient
is significant. This is reflected in an adjusted R2 of
60.9% and the firm rejection of the hypothesis that all
coefficients are jointly zero. From the results no firm
conclusions can be drawn about the effect of price terms.
This may be a reflection of the lack of cross sectional
variation in the database for these variables. This prompts






















Breusch Pagan LM 4.77
In terms of diagnostic testing the improvement is marked.
All coefficients are correctly signed, and all are
significant at the 95% level save the price and constant
terms. The null of homoscedasticity in disturbances may
not be rejected whilst an F of 106.34 and adjusted R2 of
78.9% are both satisfactory. Again the 'loading variables'
DWF and POP are included, POP ( or POPU specified in the
earlier model) taking a positive sign with total cost as
the dependent variable. As noted earlier the output
measure Q2 represents total SS removed annually. At this
early stage the work confirms the conclusion that the
physical characteristics of sewage flow, and sewerage
arrangements in general, have a significant impact on
costs. Once again, price terms do not enter strongly.
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Before examining efficiency implications the counterpart
frontier estimates are presented. Table 5.8 being the non-
hedonic specification and Table 5.9 the hedonic.
Table 5.8.








































Most notably, neither specification is improved. Indeed
for the frontier hedonic model results are exactly as
before. Waldman (19 8 2)127has shown that if OLS residuals
are positively skewed for the cost frontier, the maximum
likelihood estimate for the stochastic frontier model is
simply OLS. Thus Table 5.9 and Table 5.7 contain identical
results. Nothing further can be added, except to note that
this raises the question of incorrect model specification
or data which are inconsistent with the model.
127 Waldman, D (1982) 1 A Stationary Point for the Stochastic




Despite their drawbacks, efficiency rankings on the basis
of residuals and the Jondrow et al (1982) adjustments may
be presented. The appendix contains Table R3 (corresponding
to the preferred non-hedonic specification), Table R4
(corresponding to the preferred hedonic specification) and
Table R5 (corresponding to the non-hedonic frontier
specification).
Once again the residuals in Tables R3 and R4 should be
interpreted in a purely ordinal way, whilst those in Table
R5 purport to be cardinal measures. This time technical
inefficiency calculated for the nonhedonic frontier
specification amounts to 0.436, or 43.6%, a much more
reasonable figure than before. It appears that by giving
the analysis an improved theoretical foundation results may
be more generally reliable; and the overall level of
technical inefficiency is only one third of that suggested
by the earlier results.
Using Spearman's rank correlation coefficient once again,
pairs of rankings may be assessed. Findings are as follows.
For rankings 3 and 4 ie nonhedonic and hedonic
specifications r = 0.7525 indicating fairly strong positive
correlation. The output variable clearly lies behind this
conclusion. For rankings 3 and 5, corresponding to the OLS
and frontier estimates, r = 0.9996 indicating very strong
correlation, and suggesting that OLS residual rankings do
indeed mirror those of frontier estimation.
Overall the models presented above, although limited, do
not appear any less satisfactory than those of Knapp
(1978) . Furthermore the latter models are more
theoretically sound. But throughout it has become clear
that the hedonic specifications taking into account the
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physical characteristics of operations are the most
appropriate and the most plausible.
One final piece of analysis was undertaken. With all ten
RWA's represented in the sample an attempt was made to
assess whether or not any one particular authority enjoyed
consistently lower rankings (ie greater efficiency) for all
estimated models. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 below give the mean
and standard deviations of rankings for each of the five
models reported by Water Authority area. A lower mean
represents a higher average ranking on all models for works
in the area. Standard deviations represent dispersion of
results; and may proxy the potential for making efficiency
improvements. High standard deviations would indicate
greater potential for making efficiency improvements by
works within one authority's area. R1 to R5 correspond to




Mean Rankings by Water Authority Area.
AREA TABLE
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Anglian 67 . 6 71.1 64 . 7 58 . 5 64 . 5
Northumbrian 77 . 8 81. 7 63 .1 78 . 0 63 . 3
North West 65 . 3 58 . 6 83 . 3 61.4 83 . 3
Severn Trent 61.7 68 . 6 72 .4 71.1 72 .1
Southern 75 . 3 75 . 9 66.3 74 . 6 65 . 5
South West 86 . 9 72 .4 58 . 9 74 . 9 58 . 6
Thames 78 .2 78 .3 91.5 93 . 5 90 . 8
Welsh 89 . 0 89 . 9 78 . 6 83 .2 78 . 1
Wessex 62 . 3 60 . 8 46 . 7 54 . 4 46 . 8
Yorkshire 72 . 6 74 .1 72 . 9 76 . 3 74 . 7
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Table 5.11.
Standard Deviation of Rankings by Water Authority Area.
AREA TABLE
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Anglian 41. 3 44 . 8 35.4 33 . 3 35.4
Northumbrian 48 . 3 50 . 5 40 . 5 46 . 3 40.5
North West 29 . 1 29 . 2 39 . 9 38.6 40 . 0
Severn Trent 37 . 3 36 . 5 44 . 7 32 . 3 44 . 8
Southern 40 . 7 44 . 9 43 . 3 45 . 6 42 . 7
South West 35 . 7 33 . 7 31.4 40 . 9 31. 3
Thames 39 . 4 40 . 9 32 . 8 34 . 5 32 . 7
Welsh 49 . 2 47.6 33 . 6 45 .3 33 . 6
Wessex 42 . 0 37 . 0 20 . 2 34 . 8 20 .1
Yorkshire 44 . 7 41.1 48 . 6 45 . 7 48 . 9
Overall, although the differences are not great, the Wessex
Region has the lowest mean rank most consistently, followed
by Anglian and Severn Trent. Thames has the highest mean
rank followed by Wales and Yorkshire. In noting these
results it should be remembered that only the largest
treatment works of each region are included, and therefore
a scale effect may be picked up in the above tables.
However, on reexamining the data, the scale of works for
Thames and Wessex in the sample do not appear to be
radically different. Overall, the results do give some
indication of relative efficiency region by region on the




So what are we to conclude from these rather uneven
results? Are we able to say anything with any degree of
confidence?
The starting point must be the rather disappointing results
from the point of view of orthodox economic theory. Linear
cost models which draw little on neoclassical production
theory appear to outperform their carefully specified
counterparts according to most testing criteria. But the
question must be asked as to whether one should be
overconcerned with the theoretical niceties in constructing
a tractable system of comparative efficiency measurement.
A first best, theoretically watertight method is probably
unattainable given the limitations of technique and data.
A second best alternative is probably all that can be
achieved: and, more significantly, all that is required by
a regulator. In this light, the approach presented above
may be regarded as a good 'first approximation' to the
solution. After all, few would argue that industrial
production takes place in a Cobb Douglas world. Empirical
observation must shape our theory, not the other way
around. No excuses need be made for functional forms which
are convenient for the purposes of algebraic manipulation
but lacking in other respects.
One of the other difficulties in the study is the
specification of the output measure. Much empirical work is
conducted at a higher level of aggregation so the issue of
output quality does not arise. This chapter has taken a
quite different approach in continuing to work at the micro
level. Aggregation is rejected; and its rejection causes
many complications. But ultimately it must be more
illuminating to work with hedonic variables than to assume
them away.
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More positively it was found that price factors are not the
crucial element in determining cost functions. They are
swamped by hedonic variables which represent the conditions
under which firms operate. This effect may be amplified by
the particular dataset used in this study. As mentioned
above, price variables have little or no variation across
the cross section. However, it remains generally the case
that the heterogeneous circumstances under which firms
operate determine the cost profile. For sewage treatment
and disposal, different physical terrain, population
density and industrial activities influence methods of
treatment and disposal. The real challenge for a regulator
is to understand these conditions and make allowance for
them in any analysis. For England and Wales, the work on
'explanatory factors' by Ofwat and the water and sewerage
companies indicates that they are fully appraised of this.
Any comparative efficiency measurement must take full
account of the different circumstances faced by each
operator.
To be aware to the importance of heterogeneity is the first
important step. To analyze it for one sector of the
industry is the second. But it remains to be seen if the
problem is more exaggerated for sewage treatment and
disposal than for water. From the evidence presented above
it appears that it is. Sewage is more heterogeneous than
water in quality terms as it comes into a treatment works
and as it leaves. Therefore, hedonic variables are more
likely to have a greater influence on the cost function.
But with greater variation, the difficulties of
constructing a system of comparative efficiency measurement
are increased. The more heterogeneous the circumstances,
the more they depart from Shleifer's (1985) ideal
conditions and the more difficult is the implementation of
yardstick competition. A regulator would therefore be
advised to begin with water and move on to sewage.
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Given all the reservations over the results, they do
nonetheless indicate that large differences in technical
efficiency exist between operating units in the industry.
The high figures suggest that in the year of the study
there was great scope for improvements in efficiency and
cost savings.
Comparing the results, briefly, with those of Chapter 4,
many parallels may be drawn. Both pieces of work have
demonstrated that a method of comparative efficiency
measurement using econometric techniques may be operated.
Both studies have indicated that price terms may not be the
key determinant of the various cost functions.
Theoretically sound functional forms proved very difficult
to maintain and Cobb Douglas models were used throughout.
But technically, the sewerage study had the edge on the
water study in that cardinal measures of inefficiency may
be derived from the cross sectional data. This is not the
case with fixed effects models employing panel data;
although as has been noted this does not invalidate the use
of the techniques in an regulatory solution based on a
system of yardstick competition. The weaker ordinal
rankings are sufficient for the purpose.
Finally it appears to be the case that both the sewerage
and water operators had no clear basis of judging the
efficiency of their operations. Considerable ignorance
surrounded their work; an ignorance that the results of
econometric cost function estimation may do something to
dispel.
Thus using plant level cross sectional sewage treatment and
disposal data, this chapter has demonstrated how a
tractable means of comparative efficiency measurement for
yardstick competition may be worked. Ordinal rankings based
on residuals contain sufficient information for the
206
construction of comparators and through the use of
Spearmanxs correlation coefficient some of these have been
shown to be robust.
207
Appendix I.
CIPFA Sewage Treatment and Disposal Statistics 1979-80:
Variables Reported.
Water Authority / Division / Works.
Date of commencement of operation or any major
reconstruction.
Population of area draining to the works.
Method of purification.
Dry weather flow (cubic metres per day).
Trade effluent (cubic metres per day).
Total Sewage Flow (cubic metres per day).
Proportion of dry weather flow which is treated (%).
Average strength of influent (mg/litre)
- 5 days Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) at 20°C
- Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD)
- Suspended solids (SS)
Approved river standard (mg/litre)
- 5 days BOD at 20°C
- COD
- Suspended solids
Standard of purification actually achieved (mg/litre)
- 5 days BOC at 20°C
- COD
- Suspended solids
Works charges (costs per cubic metre DWF)
- Sewage purification (subdivided by treatment method)
- Sludge disposal (subdivided by disposal method)
- Other direct works charges
- Gross works costs
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Appendix II.
CIPFA Sewage Treatment and Disposal Statistics 1979-80:
Method of Purification. Dummy Variable
Biological Filtration:
- Single Filtration DA
- Other DB
Activated Sludge:
- Diffused Air DC
- Mechanical DD
- Pure Oxygen Plant DE
Tertiary Treatment:
- Land DF
- Micro Strainers DG





- Vacuum Filtration DL




- Annual Rainfall by Water Authority Area 1980 (mm).
Water Services Association, 'Waterfacts 1986v Table
2A p6 .
Prices:
- Price of Labour (PL) Average hourly earnings (pence)
manual men in other energy and water supply for
1980 (SIC 15-17). New Earnings Survey Part E, 1990.
- Price of Electricity (PE) Average net selling value
per KwHr (pence) for waterworks including gasworks,
drainage and sewage pumping stations (1980) . Digest
of UK Energy Statistics 1982 Table 61 pp92-93.
- Price of Rates (PR) Average non-domestic rate
poundage (pence) for English Authorities 1979/80.
Local Government Financial Statistics England and
Wales 1980/1 p36 Table 21.
- Retail Prices Index (PP) November 1980. Water
Services Association 'Waterfacts 1990' pl2.
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Appendix IV.
Tables of residuals for individual works under the various
modelling assumptions.
Rl, R2, R3, R4, R5 represent residuals.
ID represents Local Water Authority area:
1 = Anglian
2 = Northumbrian
3 = North West
4 = Severn Trent
5 = Southern






WORKS ID Rl RANK
Little Marlow 7 -3 . 0504 1
Otley 10 -1.9763 2
Miskin 8 -1 . 6365 3
Tiverton-Holywell 6 -1 . 5841 4
Bishop Auckland 2 -1.5083 5
Stoke Bardolph 4 -1.4571 6
Hayden 4 -1.3925 7
Gravesend-Denton 5 -1 .3395 8
Trowbridge 9 -1.3258 9
Eccles 3 -1.1897 10
Bridgewater 9 -1.1866 11
Peterborough-Fengate 1 -1.1589 12
Cynon Valley 8 -1.0871 13
Norwich-Whitlingham 1 -1.0571 14
Cambridge 1 -1 . 0467 15
Derby 4 -1.0417 16
Brighouse 10 -0.9815 17
Blackburn 3 -0.9523 18
Finedon 1 -0.9393 19
Yaddlethorpe 4 -0.9311 20
Wellington-Tone 9 -0.9077 21
Sittingbourne 5 -0 . 9047 22
Keighley-Marley 10 -0.8745 23
Macclesfield 3 -0.8189 24
Barnhurst 4 -0.8167 25
Consett 2 -0.7997 26
Loughborough 4 -0.7443 27
Bristol-Avonmouth 9 -0.7273 28
Chesterfield 10 -0.7189 29
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Medway-Motney Hill 5 -0 . 6616 30
Sutton-Byram Park 10 -0.6537 31
Warrington 3 -0.6222 32
Blackbirds 7 -0.6059 33
Chertsey 7 -0.6032 34
Fareham-Salterns Lane 5 -0.5932 35
Freehold 4 -0.5744 36
Barmston Lane 2 -0.5683 37
Barnsley-Lund Wood 10 -0.568 38
Rotherham-Aldwarke 10 -0.5549 39
Bury 3 -0.548 40
Liverpool-North 3 -0.538 41
Tonbridge 5 -0.5255 42
Rushmoor 4 -0.5252 43
Clay Mills 4 -0.5248 44
Poole 9 -0.5157 45
Huddersfield 10 -0.4993 46
Southend-Prittlewell 1 -0.4813 47
Bradford-North Brierley 10 -0.4805 48
High Wycombe 7 -0.4668 49
Salisbury 9 -0.4612 50
Lincoln-Canwick 1 -0.4524 51
Carlisle 3 -0.4289 52
Basildon-Nevendon 1 -0.4144 53
Northampton-Great Billing 1 -0.4018 54
Canterbury 5 -0.3887 55
Southport 3 -0.3872 56
Dukinfield 3 -0.3309 57
Maple Lodge 7 -0.2820 58
Owlwood 10 -0.2758 59
Darlington-Stressholme 2 -0.2671 60
St Austell-Menagwins 6 -0.2497 61
Kidderminster-Oldington 4 -0.2243 62
Bolton 3 -0.2174 63
Basingstoke 7 -0.1804 64
Birtley 2 -0.1755 65
Penybont 8 -0.1672 66
Salford 3 -0.1594 67
Netheridge 4 -0.1400 68
Wawlip 4 -0.1392 69
Corby 1 -0.1229 70
Rochdale 3 -0.1217 71
Minworth 4 -0.1147 72
Bath Saltford 9 -0.1051 73
Stockport 3 -0.0980 74
Rossendale 3 -0 . 0969 75
Worcester 4 -0.0934 76
Havant-Budds Farm 5 -0.0489 77
Oldham 3 -0.0319 78
Thornham 5 -0 . 0131 79
Hoscar 3 -0.0071 80
Southampton-Woolston 5 -0.0023 81
Ashford 5 0 . 0041 82
Brockhurst 4 0 . 0062 83
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Ponthir 8 0.0090 84
Davyhulme 3 0.0368 85
Burnley 3 0 . 0539 86
Strongford 4 0.1044 87
Brancote 4 0.1159 88
Crewe 3 0.1159 89
Exeter-Countess Wear 6 0.1378 90
York-Naburn 10 0.1613 91
Cirencester-Shorncote 7 0.1757 92
Bournemouth-Holdenhurst 9 0.1868 93
Sheffield-Blackburn Meadows 10 0.1871 94
Reading-Manor Farm 7 0 .2030 95
Plymouth-Camels Head 6 0.2141 96
Cramlington 2 0.2214 97
Roundhill 4 0.2340 98
ColChester-Haven 1 0.2412 99
Truro-Newham 6 0.2668 100
Chester-Sealand Road 8 0 .2741 101
Preston-Clifton Marsh 3 0.3054 102
Chelmsford-Brookend 1 0.3086 103
Thurrock-Marsh Farm 1 0 .3145 104
Guildford 7 0.3180 105
Coleshill 4 0.3276 106
Southampton-Millbrook 5 0 .3332 107
Plymouth-Ernesettie 6 0 .3500 108
Leeds-Knostrop 10 0.3571 109
Dewsbury-Mitchell Laithes 10 0 .3720 110
Dcncaster-Sandal1 10 0.3978 111
Runcorn 3 0.5063 112
Kingston-Seymour 9 0 . 5134 113
Bedford-Summerhouse Hill 1 0.5577 114
Bradford-Esholt 10 0.5715 115
Taunton-Ham 9 0.7750 116
Barnstaple-Ashford 6 0 . 8547 117
Slough 7 0 . 8841 118
Plymouth-Marsh Mills 6 0.9051 119
Luton-East Hyde 7 0.9151 120
Harlow-Rye Meads 7 0 . 9663 121
Maidstone-Aylesford 5 0 . 9735 122
Ray Hall 4 1. 0422 123
St Helens 3 1. 1581 124
Eastleigh-Chickenhall Lane 5 1.1687 125
Christchurch 9 1.2017 126
Swindon-Rodbourne 7 1. 2246 127
Ipswich-Cliff Quay 1 1. 2743 128
Hereford 8 1.3277 129
Durham-Barkers Haugh 2 1.5524 130
Wellingborough-Broadholme 1 1. 6188 131
Southampton-Portswood 5 1 . 6751 132
Fullerton-Andover 5 1 . 6936 133
Gowerton 8 1.7728 134
Wrexham-Five Fords 8 1. 8220 135
Nash 8 1. 8367 136

























































2 3 . 2520 141
10 3.2817 142
ID R2 RANK
7 0 . 1141 1
1 0 . 1273 2












1 0 . 2929 15
10 0.2970 16
5 0 .3386 17
5 0.3414 18
1 0 .3447 19
7 0 .3506 20
2 0 .3548 21
4 0 .3564 22
8 0 .3693 23
10 0.3916 24
7 0 .4212 25
1 0 . 4372 26
5 0 . 4492 27
3 0 .4572 28
3 0.4665 29
10 0.4795 30
5 0 .4878 31
4 0 .5009 32














Poole 9 0.6758 46
Chesterfield 10 0.7084 47
Darlington-Stressholme 2 0.7159 48
Oldham 3 0.7345 49
Rossendale 3 0.7372 50
Thornham 5 0.7412 51
Northampton-Great Billing 1 0.7432 52
Bath Saltford 9 0.7495 53
Bolton 3 0.7524 54
Plymouth-Ernesettle 6 0.7720 55
High Wycombe 7 0.7926 56
Owlwood 10 0.8086 57
Exeter-Countess Wear 6 0.8103 58
Worcester 4 0.8154 59
Bury 3 0.8177 60
Freehold 4 0 . 8199 61
Penybont 8 0 . 8342 62
Barnhurst 4 0.8392 63
Preston-Clifton Marsh 3 0.9110 64
Kidderminster-Oldington 4 0.9128 65
Chertsey 7 0.9474 66
Coleshill 4 0.9503 67
Bradford-North Brierley 10 0.9825 68
Canterbury 5 1.0085 69
Rochdale 3 1.0110 70
St Austell-Menagwins 6 1.0476 71
Dukinfield 3 1.0527 72
Basingstoke 7 1.0634 73
Crewe 3 1.0782 74
Truro-Newham 6 1.1026 75
York-Naburn 10 1.1152 76
Derby 4 1.1315 77
Bournemouth-Holdenhurst 9 1.1363 78
Huddersfield 10 1.1420 79
Ponthir 8 1.1467 80
Davyhulme 3 1.1548 81
Barnstaple-Ashford 6 1.1588 82
Corby 1 1.1601 83
Hoscar 3 1.1633 84
Wawlip 4 1.1740 85
Cirencester-Shorncote 7 1.1776 86
Stockport 3 1.1905 87
Colchester-Haven 1 1.2162 88
Clay Mills 4 1.2451 89
Lincoln-Canwick 1 1.2489 90
Southampton-Millbrook 5 1.2568 91
Havant-Budds Farm 5 1.2735 92
Doncaster-Sandal1 10 1.2974 93
Brancote 4 1.2988 94
Birtley 2 1.3058 95
Basildon-Nevendon 1 1.3455 96
Leeds-Knostrop 10 1.3792 97
Burnley 3 1.3899 98








































































































Bishop Auckland 2 -0 . 8134 7
Otley 10 -0 . 7595 8
Brancote 4 -0 . 7536 9
Finedon 1 -0.7241 10
Consett 2 -0 . 7170 11
Sutton-Byram Park 10 -0.7084 12
Yaddlethorpe 4 -0 . 6874 13
Barmston Lane 2 -0.6555 14
Blackburn 3 -0 . 6511 15
Peterborough-Fengate 1 -0.6428 16
Hayden 4 -0.6132 17
Netheridge 4 -0.5875 18
Tiverton-Holywell 6 -0.5397 19
Owlwood 10 -0.5300 20
Penybont 8 -0.5188 21
Salford 3 -0.5122 22
Rushmoor 4 -0.4955 23
Thornham 5 -0.4808 24
Truro-Newham 6 -0.4641 25
Trowbridge 9 -0.4448 26
Chesterfield 10 -0.4406 27
Colchester-Haven 1 -0.4083 28
Strongford 4 -0.4027 29
Brighouse 10 -0.4013 30
Warrington 3 -0.3855 31
Northampton-Great Billing 1 -0.3573 32
Havant-Budds Farm 5 -0.3403 33
Bristol-Avonmouth 9 -0.3354 34
Freehold 4 -0.3332 35
St Austell-Menagwins 6 -0.3274 36
Barnsley-Lund Wood 10 -0.3245 37
Little Marlow 7 -0.3036 38
Cambridge 1 -0.2971 39
Southend-Prittlewell 1 -0.2951 40
Wellington-Tone 9 -0.2890 41
Bournemouth-Hoidenhurst 9 -0.2770 42
Rotherham-Aldwarke 10 -0.2763 43
Chertsey 7 -0.2635 44
Fareham-Salterns Lane 5 -0.2405 45
Southport 3 -0.2389 46
Poole 9 -0.2316 47
Bridgewater 9 -0.2253 48
Carlisle 3 -0 . 2204 49
Barnstaple-Ashford 6 -0.2167 50
Clay Mills 4 -0.2108 51
Corby 1 -0.2050 52
Blackbirds 7 -0.1778 53
Kingston-Seymour 9 -0.1585 54
Cynon Valley 8 -0.1564 55
Ponthir 8 -0.1452 56
Wrexham-Five Fords 8 -0.1408 57
Kidderminster-01dington 4 -0.1371 58
Roundhill 4 -0 .1337 59
Morley 10 -0.1199 60
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Taunton-Ham 9 -0 .1104 61
Liverpool-North 3 -0 . 0914 62
Cirencester-Shorncote 7 -0 . 0676 63
Basingstoke 7 -0 . 0647 64
Plymouth-Marsh Mills 6 -0.0583 65
Plymouth-Ernesettle 6 -0.0534 66
Ashford 5 -0.0361 67
Medway-Motney Hill 5 -0.0277 68
Worcester 4 -0 . 0091 69
Durham-Barkers Haugh 2 -0.0063 70
Chester-Sealand Road 8 -0.0057 71
Darlington-Stressholme 2 0.0017 72
Bedford-Summerhouse Hill 1 0.0026 73
Norwich-Whitlingham 1 0.0154 74
Bath Saltford 9 0.0172 75
Dewsbury-Mitchell Laithes 10 0 . 0241 76
Dukinfield 3 0.0482 77
Barnhurst 4 0.0694 78
Chelmsford-Brookend 1 0.0761 79
Christchurch 9 0.0858 80
Macclesfield 3 0.0900 81
Preston-Clifton Marsh 3 0.1246 82
Doncaster-Sandal1 10 0.1265 83
Birtley 2 0.1268 84
Aycliffe 2 0.1447 85
Stoke Bardolph 4 0.1505 86
Southampton-Woolston 5 0.1535 87
Lincoln-Canwick 1 0.1548 88
Bolton 3 0.1553 89
Bradford-Esholt 10 0.1612 90
Hereford 8 0.1654 91
Southampton-Millbrook 5 0.1744 92
Maidstone-Aylesford 5 0.1814 93
Basildon-Nevendon 1 0.1818 94
Exeter-Countess Wear 6 0.1882 95
Cramlington 2 0.1982 96
Crewe 3 0.2033 97
Burnley 3 0.2076 98
York-Naburn 10 0.2193 99
Stockport 3 0 .2245 100
Guildford 7 0 . 2280 101
Reading-Manor Farm 7 0 . 2315 102
Hoscar 3 0 . 2408 103
Ray Hall 4 0 . 2455 104
Ipswich-Cliff Quay 1 0.2858 105
Erockhurst 4 0 .2996 106
Loughborough 4 0 .3042 107
Miskin 8 0 .3160 108
Harlow-Rye Meads 7 0 .3566 109
High Wycombe 7 0 .3674 110
Bury 3 0 .3733 111
Coleshill 4 0 .3817 112
Wei1ingborough-Broadholme 1 0 .3823 113






































































































Bridgewater 9 -0 .4243 21
Bishop Auckland 2 -0 .4033 22
Trowbridge 9 -0 .4013 23
Tonbridge 5 -0 . 3936 24
Rotherham-Aldwarke 10 -0 . 3840 25
Preston-Clifton Marsh 3 -0.3822 26
Barmston Lane 2 -0.3760 27
Stoke Bardolph 4 -0.3713 28
Carlisle 3 -0.3693 29
Sutton-Byram Park 10 -0.3692 30
Consett 2 -0.3604 31
Salisbury 9 -0.3451 32
Yaddlethorpe 4 -0.3308 33
Otley 10 -0.3240 34
Poole 9 -0.3177 35
Miskin 8 -0.3156 36
Tiverton-Holywell 6 -0.2794 37
Liverpool-North 3 -0.2600 38
Cambridge 1 -0.2567 39
Barnstaple-Ashford 6 -0.2188 40
Northampton-Great Billing 1 -0.2073 41
Macclesfield 3 -0.1950 42
Darlington-Stressholme 2 -0.1902 43
Southport 3 -0.1810 44
Corby 1 -0.1677 45
Chesterfield 10 -0.1461 46
Rushmoor 4 -0.1401 47
Brancote 4 -0.1176 48
Chertsey 7 -0.1130 49
Penybont 8 -0.1041 50
Wellington-Tone 9 -0.0989 51
Norwich-Whitlingham 1 -0.0984 52
Ponthir 8 -0.0895 53
St Austell-Menagwins 6 -0.0794 54
Clay Mills 4 -0.0594 55
Colchester-Haven 1 -0.0590 56
Bath Saltford 9 -0.0570 57
Dukinfield 3 -0.0408 58
Lincoln-Canwick 1 -0.0363 59
Ipswich-Cliff Quay 1 -0.0288 60
Bournemouth-Hoidenhurst 9 -0.0282 61
Che1msford-Brookend 1 -0.0260 62
Kidderminster-Oldington 4 -0.0254 63
Barnhurst 4 -0.0187 64
York-Naburn 10 0.0045 65
Stockport 3 0.0112 66
Burnley 3 0.0150 67
Freehold 4 0.0157 68
Bolton 3 0.0177 69
Havant-Budds Farm 5 0.0185 70
Strongford 4 0.0247 71
Rossendale 3 0.0403 72
Oldham 3 0.0454 73


















































































4 0 . 2169 101
7 0.2192 102












8 0 . 3302 115




















































































































St Austell-Menagwins 6 0.2771 36
Little Marlow 7 0.2811 37
Cambridge 1 0 .2856 38
Barnsley-Lund Wood 10 0 .2860 39
Southend-Prittlewell 1 0 .2860 40
Wellington-Tone 9 0.2879 41
Bournemouth-Hoidenhurst 9 0.2923 42
Chertsey 7 0.2927 43
Fareham-Salterns Lane 5 0.2995 44
Rotherham-Aldwarke 10 0.3004 45
Southport 3 0.3043 46
Poole 9 0.3060 47
Bridgewater 9 0.3073 48
Barnstaple-Ashford 6 0.3100 49
Carlisle 3 0.3101 50
Clay Mills 4 0.3108 51
Corby 1 0.3134 52
Blackbirds 7 0.3199 53
Cynon Valley 8 0.3297 54
Kingston-Seymour 9 0.3297 55
Ponthir 8 0 .3338 56
Kidderminster-Oldington 4 0.3353 57
Wrexham-Five Fords 8 0.3356 58
Roundhill 4 0.3366 59
Taunton-Ham 9 0.3470 60
Morley 10 0 .3534 61
Liverpool-North 3 0.3549 62
Cirencester-Shorncote 7 0.3580 63
Basingstoke 7 0.3598 64
Plymouth-Marsh Mills 6 0.3664 65
Plymouth-Ernesettie 6 0.3674 66
Ashford 5 0.3706 67
Medway-Motney Hill 5 0.3740 68
Worcester 4 0.3834 69
Chester-Sealand Road 8 0 .3864 70
Durham-Barkers Haugh 2 0.3882 71
Bedford-Summerhouse Hill 1 0.3899 72
Darlington-Stressholme 2 0.3917 73
Norwich-Whitlingham 1 0.3953 74
Bath Saltford 9 0.3966 75
Dukinfield 3 0.4105 76
Dewsbury-Mitchell Laithes 10 0.4117 77
Barnhurst 4 0.4167 78
Chelmsford-Brookend 1 0.4210 79
Christchurch 9 0 .4260 80
Macclesfield 3 0.4288 81
Preston-Clifton Marsh 3 0 .4449 82
Birtley 2 0 .4459 83
Southampton-Woolston 5 0.4519 84
Stoke Bardolph 4 0.4537 85
Aycliffe 2 0 .4553 86
Lincoln-Canwick 1 0.4567 87
Doneaster-Sandal1 10 0.4576 88
Bolton 3 0.4599 89
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Hereford 8 0 .4623 90
Southampton-Mi1lbrook 5 0 .4623 91
Maidstone-Aylesford 5 0.4656 92
Basildon-Nevendon 1 0.4698 93
Exeter-Countess Wear 6 0 .4742 94
Bradford-Esholt 10 0 .4753 95
Cramlington 2 0.4800 96
Crewe 3 0.4824 97
Burnley 3 0 .4845 98
Guildford 7 0 .4884 99
Reading-Manor Farm 7 0.4906 100
Stockport 3 0 .4935 101
Ray Hall 4 0.4998 102
Hoscar 3 0.5019 103
York-Naburn 10 0 .5033 104
Ipswich-Cliff Quay 1 0 . 5222 105
Brockhurst 4 0 . 5278 106
Loughborough 4 0 . 5298 107
Miskin 8 0 . 5367 108
Harlow-Rye Meads 7 0 .5569 109
High Wycombe 7 0 . 5617 110
Southampton-Portswood 5 0.5715 111
Coleshill 4 0.5727 112
Bury 3 0.5728 113
Wellingborough-Broadholme 1 0 . 5748 114
Plymouth-Camels Head 6 0.5821 115
Canterbury 5 0.5866 116
Gowerton 8 0.6023 117
Oldham 3 0 . 6165 118
Maple Lodge 7 0.6256 119
Eastleigh-Chickenhall Lane 5 0.6261 120
Rossendale 3 0.6272 121
Fullerton-Andover 5 0.6313 122
Bradford-North Brierley 10 0 . 6340 123
Runcorn 3 0.6467 124
Slough 7 0.6678 125
Wawlip 4 0 . 6766 126
Thurrock-Marsh Farm 1 0.6792 127
Swindon-Rodbourne 7 0.6885 128
Sedgeletch 2 0.7050 129
Nash 8 0.7390 130
Luton-East Hyde 7 0.7450 131
Wakefield-Calder Vale 10 0.7573 132
Rochdale 3 0.7696 133
Sheffield-Blackburn Meadows 10 0.7886 134
Davyhulme 3 0.8199 135
St Helens 3 0.8428 136
Huddersfield 10 0 . 8429 137
Leeds-Knostrop 10 0.8576 138
Derby 4 0.9535 139
Leek 4 1.2211 140
Halifax-North Dean 10 1 . 2597 141





At this point it is appropriate to take stock of the
preceding work, and to ask how far this has taken us in
answering the central question - 'can yardstick competition
work'? Chapters 4 and 5 both addressed the issue using
quantitative data. In those, however, we considered the
narrower question of whether a tractable means of
comparative efficiency measurement could be devised.
Despite the limited data available we concluded that it
could; subject to certain caveats and provisos.
The quantitative analysis yielded other results of some
interest. It confirmed Shleifer's (1985) contention that
regression analysis might be employed in the process, and
that it is possible to arrive at an ordinal ranking of
companies which is robust and gives some indication of the
comparative efficiency of firms. Price variables were found
not to be the crucial element in determining the cost
function. Rather the effects of price were swamped by the
effects of heterogeneous physical conditions represented by
hedonic variables. Operational economies of scale were
found to be exhausted at a fairly low level for water, and
there appeared to be a wide variation in technical
efficiency between operators in the sewerage industry.
The quantitative work also highlighted the importance of
the cost of capital and the valuation of capital stock to
the regulation of the industry. Historic cost measures were
found to be unreliable and misleading. When current cost
estimates of stock were included the effect was to swamp
the estimate of total cost masking the effect of changes in
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operating costs. Overall, the value of the analysis lay in
the fact that it added to the information set available to
the Regulator. The fact that the extra information was
imperfect did not invalidate the whole process (appealing
to the results of Shavell (1979) and Holmstrom (1979))
Technically, then, we have demonstrated that one of the
prerequisites of yardstick competition - comparative
efficiency measurement - is possible. But this leaves many
important questions unanswered. Questions which are not
susceptible to quantitative analysis, but would enrich the
understanding of yardstick competition considerably. In
order to develop this understanding it is necessary to
widen the field of study; to examine more closely the
system as it operates in the English and Welsh water
industry. From this it may be possible to establish general
principles which would guide a policy maker towards or away
from employing a similar regulatory solution in other
industries.
Field Research: A Rationale.
Having utilised quantitative data in the early chapters a
quite different approach is proposed for the last section
of the work. The quantitative data used for the analysis
of water and sewerage functions related to periods before
privatisation of the ten Regional Water Authorities; before
reform of the regulatory arrangements. Post-privatisation
quantitative data could be employed; modelling in the same
way as before. But it may be argued that this would add
little to the analysis.
In order to develop the understanding of yardstick
competition it is necessary to draw data from the industry
post-privatisation; where, we argue, a system akin to that
of Shleifer's was working. For this purpose, qualitative
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data is potentially a very rich source of insight, and one
that remains relatively unexploited.
Qualitative data is, by definition, that which resists
quantification and location within a framework fully
described in terms of measurable dimensions. One temptation
for the researcher more used to working with quantitative
data is to succumb to a 'Gresham's law of research' whereby
the quantitative drives out the qualitative. The
predictable result is a reluctance on the part of the
researcher to enter the field where the richest source of
qualitative data lies. Historically this reluctance was not
shared by many eminent political economists. Both Smith
and Marshall were well acquainted with the business
community and made frequent visits to the place of
business, gathering information to inform their work. More
recently, distinguished analytical economists such as
Schmalensee (1989) have considered questions raised by
adopting a case study approach to economic research.128
Nevertheless there remains an imbalance in work published
in leading economic journals in favour of analyses
employing quantitative data acquired at one removed from
the object of analysis.
Therefore a case can be made for the application of field
research methods to economic phenomena. And field research
is the means of gathering qualitative data for the final
section of the thesis.
Sampling.
The aim of this fieldwork is to complement rather than
duplicate earlier work, without sacrificing academic rigour
in any way. The point is worth emphasising; for although
128 See also Lawson (19.85)
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the data of qualitative investigations are prose the
analysis may be just as rigorous. The methodology employed
in the analysis of qualitative data has been developed more
extensively by practitioners within the allied disciplines
of sociology, psychology and social anthropology. 129 And
the general approach taken owes much to the work of
sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967). Nevertheless it is
argued that a case can be made for the use of these methods
in economic research.
The case for using qualitative data from field-work in the
water industry rests on the argument that a field-study
approach brings the researcher one step closer to the
object of analysis. In other words, for the understanding
of economic phenomena there is some advantage to be gained
in first hand scrutiny of the water and sewerage operators.
To date, little work of this sort has been undertaken for
a regulated industry operating under yardstick competition.
Much of the casual empirical evidence reported in the press
falls far short of the high standards of rigour and
sophistication set by theorists. Consequently, there is a
place for formalising the approach to empirical work and
improving the care with which observations are made.
The field of study comprised the 33 water companies of
England and Wales130 and the industry's Economic Regulator.
The fieldwork undertaken was a series of semi-structured
interviews with representatives of the various
organisations. Given the constraints on time and funding
for this labour-intensive fieldwork some method of sampling
was required; although with such a small population there
was scope for fairly extensive sampling. The method chosen
129 See for example Glaser and Strauss (1967), Lofland and
Lofland (1984), Miles and Huberman (1984) and Strauss (1987) .
130 10 Water and Sewerage Companies and 23 Water Only
Companies.
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was 'selective' or 'theoretical' sampling.131 Technically,
the key feature of theoretical sampling is that it should
be organised consciously to suggest, develop and make
precise theories about relationships. The conclusions about
relationships drawn in this way are essentially
qualitative. Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasise the fact
that with this method it is difficult to draw quantitative
conclusions.
According to standard statistical sampling theory more data
is preferred to less; thus reducing the variance of the
sampling distribution.132 But under theoretical sampling
an increase in sample size is not necessarily useful. After
a point, redundancy and inefficiency emerge as problems,
where relevant data categories are exhausted or information
is added to full categories. Consequently the sampling
concentrates on filling certain 'core' categories. This may
be done in many ways and may be labelled the 'slices of
data' approach. This approach is taken to get different
perspectives on categories or emerging hypotheses by
various methods. Any unexplained exceptions and anomalies
to the received theory allow falsification leading to a
theory in its final form, which is stable in the face of
new data and not troubled by unexplained counterexamples.
Again, contrary to received theory, outliers are given
close consideration as a source of useful information. To
avoid overdetermination by collecting redundant or
irrelevant data the field worker may be inclined to
oversample around the tails of the distribution and to
undersample around its centre of gravity. In this way the
131 Other methods discussed in the literature include
'opportunistic' and 'snowball' sampling. See Schatzman and
Strauss (1973) and Glaser and Strauss (1967).
132 Note the distribution of the mean has variance a2 /n where
a2 represents the variance of a large population and n is the
sample size.
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researcher aims to acquire especially informative data.
With theoretical sampling the process of data collection is
guided in some sense by preconceived theoretical interests.
In this there must be a balance between giving direction to
the research and imposing certain theoretical
preconceptions. Either extreme is unacceptable.
Instruments of Investigation.
As noted above the semi-structured interview is the
'instrument of investigation' or the means of carrying out
the field-work.133 Other possible instruments were
considered but had disadvantages considered sufficiently
serious to rule them out in this case. For example, postal
questionnaires had the disadvantage of inviting low
participation rates and being open to misinterpretation by
the participant. Administered questionnaires were
considered to be too rigid and closed to insights which
might arise in less structured methods. A combination of
instruments, so called 'multi-method' approaches were also
infeasible given the constraints of time and funding.
Therefore the semi-structured interview was used, built
around an open ended agenda of questions with sub-questions
or 'probes' attached to each. It encouraged consistency
between cases, restricted the opportunity for researcher
bias, and left room for unanticipated directions to be
taken.
Having identified the field and established the semi-
structured interview as the instrument of investigation the
process of sampling began. The aim throughout the work was
to gather qualitative information relating to the operation
133 Dnes (1988) points out that Miles and Huberman (1984) are
wrong to argue that the prior direction of field work will
determine the instruments of investigation to be used.
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of the regulatory regime for the water industry. To this
end the process began with a letter to the deputy librarian
of the Office of Water Services, who supplied current
information on the key management personnel in each water
company in England and Wales. From this list, an
appropriate company interviewee was identified: ie the
manager who had strategic responsibility for the activities
of the company in relation to the workings of the
regulatory regime. This person was generally designated
'finance director' or 'company secretary and accountant'
for the smaller companies. Mr Ian Byatt, the Director
General of the Office of Water Services was identified as
the appropriate representative of the Economic Regulatory
body.
Before finalising the sample a semi-structured interview
agenda was drawn up for the companies but not the
Regulator. This agenda picked up on the points raised by
previous empirical work. Following Lofland and Lofland
(1984) one guiding principle of agenda design was that no
more than ten main topics should be covered. In this case,
four were chosen. A delivery time of one hour was borne in
mind when constructing the agenda; given that time
commanded a high premium for the target interviewees and
that the attention span of both interviewer and interviewee
were limited.
The companies' final semi-structured interview agenda is
reproduced as Appendix 1. This is a refined version of an
earlier pilot interview agenda used in the first company
interview and subsequently modified. It consists of four
main headings, the leading general points, with sub¬
headings covering more specific areas of enquiry. These
sub-headings were occasionally nested in hierarchical
fashion to enable questions to proceed from the general to
the specific in order to develop the understanding of
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certain points. Use of an interview agenda of this sort
encouraged consistency in the questioning but was used
primarily as an aide-memoire, a starting point, allowing
the questions to be formulated and delivered more naturally
in the interview itself. The open ended subheadings were
used to enable unanticipated directions to be taken and
unanticipated points to be developed.
With the working copy of the interview agenda in hand the
process of sampling continued to the point of selecting the
individual interviewees. Twelve out of the thirty three
companies were chosen; the main selection criterion being
representativeness. Geographically they covered the length
and breadth of England and Wales; some serving scattered
rural communities, others serving large conurbations; some
having long coastlines, others being completely landlocked;
some abstracted groundwater from water bearing rock strata,
others drew all their reserves from surfacewater sources.
Five of the firms sampled were water and sewerage companies
(previously Regional Water Authorities), and seven were
water only companies (previously statutory water
companies) . Ten of the twelve were part of the sample of
companies used in Chapter 4's database. The other two
'outliers' in certain respects were added to increase
sample size and enhance representativeness. As noted above
the sample of twelve is a very high proportion of the total
population of thirty three.
Having identified the companies in the sample and the key
personnel I contacted each by letter. The letter was word
processed, confined to one side of university headed paper,
personally addressed and signed. In it I identified myself
as a postgraduate under joint supervision. Brief, simple
and specific details of the work conducted to date were
given together with some intimation of the content of the
interview. A time limit was stated together with an offer
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of a printed summary of recent work and a brief interview
schedule. The summary interview schedule was a one-page
document on headed paper containing a one sentence summary
of each of the full interview schedule's main points. The
researcher and supervisors were identified and an assurance
of confidentiality given.
The reason for using a letter for the initial contact was
to give the potential interviewee time to consider his
participation and to signal the authenticity of the
investigation. Frey (1983) gives evidence to suggest that
pre-letters of this kind lower refusal rates and improve
data quality. However, one week after the pre-letter every
firm was contacted by telephone to ask whether arrangements
for an interview would be made.134 During this process a
certain amount of tenacity paid dividends. Often several
calls were made over a period of days. The result of this
prolonged process of friendly attrition was a 100% response
rate.
Although all the companies contacted granted personal
interviews with officials, only seven of the twelve were
with the finance directors or their equivalent. The
remaining five were with managers reporting directly to the
finance directors with special responsibility for
regulatory affairs. Thus all interviewees had first-hand
knowledge of the regulatory regime. The five regulatory
managers had day to day and some strategic responsibility
for these affairs within their companies. It may be argued
that this weakened the sample. However it proved to be the
case that the most appropriate company official was
interviewed in each case. Where finance directors had
little personal working experience of the regulatory regime
134 The telephone call was made to the





the task was delegated to someone who did. Given the
central drive of the research, interviewees were without
exception helpful and well informed.
The reasons for this very high response rate may be
examined more closely. Certainly it is the experience of
many researchers that personal interviews with high ranking
company officials are very difficult to arrange. In this
case, as with other academic studies there was no financial
or publicity 'quid pro quo' . No monetary incentive was
available and confidentiality was promised in all dealings.
However, instrumentation and response rate do appear
strongly linked. The semi-structured interview conducted on
company premises was an instrument sympathetic to the
functioning of the companies and in line with the usual
means of communication employed by officials. One may
speculate that questionnaires may have been received less
readily. Identification with the University of Edinburgh
was important as was the timing of the interviews. They
straddled the General Election and came in the early part
of the long run up to the price cap review. Therefore
companies were anxious to derive as much information as
possible about their comparative efficiency standing.
Consequently the offer of research results may have had
certain attractions.
Once all water company interviews had been completed a new
semi-structured interview agenda was constructed for the
interview with a representative of the Economic Regulator.
It was a modified version of the earlier one and benefitted
from the insights gained in the earlier interviews.(See
Appendix 2) Its contents varied little from the previous
version being comprised of a series of headings and sub¬
headings in hierarchical form as an aide-memoire in the
interviews. Again, open headings were included to allow the
interview to develop along unforseen lines.
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A modified pre-letter was used to contact Mr Ian Byatt, the
Director General of Water Services. He is popularly-
regarded as the embodiment of the regulatory authority,
whose views in relation to the regulation of the English
and Welsh water industry are unsurpassed in terms of
authority. A more lengthy draft seminar paper was included
and some mention made of the fieldwork conducted to date.
Again a time limit was stated, but anonymity could not be
offered for obvious reasons. All these measures were
designed to signal a well organised approach to academic
research. No 'secretarial attrition' was necessary in this
case. Mr Byatt responded by telephone the following day and
an interview was arranged.
The Interviews.
All the interviews were arranged by telephone and conducted
at the offices of the water companies and Regulator at
mutually agreed times. The company interviews were held
between 7th April 1992 and 30th April 1992. The interview
with Mr Ian Byatt took place on 20th May 1992.135 The
spoken responses to the questions asked were the raw data
of the process and had to be recorded in some way. The
preferred method was to take an audio tape recording of the
proceedings. The advantages of this were the minimisation
of data loss, accuracy and the fact that interviewees were
not distracted by note-taking. However, there are some
disadvantages, as Reid (1986) notes. They include: the
inability to obtain informed consent for the use of the
tape recorder; the interviewee who is guarded or inhibited
by the recording; the passivity of the interviewer induced
by this method; the expense of transcribing a large volume
of data and the difficulties of handling it terms of
assimilation and the detection of relationships.
135 Full details of these interviews are contained in a
confidential appendix available to the examiners.
234
The main alternative was the use of rough field notes made
at the time of interview, supplemented by observations
committed to paper at a debriefing session. Both methods
were employed. Interviewees were asked to give their
informed consent to tape recordings. Ian Byatt and seven of
the twelve water company officials agreed. In all other
cases interviewees permitted the taking of rough field
notes by hand. Where interviews were taped notes were also
taken to record details of interview environment and any
other aspects not captured on tape.
The interviews lasted between three quarters of an hour and
an hour. Space was left in this schedule to pursue any
unanticipated points that were raised during each interview
and to follow other lines of questioning. Without exception
the interviews were enjoyable, good humoured occasions. The
company officials were eager to talk at length, with
varying degrees of conviction, about their company's
operations. Punctuality and an organised approach to the
interviewing both reassured the interviewees and aided
later data reduction and presentation. On the evening of
each interview a thorough debriefing was undertaken in
which rough handwritten notes were expanded and written up
in summary prose form. This was also the point at which
other observations about interview environment and conduct
were added. I found, in line with Schatzman and Strauss
(1973) that memory of events did improve with practice.
Also I became more discriminating in the comments committed
to paper as the process went on. Much duplicated
information was not recorded where handwritten notes were
taken.
Having completed all the interviews the taped material was
fully transcribed and the summary field notes attached.
Although a degree of data reduction is an inevitable
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consequence of this process the tape recordings went some
way to minimising data loss.
The result was a qualitative database comprised of the text




Company Semi-Structured Interview Agenda.
I] Background to Regulation.
1.1] The Regulator's statutory functions include the
regulation of prices, to ensure duties are carried out in
accordance with licence terms, to ensure companies could
finance their activities, to protect the interests of
customers and to promote competition, economy and
efficiency. In his operation of the regulatory regime, does
the Regulator prioritise these functions?
1.1.1] How / In what ways ? Examples
1.1.2] Why?
1.2] The RPI+K price cap formula was introduced to ensure
'arms length' regulation, but there remains a fine dividing
line between monitoring activities and intervening in a
company's management. Has the Regulator ever crossed that
line?
1.2.1] Examples.
1.2.2] How has the scope of regulation changed since 1989?
1.2.2.1] Why?
1.2.3] State of relationship between the Regulator and the
company.
1.2.3.1] Illustration.
1.2.4] Are strained Regulator-regulatee relationships an
inescapable part of regulation?
1.3] Other.
II] Accounting Arrangements.
II.1] From the company's point of view, for what purposes
do the (modified current cost) regulatory accounts convey
more useful information than the historic cost accounts?
11.1.1] Strengths and weaknesses of modified current cost
accounts against background of price cap regulation.
II.1.1.1] Main user groups?
11.1.2] Strengths and weaknesses of historic cost accounts
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against background of price cap regulation.
II.1.2.1] Main user groups?
II.2] How reliable are the accounting numbers registering
capital stock, under both systems of accounting?
II. 3] If RAG 1 (Regulatory Accounting Guideline Number One)
were relaxed, but the RPI+K price cap formula remained in
place would the company still produce some form of current
cost accounts?
11.4] Does the Regulator have either an enthusiasm for, or
an aversion to any one system of accounting?
11. 4.1] Why?
11.5] Other.
Ill] Cost of Capital.
III.l] At the time of the initial K setting each company
submitted detailed plans for capital projects and their




III. 2] Attitude of company towards Regulator's 'Cost of
Capital Consultation Paper'.
III. 2.1] Politically as a regulatory device.
111. 2.2] Content.
111.2.3] What are the short and long term consequences for
the financing and operation of the company if it were to be
implemented in its original form?
111.2.4] Do the proposals in the 'Cost of Capital
Consultation Paper' signal an alteration in the way the
industry is regulated?
III. 2.4.1] Given the choice between price cap or rate of
return regulation, which would your company prefer?
III. 3] At the 1989 privatisation / K setting investors
formed certain expectations concerning companies' financial
and operating positions ie an unwritten contract between
the government/OFWAT and the investors/companies. Has this
'contract' been altered since then?
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III.3.1] How?
III. 3. 2] What prompted this?
III.3.3] Has this led to your view of the Regulator being
altered?
III. 3. 3.1] Credibility of Regulator?
III. 3. 3.2] Regulatory risk?
III.4] Other.
IV] Comparative Efficiency Measurement.
IV. 1] What comparative efficiency work has the company been
involved in?
IV.1.1] Internal.
IV.1.2] With external agencies.
IV.1.3] Familiarity with econometric techniques.
IV.2] To what extent should measures of comparative
efficiency influence regulation in general and the K
setting process in particular?
IV.2.1] Acceptance of standard comparative efficiency
measurement techniques, ie service standards etc.
IV.2.2] Acceptance of econometric techniques in K setting
process.
IV.3] Do you have any view on the optimum size of a water
company?
IV. 4] In the regulation of the water industry it was
assumed that local natural monopolies would persist, and a
system of yardstick rather than market competition adopted.
Can yardstick competition be made to work in the industry?
IV.4.1] To what extent does the industry operate under a
system of yardstick competition at present?
IV.4.2] Has comparison with other companies in the industry
affected the operation of this company?
IV.4.2.1] How?




Regulator Semi-Structured Interview Agenda.
I] Background to Regulation.
1.1] Your statutory functions include the regulation of
prices, to ensure duties are carried out in accordance with
licence terms, to ensure companies could finance their
activities, to protect the interests of customers and to
promote competition, economy and efficiency. Do you see any
of these as a priority?
1.1.1] Why?
1.1.2] Does each to these roles imply a different
regulatory model?
1.2] The RPI+K price cap formula was introduced to ensure
'arm's length' regulation, but there is a fine dividing
line between monitoring activities and intervening in a
company's management. It has been suggested that the 'Cost
of Capital' consultation paper was one example where the
line was crossed. Would you agree?
1.3] Other.
II] Comparative Efficiency Measurement / Yardstick
Competition.
II. 1] In the regulation of the water industry it was
assumed that local natural monopolies would persist, and a
system of yardstick rather than market competition adopted.
Can yardstick competition work in the industry?
11.1.1] How effective has yardstick competition been in the
three years since privatisation?
11.1.2] Competitive pressure applied successfully?
11.2] In theory no more than two companies need be compared
for effective yardstick competition but at present there
are thirty-three companies in this industry. Would you
emphasise maintaining the higher number or would you be
happy to see the number come down?
11.3] OFWAT comparative efficiency work.
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II.3.1] Familiarity with econometric techniques.
II.3.1.1] Attitude re potential impact on K setting
process.




III.l] Are there any purposes for which the historic cost
accounts convey more useful information, either to the
companies or to you, than the modified current cost
accounts?
III.1.1] Other user groups?
III. 2] Enthusiasm for CCA?
III. 3] In your conduct of regulation I have gained the
impression that you attempt wherever possible to draw
together ideas from the separate disciplines of economics
and accounting. For example in the construction of modified
current cost accounts, the moves against cross
subsidisation and towards marginal cost pricing. Is my
impression a correct one?
III. 3.1] How successful do you think you have been in this?
III.4] Other.
IV] Cost of Capital.
IV. 1] At the 1989 privatisation / K setting, investors
formed certain expectations concerning companies' financial
and operational positions ie an unwritten contract between
the government/OFWAT and the investors/companies. Has the
'contract1 been altered since then?
IV.2] Has regulation moved away from price cap to rate of
return?
IV. 2.1] Does 'cost pass through' have a place in a price
cap regime?
IV.2.2] Would it be fair to characterise the regulatory
regime as five or ten years price cap, then at the end of
that period a rate of return exercise, then another period
of price cap etc?
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IV. 3] Attitude of Regulator to reactions of companies to






The analysis of the final substantive chapter is built on
the qualitative data gathered from interviews with water
company and regulatory officials over the period April -
May 1992. Although the interview schedules were divided
into four sections the material will be presented in two
parts.
In the first we will attempt to supplement and develop the
discussion of the 'hallmarks' of yardstick competition
begun in Chapter 2. Specifically, this will throw some
light on the way in which company officials and the
Regulator understood the terms 'comparative' and 'yardstick
competition'. In addition it may enable us to assess the
extent to which the public and private pronouncements of
Regulator and Industry on matters of regulation were
aligned.
In the second we will tackle two further issues; the cost
of capital and regulatory relationships. The cost of
capital was highlighted as a key question in earlier
chapters of the thesis, when considering the means of
comparative efficiency measurement. Results were shown to
be sensitive to the particular capital valuation convention
adopted. Furthermore, it was argued that the omission of
capital cost seriously undermined the plausibility of
econometric results for this capital intensive industry.
In the run up to the 1994 periodic review the cost of
capital remains the focus of a vigorous debate between the
water companies and their Regulator.
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Regulatory relationships have been the subject of much
press speculation since privatisation. Given the nature of
the final settlement the question was, and remains,
important for economic policymakers as well as industry
officials. With qualitative data it may be possible to
explore some of the ways in which personal dynamics have
shaped and driven the regulatory system. Conclusions will
be tentative, but the discussion may go some way to
fulfilling the general aim of the thesis; which is, to
analyse and develop the understanding of yardstick
competition as it operates in the English and Welsh water
industry. With these observations it may be possible to
derive certain general principles on which policymakers may
base their decisions concerning the regulation of other
industries.
The Hallmarks of Yardstick Competition.
One of the conclusions of Chapter 2 was that whilst the
final regulatory solution for the industry embraced the
principle of yardstick competition, the system was not
operable at the time of privatisation. As the regime
developed, however, it became clear that the principle
influenced many subsequent policy initiatives of Ofwat.
Returning briefly to the earlier discussion, several
aspects of the emerging regulatory regime 'hallmarked' it
as one embracing yardstick competition. For example, the
system, derived from that outlined by Littlechild (1986),
employed a price cap136 which would be reset at 5 or 10
year intervals taking into account the comparative
performance of companies. References made to the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission were subject to the new public
interest clause which rejected consolidation if the
136 Although cost pass through and periodic review provisions
ensured the settlement deviated in some ways from pure price cap.
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Director's ability to make comparisons between companies
would be prejudiced. Ofwat's data gathering and validation
work was motivated, at least in part, by the need to
compare company efficiency. A 'comparative competition'
post within the Charges Control Division of Ofwat was
established. The 1989 Ofwat Annual Report gave a classic
policy statement affirming the view,
"I [Byatt] shall compare the performance of the 3 9
appointed companies and use the examples of the best to set
standards for the others to introduce an element of
comparative competition. Such comparisons will cover
differences in operating cost, capital cost, levels of
service and 'customer care'. There will be allowances for
differences such as geographical conditions which are
outside the control of effective managements. These
comparisons will help me to achieve a better deal for all
water customers in England and Wales."137
Ian Byatt's subsequent public announcements confirmed this.
"My ability to make comparisons between different
water companies is an essential part of my duties under the
1989 Water Act. " 138
In his interview, the Regulator confirmed that a system of
comparative or yardstick competition was being developed
but that there were substantial difficulties with its
implementation. Several company directors pinpointed the
inability of the Regulator adequately to control for
company heterogeneity as the chief stumbling block.
However, in the' majority of interviews it was suggested
that there were in fact two main difficulties over the
working of the system. And that these were the ones
suggested by Shleifer (1985): namely heterogeneity and
susceptibility to strategic manipulation.
137 Ian Byatt, Ofwat Annual Report 1989 pll.
138 Ofwat Press Notice 34/90, 4/7/90.
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Although company officials recognised and applauded much
early work on 'explanatory factors' undertaken by Ofwat139,
the technical issue of controlling comparators for
heterogeneous circumstances was perceived as being
unresolved. Many mentioned the inadequacies of the system
at the time of the privatisation of the Water Authorities.
They argued that the 'playing field' on which comparisons
had been made was 'sloped against' their own company in
various ways. Every company suggested ways in which it was
unique. Most common among the features mentioned were
geographical location, financing arrangements, water
sourcing and the customer base. But in several cases it was
difficult to take these arguments at face value. This was
due to an awareness of the second problem mentioned by
Shleifer (1985) - strategic manipulation.
In a principal-agent setting such as we have in the English
and Welsh water industry, it is clearly in the interests of
companies to try and win concessions from the Regulator. In
this context it may involve the setting of a more relaxed
price cap or the granting of interim determinations. Given
that the Regulator has accepted in principle that
allowances must be made for companies facing widely
differing operating environments, the incentive is for
companies to use this to their advantage. Therefore
companies may make as much of the heterogeneity issue as
possible when discussing regulatory arrangements with
Ofwat. It is in the Regulator's interests to make
allowances for heterogeneity, but then to ignore the
further pleadings of the companies and encourage them to
meet their charging limits through cost minimisation.
Whilst both sides admitted that the technical issue of
139 The 1991 Ofwat Annual Report (p93) lists the members of
the various working groups established to examine this and other
issues.
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accounting for company heterogeneity had not been
completely resolved companies were more openly unhappy with
the current means of comparison than the regulator. But
whilst some of this may be quite justifiable I was unable
to assess the extent to which these arguments were part of
the process of strategic manipulation: whether or not this
was a conscious or unconscious decision by those
interviewed.
One practical way in which the Regulator could get around
his inability to control for company heterogeneity was
suggested by the finance director of a water only company.
He argued that different licence arrangements were required
for different categories of company according to their
size. Other water only company officials supported the view
arguing that Ofwat now demanded a very large quantity of
detailed information for regulatory purposes. In Shleifer's
terms these officials were putting forward one particular
'heterogeneity' argument. As expected, it was the smaller
companies that regarded the demands as especially onerous
and inequitable, given that the larger companies were
required to supply very similar information. The larger
companies had an advantage in being able to spread the
fixed costs of this information gathering over their larger
personnel base.
The Regulator was aware of the issue, but the process of
interviewing revealed very clearly the extent to which this
was a problem. The contrast was striking. In the Water and
Sewerage Companies, regulatory matters were invariably
dealt with by a specialist team reporting to a single board
member or official. In this, their sole task was to
administer and direct company regulatory policy. In several
small water only companies it was not unusual to find one
man, often the company secretary and accountant, dealing
with this alone. It was in these companies that the
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argument for licence concessions was made most vigorously.
Overall, from the Regulator's point of view, there appeared
to be a tension between maintaining a clear, equitable and
effective method of regulation on the one hand, and of
allowing sufficient flexibility in the regime to deal with
company heterogeneity on the other. Or simply, it was in
the companies' interests to 'flex' the Regulator's
yardstick, and it was in the Regulator's interests to
resist.
Against such a background the potential for conflict and
indecision was enormous. The fact that the Regulator was
not locked in perpetual conflict with the industry was put
down to his personal skills, and also his attitude towards
the conduct of regulation by yardstick competition. An
important aspect of his approach was highlighted during the
interview and confirmed by extensive reading of the
official publications of Ofwat. It is that the Regulator
seldom refers to the principle of 'yardstick competition'
preferring the term 'comparative competition'.
Taken at face value the observation is insignificant,
almost trivial. In the conduct of regulation Byatt clearly
follows the approach labelled by Littlechild (1986) as
'yardstick competition'; however imperfect the scheme may
be at present. Nevertheless he consistently avoids the use
of the term. He explained his preference in the following
way,
"I think that yardstick competition...I'm not sure
that's the word I quite like because it suggests there's a
yardstick against which you measure things and I'm not sure
that there is. But some comparison of the performance of
companies is a good deal better than having no ability to
compare in a situation where you have a monopoly which is
likely to persist" [Byatt]
This confirmed the impression gained from the literature
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that, as Regulator, he was reluctant to use the term
'yardstick'. The word, he believed was 'loaded' in the
sense that it implied the possibility of deriving absolute
rather than relative measures of efficiency; cardinal
rather than ordinal rankings. He recognised that the
techniques for comparative efficiency measurement were, as
yet, rather imperfect. Therefore, whilst he embraced the
principle of yardstick competition and sought to apply it
in his work, his preferred terminology for the process was
'comparative competition'. Consequently, comparisons would
be indicative of relative efficiency rather than the last
word in the debate.
In one sense this careful use of language may go some way
to signalling to the companies his awareness of the
imperfections of any set of company comparisons. By so
doing the Regulator may have diffused some of the tension
spoken of earlier, by indicating a willingness to adopt a
flexible approach to the issue of comparative competition.
Inevitably, perhaps, this 'flexibility' did not go far
enough to satisfy the various company officials who were
interviewed. They generally regarded the whole process with
a discomfort bordering on suspicion. And again they
expressed concerns that the Regulator was not fully aware
of the imperfections of any set of company comparisons.
(The point will be returned to later when discussing the
issue of regulatory capture.)
Thus the general picture of regulation may be crudely
characterised as one in which the Regulator sees the
company comparisons as flexible tools to be used sparingly
in the task of regulation; whilst companies see the
comparisons as threatening, inflexible devices which would
direct and inhibit their operations. So although both
parties were agreed that the regime was at an early stage
of development different attitudes were held towards it.
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The Initial Settlement.
The regulatory settlement put in place in 1989 was not, of
course, of Ofwat's making. K values which fed into the
RPI+K price cap were set by the Secretaries of State for
the Environment and Wales. So it was the Government, rather
than the new independent regulatory authority that set the
industry's course for the first five years.
The financial arrangements were ostensibly organised with
a view to providing companies with sufficient funds to
finance large investment programmes and to encourage the
efficient allocation of resources. However, several finance
directors expressed the view that the initial K settings
reflected a quite different agenda. They believed that in
this the new Director General, Ian Byatt, had little or no
input; the key decisions being taken by those working
through the Department of the Environment. Consequently,
"He [Byatt] thinks the K's are too high. They were too
generous. The companies pulled the wool over the DOE's
[Department of the Environment] eyes by throwing the
kitchen sink into the book of numbers; and inevitably
there's some truth in that" [Finance Director (FD)]
It was suggested that these K values were justified on the
basis of expected investor requirements rather than on what
the industry Regulator regarded as appropriate. This was
apparently confirmed in the Ofwat Cost of Capital
consultation paper (July 1991) which noted that company
profit before tax in 1990-1 was 20% and operating profit
12% above the expectations of the Secretaries of State when
they set the initial price limits.140
Several finance directors were of the opinion that Byatt's
140 'Cost of Capital : A Consultation Paper' Ofwat,
Birmingham, July 1991 vol 1 piv.
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"hands were tied" at the time of privatisation and that the
Government had erred on the side of a generous K for
reasons of political expediency. Chief amongst these was
the need to ensure the successful floatation of the ten
water authorities who were in a politically powerful
position in the run up to privatisation. Others said
motivations included the need to give companies sufficient
"headroom for manoeuvre" because of the inaccuracies in
the initial survey and comparison of operating conditions,
undertaken by the Government's consultants, Deloitte Haskin
and Sells. Officials of the water only companies believed
the initial settlement with its write off of substantial
water authority debt (the 'green dowry'), and the prospect
of privatisation proceeds going directly to the exchequer
had been prejudicial to their position. Nevertheless Ian
Byatt had done the best he could with the "poisoned
chalice" of a settlement he had inherited.
Since then it was suggested that Byatt had set about
redeeming the regulatory position, with a series of
measures designed to reduce the scope for strategic
manipulation of information. In this he apparently met with
considerable success as a finance director of one of the
water only companies explained.
Before 1989 the statutory water companies had collaborated
very closely and had exchanged information freely with each
other. But any continuation of such a scheme would clearly
threaten to undermine a reformed regime embracing the
principle of yardstick competition. It was therefore
imperative that this informal 'informational cartel'
between the statutory companies was broken. This would in
turn limit the scope for the strategic manipulation of
information by groups of companies. The reformed regulatory
regime and the new environment in which companies operated
apparently achieved this. A finance director still in post
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following the 1989 reforms recalled the previous position
with enthusiasm and affection,
"Within the statutory companies until the ownership
changes took place there was a very, very free exchange of
information. It was a delightful industry to be involved
in. Because rather than being in competition we actually
saw ourselves working together in a very pleasant way. So
that when we had a problem here we would talk to one of the
other companies to find out what they were doing to solve
the problem" [FD]
But under the new regime this position had been altered.
Companies previously unaware and unaffected by competitive
pressures were disturbed by the new rigours of yardstick
competition. By setting performance targets with reference
to comparative efficiency measurement the Regulator had, at
a stroke, removed the incentive for collaboration. The
informal cartel of the statutory companies was broken.
Another example offered of the way in which the Regulator
sought to redeem the regulatory situation was his
intervention on several occasions to persuade companies not
to increase prices by the full amount allowed under the
price cap141. With the 1994 periodic review being the
responsibility of Ofwat rather than the government, company
officials saw the exercise as something of a watershed. At
that time they argued that Byatt would be able to clear
away many inadequate controls which he inherited and to put
in place new, tighter, price caps set in line with publicly
announced criteria. This, they hoped, would reduce the
scope for regulatory intervention over the next five or ten
years.
The Effects on Competitiveness.
141 The issue of 'voluntary abatement' was discussed by Ian
Byatt in the Ofwat Annual Report 1992 p9.
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The new regulatory regime, by breaking the informational
cartel and introducing company comparisons had implications
for company competitiveness. The first clear message from
a majority of interviewees was that the comparative element
of the yardstick regime had improved performance
incentives. One finance director said,
"There is no doubt that the incentives to become more
efficient have become more effective. This company has been
reducing head count for example, significantly, in order to
drive down operating costs and to drive up profit. And it's
most unlikely that sort of change would have taken place if
we'd remained in the public sector. Which I think is clear
evidence that the idea of price caps and becoming more
efficient is working." [FD]
Several companies cited the comparative efficiency
exercises as prompting them to reexamine all areas of their
operations with a view to achieving greater efficiency.
Yardstick competition had been a spur to management and the
means whereby regulatory pressure was being exerted.
Consequently what had previously been parochial approaches
to water company functions were now being reviewed in the
light of national information.
A strong connection was made between the delivery of
yardstick competition and the use of the price cap. One
finance director saw the two as being inextricably linked.
"I think the first thing you've got to say is that if
you sign up for a price cap regime then you have to make
yardstick competition work, because it is the absolute
essence of price cap. The efficiency factor is built into
the formula. Otherwise there is no benefit to the
customer." [FD]
In other words, even this very limited form of yardstick
competition, imperfect and at an early stage of
development, was delivering results. These results included
increased competitive pressure on the companies and the
recognition that benefits accrued to customers from the use
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of the system in conjunction with a price cap. This
evidence ostensibly confirms Shleifer's contention that
there were benefits from a yardstick solution. It runs
contrary to the criticisms of Stelzer (1988) mentioned in
Chapter 2.
The responses were unsurprising in the light of the sample
of interviewees. Officials of publicly quoted companies
would be unlikely to reveal their doubts over company
efficiency whether or not anonymity was assured by an
interviewer. However, it would be wrong to discount
completely their observations concerning increased
competitive pressure. Whether or not this has led to
improved company performance, however defined, is another
question. No quantitative evidence was presented by
interviewees to support the argument that increased
competitive pressure had led to improved company
performance. But a majority of interviewees did suggest
quite firmly that this was the case.
In order to attempt to gain some further insight into this
view using quantitative data, one of the points mentioned
by an interviewee as an indication of increased efficiency
was examined. The reduction in numbers of employees was
cited as a tangible result of increased competitive
pressure since privatisation. Table 7.1 below gives time
series data for the English and Welsh industry compared to
its Scottish counterpart; which did not experience











1981/2 70,852 6, 318 4.48 2 . 79
1982/3 68,955 6, 226 4 .25 2 . 77
1983/4 66,551 6, 121 4 . 07 2 . 74
1984/5 63,175 6, 144 3 . 83 2 . 79
1985/6 59,606 6, 129 3 . 59 2 . 78
1986/7 57,502 6, 155 3.41 2 . 80
1987/8 56,774 6,270 3 .36 2 . 79
1988/9 55,356 6, 194 3 .28 2 . 81
1989/90 54,653 6, 094 3 .16 2 . 71
1990/1 53,318 6, 229 3 . 06 2 . 71
1991/2 54,110 6, 230 3 . 14 2 . 75
Source: Waterfacts 1992,. Water Services Association.
142 Full time equivalent employees at 31st March. Note
figures for England and Wales include employees of statutory
companies; those post 1989 include numbers employed by the newly
established NRA (National Rivers Authority). It took over some
of the functions of the Regional Water Authorities and most of
its staff transferred from the Water Authorities.
143 Employees per megalitre of water supplied per day. Note
that the denominator just captures one aspect of the companies'
activities. Sewerage and other functions are omitted in this
measure.
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The evidence for a marked reduction in head count post 1989
for the English and Welsh companies is rather unclear.
Indeed employee numbers have reduced consistently from
1981/2, and there appears to be no structural break on or
around 1989. The measure of employees per unit output has
also reduced year on year; although great care should be
taken in interpreting this statistic as it merely reflects
water supply activities.
Three points do, however, come out from the table. Firstly
this steady reduction in employee numbers in England and
Wales contrasts with a more stable pattern for Scotland
where no consistent reductions are made. Secondly, figures
for 1991/2 show a sharp rise. This may be due to the
diversification policies of newly privatised companies
which meant that other going concerns were bought, which in
turn raised the head count. Thirdly, there may be some
minor structural break in the English and Welsh series
between 1984/5 and 1985/6 where the decline in employee
numbers is most marked. This is around the time at which
privatisation of the RWAs first came onto the policy agenda
of the Government. Consequently companies may have begun to
take more vigorous action to reduce employees from that
time onwards.
Returning to the interviews it was noted that the trend
towards the takeover and merger of water companies would
inhibit the future development of the process of making
comparisons. Ofwat's policy towards mergers was set out
clearly in the 1989 Annual Report,
"Mergers between existing water enterprises in the UK
and the integration of their management would reduce the
number of comparators and prejudice my ability to make
valid comparisons. I recognise, however, that there may be
public benefits which could outweigh such a detriment." 144
144 Ian Byatt, Ofwat Annual Report 1989, pll.
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During the interview Ian Byatt repeated the official line
but then added an interesting rider,
"In order to get good comparisons I would like to see
the number stay up. And any reduction in the numbers is
going to lose something in the way of ability to compare
because there are obvious differences in the environments
in which the companies operate. So you've got to allow for
those, and you soon run out of degrees of freedom in this
game. And in the case of the dirty water, indeed work done
by Deloittes at the time of privatisation was a good deal
less successful than the case of clean water and that may
have been because of the larger number of companies. There
may sometimes be arguments for reducing the number of
companies, if for example you can have such a gain in
efficiency that it outweighs the ability to compare. Not a
very easy trade off but that came up in the Three-Valleys
case in front of the MMC [Monopolies and Mergers
Commission]. The MMC took a view about the trade off and
made recommendations and then the case came back to us and
I suppose we took a view about the trade off. We said it
was satisfactory for prices to go down by ten per cent and
to lose possibly two comparators. But that relationship
isn't a linear relationship. So the more we lose companies,
the more the number of comparators falls, the bigger the
loss in terms of ability to compare." [Byatt]
The significant issue from the point of view of yardstick
competition in all of this is the argument that there is a
non-linearity in the relationship between the number of
comparators and the ability to compare companies.
Strictly, of course, only two comparators are needed for
Shleifer's regulatory system to work. Thus by retaining a
preference for a greater number of comparators the Director
General departs from the strict requirements of yardstick
competition. However, the retention of a greater number is
a pragmatic compromise between the demands of pure theory
and those of institutional reality. It is made necessary by
the fact that the systems of comparative efficiency
measurement are insufficiently robust to support yardstick
competition in all its purity. Informational requirements
are such that a relatively large number of comparators must
be retained in order to supply sufficient information on
differing operating environments to allow reliable
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comparisons to be drawn.
In an ideal world, with two identical firms serving
different areas with common features the Regulator would
presumably allow mergers to proceed until only two firms
were left and then put an absolute halt to the process.
Instead he has signalled a growing reluctance to sanction
mergers as the number of independent firms continues to
decline.
Outlook for Yardstick Competition.
All interviewees offered opinions on the future development
of yardstick competition in the industry. Two contrasting
views emerged. The first, minority view, was offered by
only one of the finance directors. He suggested that the
problem of accounting for heterogeneity was simply too
difficult to solve. Consequently comparisons would be too
difficult to draw and that different licence arrangements
would be required for different companies. Several finance
directors pointed out how theoretically seductive the idea
of yardstick competition had been, but how practically
difficult the system was to implement. One said of the
initial comparative efficiency exercise,
"I don't know whether you tracked the Deloitte study
that was done in 1989, but that's really the process they
went through. Initially they thought 'this is nice and
easy. Stage one you produce a framework, stage two collect
all the data, stage three Bob's your Uncle ! You just rank
all the companies and press the efficiency button'. Of
course it degenerated into a horrendous exercise. But at
the end of the day, efficiency factors were built into the
K, however sort of arbitrarily." [FD]
The second view was more widely held. It was, in essence,
incrementalist. Those taking this line openly acknowledged
the difficulties inherent in the whole process of
regulation, but maintained that to sidestep the issue of
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comparison would be to diminish the concept and working of
yardstick competition. The view was pithily summed up by
one interviewee,
"OK we may have made some wrong decisions, but we'll
get better next time" [FD]
The development of improved information flows and the
harmonisation of accounting practices led many companies to
believe that the 'playing field' on which comparisons were
being made was becoming more level over time. Consequently,
yardstick competition, which was working in only a very
limited way, would continue to gain acceptance and become
a more accurate regulatory tool. In other words, the
situation would improve over time as data and analytical
techniques were developed. Ian Byatt shared this broadly
optimistic view, whilst acknowledging the difficulties.
"Pinning down exactly why costs vary is a more
difficult activity, but the great range of prices which
they have suggests that there is scope for looking at where
people are more or less efficient" [Byatt]
Other evidence to suggest the incremental improvement in
the means of regulation was offered. This included Ofwat's
comparative efficiency studies145 which progressed slowly
through a series of technical committees and comparative
efficiency working groups preparing reports for company
comment. Several companies, particularly the large water
and sewerage operators had representatives on these bodies.
The larger companies with their regulatory teams, undertook
additional internal work to shadow the Ofwat studies as a
proactive management strategy. The smaller companies,
particularly those in which the company secretary and
accountant dealt with all regulatory matters, frequently
undertook no formal comparative efficiency work for fairly
145 Information on their progress was issued by way of 'Dear
FD' letters. FD19,22,33,38,41,49.
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long periods of time. One view expressed was that this
sort of work was best left to the 'higher bodies'146 and
those with the resources to finance these policies.
However, all confirmed that they used informal performance
comparisons even if it was as basic an exercise as
comparing company dividend levels.
It should be noted that the considerable variation in the
amount of comparative efficiency work undertaken by
companies could potentially undermine the working of
yardstick competition. This would be the case if it led to
companies forming information cartels of the sort employed
by the statutory companies before 1989. Equally, if the
companies possessed superior comparative efficiency
information to the Regulator then problems would arise. The
evidence was that, for the foreseeable future, this does
not appear to be the case. The incentive structure is such
that it is not obviously in a company's interests to
collaborate on comparative efficiency work with a
counterpart. Even the most rudimentary system of yardstick
competition ensures that this is the case. Moreover, Ofwat
has driven much of the comparative efficiency work
involving industry representatives and leads the industry
in terms of expertise.
The overall impression gained from interviewees was that
yardstick or comparative competition was an important
feature of the regulatory regime that would become more
significant in the future. This would be due, in part, to
the steady improvement in the techniques available to
analyse improved industry data. Whilst companies accepted
this, they were apprehensive that the Regulator would be
tempted to use the tool in an inflexible way, not taking
sufficient account of company heterogeneity. The Regulator
146 Meaning the Water Services Association and Ofwat.
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had been at some pains to dispel this notion, but it
remained and emerged in the public and private comments of
company officials.
The Outstanding Issues.
Two further issues of particular importance to the concept
of yardstick competition were addressed specifically in the
interviews: the cost of capital and regulatory
relationships.
Cost of Capital: Current Cost Accounting.
The empirical work of chapter 4 demonstrated quite clearly
the importance of the cost of capital to any comparative
efficiency analysis of this sort. In a capital intensive
industry with very long asset lives it was unsurprising
that results were shown to be sensitive to the particular
capital valuation convention adopted. Furthermore it was
argued that the omission of capital costs seriously
undermined the econometric results.
Under s7 of the Water Act 1989 the Regulator was given a
duty to ensure that companies could carry out and finance
their functions. This required that the cost of capital be
set high enough to attract private funds. At one level the
setting of the cost of capital is a purely technical
question. But it became clear from the interviews that the
whole issue had become highly politicised.
The better than expected company profits in the first
couple of years following privatisation sparked a lively
debate over the appropriate means of setting the cost of
capital and its level. Much press comment, hostile to the
companies and the Regulator, reinforced the perception that
companies were earning supernormal profits, and that
returns to shareholders were in excess of those necessary
to induce them to retain their shares. In July 1991 Ofwat
responded to its critics by addressing the whole cost of
capital issue in a consultation document. The document
argued that there was no prime facie reason why investors
in the water industry should be rewarded with returns in
excess of those generally available in the financial
markets. The paper went on to set out reasons why they
considered an appropriate return on equity in the water
industry to be between 5% and 7% in real terms.
This move provoked the industry to make a robust response.
In a joint document by the Water Services and Water
Companies Associations (November 1991) they argued for a 9M
% real cost of capital. In welcoming the Regulator's
support of an incentive-based approach to economic
regulation, they opposed any 'drift' in the regulatory
system towards one that involved annual or frequent
intervention in the agreed price cap on the basis of ex
post rates of return which were actually achieved. A third
Ofwat paper (November 1992) 147 moved the debate forward
again in presenting a discussion of the framework for
reflecting reasonable returns in the periodic review. It
complemented the previous paper in raising the question of
how to establish a value for each company to which the cost
of capital could be applied. A value which would properly
reflect the capital attributable to investors and
creditors.
Whilst time precluded questioning over the technical issues
raised in these and other documents, two points at the
heart of the debate were discussed in the interviews. These
were current cost accounting and regulation by rate of
return or price cap. The choice was made, firstly, because
147 'Assessing Capital Values at the Periodic Review', Ofwat
November 1992.
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they were questions of central importance to the debate
over yardstick competition. Comparisons are influenced
heavily by the particular accounting conventions adopted,
as was seen in Chapter 4. Yardstick competition and use of
the price cap have both been part of the move towards an
incentive-based approach to economic regulation. The second
reason was that the views of the company officials promised
to yield material relevant to debates being conducted in
other recently privatised capital intensive utilities.
Thus, many rather esoteric, and industry-specific,
questions of asset valuation were set aside.
In the post 1989 regulatory regime one of the main
innovations, and consequently one of the main bones of
contention, was the requirement for companies to prepare a
set of regulatory accounts on a modified current cost
basis, alongside the legally required historic cost
statements. And although the system of accounting now used
differs in some ways from that of SSAP 16148 its general
approach is the same. Ian Byatt was enthusiastic that this
was the appropriate way to report the economic activities
of companies in the industry. In the 1990 Ofwat Annual
Report he made the point.
" A key decision has been to change the basis on which
current cost accounts are produced, to be based in future
on the concept of Financial Capital Maintenance. I am
confident that these guidelines will generate accounting
information which will be of greater value to the
management of the companies and will also provide me with
a reliable basis for the comparisons of performance which
are central to the regime."149
As the statement made clear, the Financial Capital
Maintenance (FCM) concept was established as the foundation
148 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16, Current
Cost Accounting.
149 Ian Byatt, Ofwat Annual Report 1990 pl2.
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for the new current cost reporting.150 This was deemed to
be more appropriate than the competing Operating Capability-
Maintenance (OCM) concept. Under FCM, profit was measured
after allowing for maintenance of the purchasing power of
the business' opening financial capital. Operational assets
were to be valued at their current replacement cost. This
involved the use of a general inflation index, such as the
RPI. The emphasis of the approach was therefore on
maintaining the real financial capital of the company with
its ability to finance its functions. In this, FCM
addressed the principal concerns of the shareholders of the
company151.
The alternative OCM approach was rejected. This would have
shifted the emphasis towards maintaining the physical
operating capability of the assets of the company. Under
OCM profit would have been measured after provision had
been made for replacing the output capability of a
company's physical assets; typically using a specific
inflation index. The approach would have addressed the
major concerns of company management rather than
shareholders. This idea underpinned SSAP 16 and is the main
point at which the system of accounting adopted in the
industry differs from the current cost accounting of the
previous decade.
Byatt argued that the modified system of current cost
accounting gave comparable measures of the real costs of
supply including the cost of capital across companies. It
avoided the main problems of historic cost accounting which
were especially acute when considering returns on capital
in a capital intensive industry with long asset lives. In
150 See Appendix.
151 Note, if there is no general inflation real FCM is
equivalent to conventional historic cost accounting with the
exception of the treatment of unrealised holding gains.
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the presence of inflation these included understated asset
values, overstated profit measures and distorted measures
of total costs. The FCM system, he argued, also led to
realistic assessments of asset values and trends in the
returns earned on the assets. From a management perspective
the annual 'July Return'152 of information to his office
was intended to be a monitor of operating capability.
Consequently he deemed it unnecessary to reflect OCM
concepts in the current cost accounts. Most importantly, he
regarded it as being appropriate that the companies publish
accounting statements which were consistent with the
economic framework in which they were regulated.153
Clearly there is an inherent logic in a system that
regulates through the use of a price cap which employed the
Retail Prices Index (RPI), and required accounts to be
prepared on an FCM basis that used the RPI as its general
inflation index. In addition there would appear to be an
incoherence in accepting an RPI+K price cap but continuing
to report using historic cost accounts exclusively. In
setting price caps the Government worked under the
assumption that it was the customers who should fund the
replacement of capital stock through increased real prices.
In contrast, the implied assumption underlying historic
cost accounting is that capital funding is derived from the
stock and loan markets. Intellectually then, the arguments
appear weighted towards Byatt.
However, although Byatt was enthusiastic about this
accounting solution, interview evidence appeared to
152 An annual return of information made by companies to the
Regulator in fulfilment of the terms of their licences. The
return includes information on output and performance and
progress on capital expenditure programmes.
153 Full details of the system of accounting are contained
in the Regulatory Accounting Guideline (RAG) 1.01 published by
Ofwat.
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indicate that he was at variance with the rest of the
industry. Anti-current cost sentiment ran high. And whilst
company officials generally accepted that the system was
slightly more satisfactory than traditional historic cost
accounting, (or the SSAP 16 approach) in theory, they said
that the practical implementation of it had proved very
troublesome. One official summed up the view by stating
that as high theory, it was acceptable for academics but
not for practitioners. He went on,
"I'm not getting particularly excited about the
current cost accounts. I'm fairly annoyed that we've got to
produce them because its a drain on our resources" [FD]
Most concern was expressed over the compilation of
inventories of physical capital stocks. In general it was
found that the larger water and sewerage companies were a
good deal more sceptical about their inventories that the
water only companies. In several cases the large companies
indicated that inventories were fairly inadequate and that
capital valuations had been undertaken on the basis of some
quite limited sampling. In stark contrast, the finance
director of one small water only company maintained that
the capital asset valuations were excellent and that a full
inventory of fixed assets had been maintained. The reason
for this may lie in the fact that only the better-run
statutory water companies were able to continue operating
after the 1974 reorganisation of the industry. Consequently
the ten Regional Water Authorities inherited a good many
incomplete records from less well organised bodies.
Despite their continued reservations over valuation all
interviewees were agreed that historic cost figures were
seriously flawed. Consequently, they argued, customers were
being misled by the reported profit figures. However they
considered that over time the records of physical capital
stock and hence current cost measures would improve. But
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despite this, for the moment the valuation of capital stock
was,
"In the right ball-park" [FD]
So although the new system had theoretical merits, there
was a question over the consistency of approach taken by
various companies.
Given this response further analysis of the data was
undertaken to see whether other reasons for the lack of
enthusiasm for this form of current cost accounting could
be uncovered. The majority of interviewees were trained as
accountants. As such they were aware of the whole inflation
accounting debate conducted over the last couple of
decades. They were also aware that, in the end, the
profession was unable to come to one mind on the matter;
and as the problem of inflation slipped down the agenda so
did the current cost accounting debate. This staffing
situation may go some way to explaining why those trained
primarily in the preparation and interpretation of historic
cost accounts felt unenthusiastic about the others.
Some interviewees revealed that, for the management of
companies, the modified system of current cost accounting
was seldom used. Despite its obvious flaws the historic
cost accounts were more widely employed and understood.
Significantly, the majority said that, if the Regulator
relaxed the requirement for the modified current cost
accounts, the companies would cease producing them. Apart
from the fact that they found little value in them for
management purposes, the company finance directors believed
that the 'City' did not understand or use current cost
accounts. They maintained that shareholders were only
interested in historic cost profit figures (even though
they recognised how misleading they could be); and that the
fact that the accounting profession as a whole was unable
to resolve the issue previously was evidence of how complex
the technical and conceptual questions were. Only one
finance director suggested rejecting both systems in favour
of a cash-flow basis for reporting.
Only in the context of the regulatory regime were the
accounts said to have much value. Even here, several
officials argued that Ian Byatt had taken an 'economic'
approach to an 'accounting' problem. They pointed to his
previous work in the Treasury154 and argued that he had
been unsuccessful there in drawing together the accounting
and economics disciplines. They pointed to the suspension
of SSAP 16 as evidence of this. Nevertheless they viewed
his commitment to this new system of accounting as total,
and his enthusiasm for it as bordering on evangelical zeal.
One official said that he was,
"Totally sold on it" [FD]
Others portrayed him as someone leading a one-man campaign
to convert the 'City' from historic to current cost
accounting and thereby bring a system, similar to one
rejected a decade ago, back into fashion. One finance
director was adamant that his company would not be part of
any such movement; and his view of the City's probable
response was equally muted,
"The City is not going to turn itself on its head for
just one industry or one person. So even though he will
certainly want current cost accounting to provide the
principal method, he will continually have to have regard
to the historical cost indicators and will have to change
the K factor in my opinion if necessary to reflect
that."[FD]
154 Ian Byatt chaired the Advisory Group which produced the
report 'Accounting for Economics Costs and Changing Prices: A
Report to HM Treasury' in 1986.
268
Others saw the Byatt system of current cost accounting as
a parochial water industry solution to the wider problem of
accounting for capital costs in times of rising prices.
But despite this they believed the system would not be
radically reformed in the foreseeable future and that they
would have to follow the line. In other words, as far as
historic cost and current cost accounts were concerned,
"We just have to be able to ride both horses." [FD]
Cost of Capital: Price Cap Regulation.
The other major regulatory issue raised in the context of
the cost of capital debate was the question of the price
cap. Having already noted the industry's general opposition
to any 'drift' in the regulatory regime from price cap to
rate of return regulation, reasons were sought for this
position.
It is probably safe to assume that the monopoly suppliers
of water would have been content to operate with little or
no regulation. Given that the legislators took a different
view, two broad approaches were considered workable in the
English and Welsh water industry: a price cap or a cost
plus rate of return system. The preference of the
legislators was for the former, a view upheld by Ofwat in
its various publications. This official line was spelt out
in the 1991 Annual Report.
"There are advantages in maintaining price cap
regulation, with incentives for the companies to reduce
costs, rather than moving towards a cost plus system where
revenues are directly set to cover costs, including a rate
of return element. The nature of the water industry,
however, means that there is a need to have particular
regard to ensure a reasonable rate of return on capital
when setting price limits at periodic reviews."155
155 OFWAT Annual Report 19 91, p6.
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This statement suggests that the choice in terms of
regulatory regime is not a simple one, between pure price
cap regulation and pure rate of return regulation. The
picture is more complex than that. The choice is not
'either-or'. The fundamental difference is one of timespan.
In setting a price cap for a company operating in an
industry as capital intensive as water some rate of return
must be assumed. After all, a price cap is set with the
expectation that over a period of time there is a
reasonable prospect that an industry will be able to earn
an appropriate rate of return. The question is, how often
is the exercise undertaken? How often is the price cap
reset? Consequently, how often is a target rate of return
fed into the calculation? The more frequently this is
undertaken, the more the regime is engaging in rate of
return regulation. The more infrequent the reviews, the
longer are operators allowed to conduct their business
under the price cap. There is, in one sense, a continuum of
regulatory positions between the two extremes. The position
of any Regulator along this continuum may therefore be
thought of as being determined by the frequency of price
cap resetting exercises. From a shareholder's point of view
the more infrequent the resetting of the price cap, the
greater the risk/reward element; the greater the
uncertainty.
The present regime (1989-92) was seen by one regulatory
manager in exactly this way; embracing a series of five or
ten year periods of price cap split up with rate of return
exercises - the periodic reviews.
"When you get to the periodic review you are talking
about rate of return using the cost of capital and then you
have another five or ten years of price caps. It's a fairly
logical model" [FD]
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Ian Byatt agreed with this view, regarding it as
"a stylised way of looking at it" [Byatt]
With one exception156 the company officials were
enthusiastic supporters of the price cap regulation. They
appeared to resist any movement away from this regulatory
position. Among the benefits cited were its simplicity,
its promise of long run stability and security for company
operations and consequently its positive effect in
attracting private finance. Above all they recognised its
part in enhancing management performance incentives,
"The price cap is the one thing that every company
should have, which is an incentive to management to
outperform. And it's really got to be that which is
underlined. Not just utility companies but companies in
monopoly positions do need something that's going to spur
them. And there's no evidence in my view that the
alternative based on what I've seen of regulation in the
States, for example, is going to be any better." [FD]
Companies saw the price cap system as giving them freedom
to operate as opposed to being subjected to,
"...intrusive annual reviews that you would expect to
see under a rate of return regime [rather] than a price
cap. Because under a price cap regime it should be accepted
that if things turn our favourably for the companies then
that's for the companies to hold. Because next year or the
year after things might turn out completely the other way."
[FD]
Although they were convinced that price cap remained the
Director General's favoured regime many equated more
'active' regulation with an insidious drift away from its
spirit. The promise of operating 'headroom' from a 'hands-
off' Regulator appeared to be vanishing as the regime
developed. Nevertheless, the companies' aversion to annual
156 A water only company's official with over 14 years
experience of the industry.
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reviews and rate of return exercises in general was given
a new perspective by Ian Byatt. He pointed out that company
risk-aversity, when faced with the prospect of rather
longer periods of price cap operation had, in the initial
settlement, led to the inclusion of,
"...a lot of provisions for interim determinations.
These provisions were put there by the companies. They
wanted them because they wanted to reduce the risk. In so
far as there is a rate of return aspect to it compared with
just looking at it periodically on an annual return, they
subsequently went there on the behest of the companies.
There's a confusion sometimes between the notion of the
annuality. I don't like annuality very much, I just happen
to have been given a licence that's got a lot of annuality
in it... Then the rate of return aspect seems to me in a
capital intensive industry with a very big investment
programme, it makes sense to talk about the rate of return
and periodic reviews." [Byatt]
Given these comments it would appear that companies are
generally seeking means to reduce risk whilst allowing
scope for making greater rewards.
But the price cap model was not without its flaws. Chief
among those cited was the need for long range budgeting.
Even a five year time horizon was regarded by the companies
as wholly unworkable. By the time the budget was published
its assumptions had been overtaken by events. Politically
the price cap was regarded as fragile tool in the hand of
the politically appointed Regulator, with the potential to
be turned rather too easily other uses. In this connection,
one interviewee speculated that there might be some
significance in the fact that the minimum time span for
interim determinations (5 years) matched the maximum life
of one Parliament; without wishing to enlarge on this.
Finally the cost-pass-through 'safety-valve' built into the
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system and used in the case of South West Water157, was
regarded by the Regulator as being out of tune with the
price cap regime. On this and other issues the forthcoming
interim determination was anticipated by all parties as an
opportunity for more clearly articulating the regime;
redeeming the 'mistakes' of the past and setting a new
course for the future. The success or otherwise of this
process will ultimately depend on the informational
resources available to Ofwat.
Overall, the question of rate of return as against price
cap regulation appears to be a question of balance. Despite
their reservations, companies and Regulator confirmed that
the present solution of 5 or 10 year reviews appeared
acceptable. Both parties were anxious to reduce the
opportunities for regulatory intervention between reviews.
Regulatory Relationships.
The second general issue on which qualitative data was
acquired was the question of regulatory relationships.
Although much filtered information appears in the press
from time to time on this question the data is, by
definition, second hand. Personal interviews with the
principal actors removes this filter. Many interviewees
were quite candid about these questions, but some
important data was obtained which illuminated the way in
which relationships impacted on, or determined, economic
events. This economic question is the relevant aspect of
the work.
Ian Byatt was appointed Director General of Water Services
on 1st August 1989. One month later his office (Ofwat)
157 On 23/12/91 the Director General determined South West
Water's K to be increased form 6.5 to 11.5 for each of the three
years 1992/3, 1993/4 and 1994/5.
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began preparatory work for the implementation of the 1989
Water Act.158 As a civil servant, his task was to
administer and operate a regulatory regime conceived by
politicians and delivered in statute. Consequently, as was
noted above, his influence over its initial form and
substance was restricted.
A water-only-company interviewee summed up the initial
position in the following way.
"I think he [Byatt] saw when he came into office a
certain amount of freedom within the price cap for the
companies; which we believed, as far as the privatised
companies were concerned, was a deliberate intention.
Because privatising such organisations must leave a certain
headroom for manoeuvre. And we, looking at that side of it
from the outside felt the Government had done that
deliberately. We also felt the Government wouldn't be
averse to the regulator coming along afterwards, having got
the money in for the privatisation, for the Regulator to
try and clamp down. So I think he [Byatt] recognised a
certain amount of looseness in the price cap, and couldn't
do anything about it other than ask for a voluntary
abatement of K because there wasn't an opportunity for
clawback to be operated." [FD]
Comments should therefore be seen against the background of
this work; a gradual tightening of the regulatory regime.
In some ways Byatt had a more difficult position than his
peers in other industries. He was regulating an industry
with rising prices, significant investment requirements,
little competition and the right to seek cost pass through
for certain expenditure. This undoubtedly shaped the way in
which he interacted with industry officials.
During every interview the point was made that the
regulation of the industry took place in highly charged
political environment. This may have been a function of
158 The duties of the Director General with respect to water
and sewerage were set out in the Water Act 1989 s7.
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interview timing, straddling the 1992 General Election. But
clearly any regulatory regime implying interaction and
relationship between the various parties also implies a
political dynamic. According to one interviewee regulation
was a 'political game'. And information and publicity were
the primary weapons in the fight to balance the competing
demands of national politicians, European politicians and
consumers.159
In this task, Ian Byatt employed the tools of publicity.
The role of publicity in creating an image for Ofwat was
not lost on the Regulator. Press notices, radio and
television appearances and glossy annual reports all raised
the profile of the office. He viewed this as part of the
job of communication, consultation and maintaining an 'open
relationship'160 with the industry. Annual visits to the
companies, he said, went some way to building a 'personal
rapport' which he saw as 'a prerequisite of effective
regulation'161 The openness to publicity and the public
consultation exercises have marked the Regulator as one of
the most open of his peers dealing with recently privatised
utilities. A contrast may be made between these extensive
and well publicised exchanges in the run up to price
setting at the 1994 periodic review, and the rather less
well publicised price setting exercises of organisations
such as British Telecom.
Unsurprisingly, attitudes towards the 'personal rapport
building' process varied from thinly disguised hostility to
outright enthusiasm. As with all relationships Byatt's
advances were received in different ways. He was regarded
159 One finance director labelled these the Westminster
Effect, the Brussels Effect and the Esther Rantzen Effect.
160 Ofwat Annual Report 1989 p9.
161 Ofwat Annual Report 1990 pll.
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by some as a benign dictator; the fatherly patrician who
combined generosity of spirit with firm purpose. Others saw
him less favourably as undertaking his tasks too
enthusiastically, in the sense of engaging in company
management too frequently by his various interventions.
However, all were united in their respect for the
capabilities of the man; his intellectual stature and his
political astuteness. Company officials were in no doubt
as to his potential as a powerful ally of the industry in
pressuring other regulators and 'fighting the corner' for
the industry against the various European bureaucrats.
These attitudes highlight a certain tension, recognised by
Byatt, as he seeks to steer a course between two extremes.
On the one hand a regulator could operate under rules which
may be regarded as being completely 'objective' in some
sense. The alternative is for him to follow a 'subjective'
and completely idiosyncratic approach to regulatory policy
making. The question remains unresolved, but the challenge
is to strike a balance.
In terms of regulatory 'personal rapport' the fact that Ian
Byatt is an economist by training is a matter of some
concern to the company officials. The language of the
Ofwat Annual Reports and Ian Byatt himself reflect this.
Senior company finance executives invariably with an
accounting background, regard sympathy with the world-view
of an economist as essential to working in the regime.
Indeed the view was expressed that Ofwat was 'dominated' by
economists. Byatt himself was aware of the criticism and
has had considerable experience of the efforts made to link
the twin disciplines of economics and accounting in some
logical structure.162 Many companies remained unconvinced
and still regarded the link as opaque. This, despite the
162 See for example the Byatt Report (1986) .
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fact that Byatt had taken steps such as issuing accounting
guidelines in a format identical to that adopted by those
preparing Statements of Standard Accounting Practice.
Regulatory Relationships: Regulatory Risk.
One of the most obvious ways in which personal
relationships have an economic impact is in the fact that
the actions of the Regulator affect the stock market
assessment of the industry's regulatory risk. This is
important from the point of view of the cost of capital and
hence the use of modified current cost accounts.
An important determinant of the cost of capital is the
degree of risk, regarded as being very low in the regulated
water industry. One finance director characterised the
industry as 'gilt edged' protected as a natural monopoly by
the prohibitive cost of duplicating fixed assets.
Nevertheless a level of risk exists and is perceived as
being significantly affected by Ian Byatt's behaviour and
use of publicity . The 'Cost of Capital Consultation Paper'
was regarded with open hostility as one way in which risk
had been raised, although one finance director expressed
the opinion that the Regulator did not want to drive the
companies out of business through an unreasonably low cost
of capital.
Evidence on share price movements was offered to suggest
that stock market valuations were very sensitive to
regulatory initiatives. And that this, rather than any
fundamental change in the earnings growth potential of
companies, determined short term price fluctuations. Once
more, companies were critical of any regulatory initiatives
which had a detrimental effect on their market valuation.
They regarded regulatory inactivity as desirable for the
reason that regulatory risk assessment would be held down.
Regulatory Relationships: Regulatory Capture.
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Although the building and maintenance of personal
relationships between regulator and regulatees is an
important aspect of the work, the danger is that this
relationship becomes too close and that the regulator is
effectively 'captured'. The firm impression from the
interviews was that this had not taken place. And whilst
the initial settlement had been heavily influenced in the
industry's favour and given its hallmark, since then there
was no suggestion that the exercise had been repeated. The
view of the Regulator as a benign dictator adds weight to
this argument. As one finance director noted,
"So there's got to be a good working relationship. But
for that to become too cosy reduces the problem of the
Regulator to being one of part of the industry instead of
the champion of the consumer. However the most noticeable
aspect of his stance to me anyway, is his publicity, which
he's quite keen on and he uses every opportunity. I'm not
sure whether it's entirely for the benefit of the consumer
or for Ofwat."[FD]
Underpinning this regulatory independence was Ofwat's
possession and use of information. In any principal-agent
setting the possession of information is central to the
interaction of the parties. Indeed the essential regulatory
problem is a problem of asymmetric information. Therefore
information, confers bargaining strength on its possessor.
The point was not lost on Ian Byatt,
"I think that especially when I was trying to regulate
3 0 odd companies, having a lot of good information is
critical. It's critical to the ability of the Regulator,
it's also critical to the credibility of the regime of the
information, so that people can understand what's going on.
So much of the information which is around is not of a very
comprehensible form."[Byatt]
Undoubtedly the ministrations of Ofwat have increased the
quantity of data coming out of the industry. But more
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significantly they have improved its quality and
consistency. Where companies formerly reported various
output measures, often peculiar to themselves, now 'water
delivered' has been established as the cornerstone for
company performance measurement. Many companies said that
they used these innovations as a spur to improve their own
information systems. But there was little doubt that
improved information flows in favour of Ofwat had gone some
way to tipping the balance of power away from the companies
who were at their zenith during privatisation.
Increased information requirements were frequently cited as
an example of the 'intrusive' nature of the regulation.
Although it was, and remains, the stated aim of Ian Byatt
to remain at 'arms-length' from the day to day operations
of the industry163 many companies saw the informational
demands as an unwarranted 'interference' in the affairs of
the company. A slightly different perspective on the
problem was given by one finance director. He saw improved
output information eventually unravelling the knot of
regulatory intervention. His argument was that if the
output measures were 'got right', regulatory interference
would diminish. Byatt, he maintained, only required so
much input and other information because output measures
were currently so poor. The 1989 Ofwat Annual Report
appeared to confirm this:
"I shall regulate by reference to outputs - what the
customer receives and what he or she pays for - rather than
by inputs, because the industry should be allowed to
allocate its resources in the most effective way. 1,164
Nevertheless, the idea has yet to be accepted by other
officials such as the following who stated,
163 OFWAT Annual Report 1990 pl2 .
164 OFWAT Annual Report 1989 p 10.
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"What has happened is that there's been a great
development in information systems and consequently the
data that you would be using in the old authorities has
been improved upon. Ofwat has actually played a part in
that because of their intrusive sort of regime. They
require fantastic amounts of information." [FD]
Ofwat's wide and deep trawl for information also reflects
the breadth of its remit. Trying to pin down one over¬
riding regulatory priority on this or any other basis
proved very difficult. Priorities cited included customer
service, price control, the promotion of efficiency, the
promotion of metering and the general interest of
shareholders. But many of these offerings were qualified by
the observation that there was a 'regulatory balance' to be
maintained. Whilst this was confirmed by the Regulator, his
view as at May 1992 was,
"I suppose when the chips are down it's the level of
prices that's going to matter most." [Byatt]
Which is a wholly appropriate view for an economic
regulator operating a price cap regime.
One other issue included only as a supplementary question
received much interesting comment. In the wake of several
well-publicised mergers and the introduction of the more
rigorous system of comparisons, opinions were canvassed on
the optimum size of a water-only-company operating under
the current regime. Several views emerged. Among them were;
that managerial considerations greatly influenced a
company's optimum size: two regulatory managers asserted
that large units similar in size to the water and sewerage
companies were of optimum size whilst another confessed to
having no idea. The response of Ian Byatt was predictably
non-committal.
"I don't think that it's part of the Regulator's job
to have a view about the structure of the industry and
therefore to go into a lot of static economic comparisons
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of these things. I think it's much more important to
maintain enough comparators to see changes in the structure
of the industry, in the number of companies only when there
are very good reasons for doing it."[Byatt]
Nevertheless, with these exceptions a remarkable unanimity
emerged. The point was made that water was a parochial
commodity, a heterogeneous local resource which required a
supplier very well appraised of local conditions. The view
of both water only and water and sewerage officials was
that the bigger companies were probably too big, too
distant from the customer and remote. Their size meant
lines of communication from consumer to producer were
necessarily longer and information messages travelling
along them were attenuated. Whilst the general integrated
river basin management principle was seen as valuable there
was a case for breaking up the very large local monopolies.
At the other extreme the smallest statutory companies were
probably too small. Their position had been tenable only
through their access to good resources. But under the new
regulatory regime, demands for large quantities of
information were difficult to meet. Although more in touch
with the customer, companies were simply not large enough
to carry the substantial overheads. The general view of
optimum size appeared to be that of the larger statutory
companies. Small enough to remain near to the customer,
large enough to carry the regulatory burden.
Conclusion.
In concluding the chapter it is necessary to draw together
some of these rather disparate lines of argument and
opinions reported above.
In a sense we have come full circle. We began by arguing
that, following Holmstrom and Shavell's result any addition
to information is valuable in improving economic outcomes.
The Shleifer approach to yardstick competition led us to
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argue that even marginal improvements in comparative
efficiency measurement could have benefits in terms of
regulatory outcomes. The acquisition, possession and use of
information proved to be recurrent themes in all the
discussions. Underlying the important questions of the cost
of capital, the current cost accounting and price cap
debates, was the issue of reported figures giving reliable
data on economic stocks and flows. Underlying the questions
of regulatory relationships, regulatory risk and regulatory
capture, was the issue of the acquisition and control of
information. Throughout, the use of comparative information
appeared to be a strong driving force to increased levels
of activity.
Controlling for heterogeneity, and the arguments for and
against historic cost accounts surfaced frequently as
issues of concern to finance directors. The Regulator
appeared clear in his own mind that the second question had
been resolved, but that the first required closer
attention.
Industry officials also revealed that, although much early
comparative work concentrated on operating cost in the
context of the water supply function, neglecting the more
difficult questions of sewage treatment and capital costs;
its value was clear. New personnel drawn into the industry
following privatisation, in particular, have used
comparisons as a means to drive efficiency improvements.
Clearly acceptance of the results of the work must preceed
any effect it has on company operations and much scepticism
still surrounds the more elaborate attempts at comparative
efficiency measurement. Yet even informal comparisons have
apparently driven efficiency savings and forced the hand of
management in several ways. Yet companies continued to be
aware that yardstick competition was not understood by the
public and that much work remained to be done in convincing
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them of its efficacy.
The above qualitative data appears to have clarified
certain issues pertinent to the analysis of yardstick
competition, but not susceptible to quantitative analysis.
Firstly over the use and understanding of the terms
'yardstick' and 'comparative' competition. The Regulator
appears to take a more relaxed stance in respect of its
implementation than that feared by the companies. Secondly,
that by introducing the regime, even in this imperfect
form, collusion between companies has been inhibited.
Rather than seeing the implementation of yardstick
competition as an unattainable long run goal, the general
view of Regulator and industry is that incremental
improvements are being, and will continue to be made. In
terms of the attitude of companies to the system, the
Regulator has achieved much in a relatively short time.
Although much opposition remains - for example on the
particular question of the place of modified current cost
accounting. From an original position of muted enthusiasm
there is now more general acceptance of these devices.
Comparative efficiency measurement for yardstick
competition was heralded as a powerful instrument in the
new regulatory regime established in 1989. As time went on
the great expectations were not completely fulfilled.
Questions still remain about its feasibility, nevertheless
the principle is well established and accepted by the
industry. Practically its operation is improving by stages.
The 1994 interim review of the price cap promises to take
the regime forward a long way in the drive to implement a
system of yardstick competition. As one finance director
stated,
"There is an acceptance on the part of the industry
for there to be some kind of yardstick competition. There
is a definite view within Ofwat that there must be such a




RAG 1.01 Guideline on Accounting for Current Costs, Ofwat,
1991, Birmingham. (pl6)
Real FCM Retained Profit = Increase in reserves
RPI x Opening Shareholders
funds
where
'Increase in Reserves' = HC Retained Profit
+ Nominal gains on assets not
recognised in HC profit
- Nominal gains recognised in HC




Shareholders' Funds' = RPI x Opening fixed assets
+ RPI x Opening working capital
- RPI x Opening net finance
Fixed Asset Adjustments
With the above assumption and simplifications, the fixed
asset adjustments can be derived as follows:
'Nominal gains on fixed assets not recognised in HC profit
- Nominal gains recognised in HC profit in the period not
previously so recognised
- RPI x Opening fixed assets'
(Closing CC fixed assets - Opening CC fixed assets)
- (Closing HC fixed assets - Opening HC fixed assets)
- RPI x Opening CC fixed assets
(Opening CC NBV + RPI x Opening CC NBV + AMP/SIR
Adjustment + Additions - CC NBV of Disposals - CC
Depreciation - Opening CC NBV)
(Opening HC NBV + Additions - HC NBV of Disposals - HC
depreciation - Opening HC NBV)
RPI x Opening CC NBV
AMP/SIR Adjustment
(CC Depreciation - HC Depreciation)
(CC NBV of Disposals - HC NBV of Disposals)
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Note :
AMP / SIR Adjustment is the revision in the real value of
assets arising periodically from improved information,
notably in AMPs and SIRs.
AMP = Asset Management Plan




The thesis set out to answer the question as to whether or
not yardstick competition could work. In other words, how
effective was the regulatory system described by Shleifer
when applied to a particular industry? In this, the water
and sewerage industry in England and Wales was chosen as an
appropriate testbed.
In tackling the question, two related pieces of research
were undertaken. First was the econometric estimation of a
series of cost functions for the water and sewerage
branches of the English and Welsh water industry. The
purpose of this was to assess the tractability of an
econometric method of comparative efficiency measurement.
It was shown that a workable system of this sort was a
prerequisite for the implementation of yardstick
competition. Secondly, fieldwork was undertaken.
Interviews with the industry's Regulator, and finance
directors of a sample of the companies, enabled the
development of a richer picture of the workings of the
regulatory system in the industry.
Several general conclusions were arrived at. Given the
necessity of comparative efficiency indicators for the
operation of a system of yardstick competition it was
important to confirm at least one way in which they could
be derived. The econometric methods proposed for this work
have not been adopted by the Regulator or companies to
date, and are therefore pioneering. Furthermore, using
these methods it was shown how a robust set of comparative
efficiency rankings could be derived for both the water and
sewerage sides of the industry. The rankings were robust
with respect to the estimation method employed; this in
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spite of the rather poor data used for the study.
Evidence was also presented to confirm that the principle
of yardstick competition had been part of the 1989
regulatory settlement and that it had since influenced the
Regulator's industrial policy. And although yardstick
competition was not fully operable from the beginning,
since then, policy reforms had produced incremental
improvements in the operation of the system and these
continued to take place.
Qualitative evidence led to the rejection of Stelzer's
(1988) argument that yardstick competition was too weak and
remote a goad to performance. On the contrary, the finding
was that both competitiveness and efficiency had been
enhanced since the introduction of the new regulatory
regime. And that part of the reason for this was the
yardstick comparisons being made for the first time.
However there was little quantitative evidence available as
yet to either confirm or refute the view. In general, it
was argued that regression techniques had a place in
comparative efficiency measurement within the industry.
More specific conclusions were derived from the component
pieces of work. Chapter 4 demonstrated ways in which
comparative efficiency measurement for the water supply
function could be undertaken, which gave robust ordinal
rankings. It was found that economies of scale over the
period examined were largely exhausted, but pointed to the
fact that the service of more densely populated areas
tended to lower the unit costs of service. Apart from one
outlier in the sample, the Regional Water Authorities
appeared to offer a relatively more efficient service than
their statutory counterparts. This, despite the fact that
the water only statutory companies generally served very
densely populated areas and that this fact would have
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suggested a lower unit cost of service.
In addition, results confirmed the work of Spady and
Friedlaender (1978) that hedonic specifications led to a
greater degree of consistency in rankings across
definitions of cost, and were therefore to be preferred. In
the same vein, price factors displayed relatively little
cross sectional variation over the sample and therefore
appeared not to be the crucial element in determining the
cost function. The effects of price were swamped by the
effects of physical conditions in the measurement of
comparative efficiency.
Similarly, for the sewerage treatment and disposal
functions analysed in Chapter 5 it was found that robust
comparative efficiency rankings could be derived. With
cross sectional, rather than panel data the existence of
substantial economies of scale in sewage treatment and
disposal was confirmed. Once again the characteristics of
sewage flow and sewerage arrangements had a significant
impact on costs and tended to swamp the price variables in
the comparative efficiency assessment. This led to the
conclusion that work on so called 'explanatory factors' was
vital for the modelling; particularly where the greater
heterogeneity of sewage meant that the various processes
were more difficult to model than those of water.
The results were consistent with the assertion that
regulation may be more vigorous for works that discharge
visibly more unsightly effluent than those discharging
equally polluting but less visible effluent with high BOD
levels. However, given the wide variation in estimates of
efficiency another, tentative, conclusion was that the
operators themselves had no clear way of judging the
efficiency of their operations. As is still the case,
considerable ignorance appears to surround assessments of
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comparative efficiency in this branch of the industry in
particular.
As already mentioned, the data underlying the conclusions
of Chapter 7 were qualitative rather than quantitative in
nature. The conclusions were no less valid because of this.
As has been mentioned above, one of the main conclusions
was that comparative efficiency measurement has led to
enhanced efficiency and competitiveness in the industry
since 1989. The view of industry officials and the
Regulator was that the final regulatory settlement did
embrace the notion of yardstick competition, but that this
was not fully operable at the time. The privatisation
settlement, conceived and implemented by the Government was
apparently very favourable to the water companies for
reasons outlined above. Ian Byatt had inherited settings of
price and conditions which were rather generous to the
companies and their shareholders. One view that could be
maintained was that the initial price cap settings were not
founded on any rigorous objective assessment of comparative
unit costs. The technical tools for undertaking the task
were not available at the time. Rather the settlement came
about following a protracted, political process of
negotiation. However, the view was that, since then, the
Regulator had set about redeeming the position by
tightening up the regulatory regime in stages.
Significantly, it appeared that the informational cartel of
the statutory companies had been broken by the reform of
the regulatory regime, and that collusion between companies
was effectively inhibited. Consequently, companies saw
themselves as competitors rather than industry partners.
Hence the conclusion that yardstick competition had
improved performance incentives for company management.
In terms of the future, it was clear that both the
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Regulator and his industry were committed to the concept of
yardstick competition (Byatt preferred the term
'comparative competition'). The general view was that,
whilst the system suffered from severe imperfections at
present, it would improve incrementally as the quality of
data and sophistication of analytical techniques were
developed.
From the interviews it appeared that the issue of
controlling for company heterogeneity in comparisons (the
level playing field) was one of the most important to the
Regulator and industry officials. The results of Chapters
4 and 5, the specification of hedonic cost functions
address those concerns directly. And may, arguably be a
useful tool for the Regulator in his work.
Limitations.
But almost as important as the statement of conclusions
reached is a note about the limitations of the work. The
research was ringfenced in certain important respects.
Therefore it is essential to consider what questions the
thesis did not set out to answer and what opportunities
still exist for the research to be extended.
Although the empirical analysis of Chapter 4 employed data
drawn from publicly and privately owned companies operating
side by side the question of the relative efficiency of
public and private companies was addressed only in passing.
This, and other property rights issues were strictly
outwith the remit. However it may be noted that the water
industry over the period 1974-89 would offer a very useful
testbed for many of the property rights questions. During
that period, unusually for the UK, public and private
companies operated side by side in different geographical
regions to provide a similar service. Future research could
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usefully employ data from this period to focus on the
comparative efficiency measurement question explained in
terms of property rights theories. One of the chief
obstacles to this sort of work would be the disentangling
of pure 'ownership' effects from the effects on company
performance of location and customer profile.
Another limitation was that empirical work used data
covering the pre-privatisation time period. Reasons for
this included the lack of a sufficient quantity of data
post-privatisation, and the advantages of conducting the
analysis at a time of comparative institutional stability.
Whilst this was sufficient for the purpose in hand, ie
demonstration of the feasibility of comparative efficiency
measurement by econometric methods, there was a trade off.
It was not possible to arrive at conclusions concerning
company efficiency and whether or not it had improved since
the reform of the regulatory regime. As time goes on, and
consequently as more data points become available, an
extension of the work in this direction will become
possible. Indeed, the prospects for improved results are
bright given Ofwat's commitment to the development of
reported data of enhanced quality and quantity.
Underpinning all the empirical work were the results of
Shavell (1979) and Holmstrom (1979) discussed in Chapter 2;
that any addition to an information set, no matter how
imperfect, would improve contracting in a principal-agent
setting. Given the limitations of data this proved vital in
the study. Shleifer's (1985) observation, that only a
ranking of firms was required to give the right incentives
in a system of yardstick competition, made the approach
taken feasible. The object throughout was not to derive
absolute measures of firm efficiency, rather find
efficiency rankings for firms that were robust with respect
to the estimation method employed. Therefore, any more
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detailed measures, although interesting, would be surplus
to requirements. There remains scope for further work in
this area, to derive absolute efficiency measures and
therefore to assess the potential each firm has for making
efficiency improvements. Given the difficulties of
controlling for company heterogeneity and the fact that
companies operate in a dynamic rather than static economic
environment, the task is non-trivial.
This comment leads on to one final caveat concerning the
work. Although the results may be used productively in the
various ways outlined above, they are founded on static
economic analysis. The question of regulatory dynamics has
not been addressed. In terms of technical competence this
would require a whole new approach to be taken. The problem
is noted but not resolved in the work presented here. With
economic analysis of the industry at such an early stage of
development much static work remains to be completed.
Policy Implications.
Finally, what policy implications may be drawn from the
work? Are there any general principles which may be
established which would guide a policy maker towards or
away from employing a similar regulatory solution in other
industries? Is yardstick competition a more widely
applicable regulatory device?
The basic conditions laid down by Shleifer for the working
of the system appear to be a reasonable guide to this
question. Paramount is the requirement of a series of
local monopolies supplying similar commodities in differing
areas. Accounting for heterogeneity in terms of service
regions proved to be very difficult indeed in the case of
water. The question of establishing a 'level playing field'
on which to make comparisons is one of the earliest and
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most difficult that any regulator must tackle. Therefore in
applying the solution to other industries, much preparatory
work must be conducted in this area, and broad agreement
reached on the explanatory factors to be taken into account
when making comparisons. Either operators must serve
identical regions, or agreement must be reached over
accounting for heterogeneity.
An industry such as telecommunications would have appeared
an attractive candidate for yardstick competition treatment
a decade ago. Although one supplier dominated the market it
may be argued that in terms of domestic calls the market
could have been split up into a series of local
monopolies.165 With this industry structure giving a large
number of comparators, yardstick competition may have been
appropriate. However, given the recent pace of technical
change, opportunities now exist for increased competition
even in local areas. Technological advances have lowered
market entry barriers to the point where the
characterisation of the service as a natural monopoly is
questionable. For yardstick competition to work effectively
it must be the case that local monopoly situations are
likely to persist; a slow rate of technical change is
required. Water and sewerage services meet this
requirement, telecommunications services do not.
Given that local monopoly conditions must persist, the
chief candidates for implementation of this type of
regulatory regime are the public utilities, gas and
electricity. And whilst extraction and generation
operations may be opened up to competition the distribution
function is apparently naturally monopolistic. Distribution
is, however, a capital intensive activity, as was the case
165 The City of Kingston upon Hull operated successfully
during the period as a local telecommunications monopolist in
Hull and the surrounding area.
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for water. Regional distributers may therefore be
candidates for yardstick competition but the question of
capital valuation must be resolved. The cost of capital
was seen to be one of the most intractable questions facing
the water industry. Therefore as a prerequisite agreement
must be reached on conventions to be adopted over the
measurement of capital stock and its cost. Reliable
information systems are necessary if the solution is to be
implemented.
One other drawback of the system mentioned by Shleifer,
strategic manipulation, should also be acknowledged. Close
cooperation between operators must, to some extent, be
supplanted by competitive behaviour. And whilst, in theory,
only two companies are required for the operation of
yardstick competition it may be the case that with a
duopoly strategic manipulation of information and tacit
collusion are almost inevitable. Consequently, following
the comments of Ian Byatt, there may be a bias towards
maintaining a higher number of comparators.
In the English and Welsh water industry it would appear
that the prospects for yardstick competition covering the
water supply function are more positive than those for
sewerage. With only ten sewerage comparators available,
controlling for company heterogeneity would appear to be
more problematic. A reduced number of comparators implies
reduced information on heterogeneous circumstances under
which companies operate. Given the difficulties encountered
with a system using over thirty comparators, it may be
argued that with less than half that number of comparators,
the problems of implementation are multiplied many times.
The feasibility of such a system should be called into
question.
There is, however, one other area in which the yardstick
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regulatory solution may have a role: the Scottish water and
sewerage industry.
As part of the ongoing consultation process over local
government reform, the Scottish Office issued a
consultation document on the future of the water and
sewerage industry in Scotland166 in November 1992. At
present these services are the responsibility of the nine
Regional, and three Islands, Councils. The document
highlighted the Government's intention to reform the
industry's structure and regulatory arrangements. Given the
English and Welsh experience discussed above, there appears
to be some scope for using comparisons among service
providers to substitute for market disciplines in securing
an efficient allocation of resources. The Scottish industry
has many operational, legal and technological similarities
with its southern neighbour. It is an industry comprised of
local natural monopolies, charged with delivering a service
to standards laid down in British and European statutes.
Given these characteristics, the Shleifer regulatory
solution (or some variant) would appear to be appropriate.
Regardless of whether ownership remains in the public
sector or is transferred to the private sector, it may be
argued that there would be regulatory benefits to be gained
from bringing the Scottish industry within Ofwat's
regulatory remit. These would include access to
intellectual, administrative and technical expertise built
up since 1989. And most significantly, from the point of
view of yardstick competition, Scottish comparators would
be added to the pool. Clearly there would be many other
issues to be considered. The differing political and
institutional dynamics would determine which ownership
option would be chosen. This may add considerable, perhaps
166 'Water and Sewerage in Scotland: Investing for our
Future.' (1992) Scottish Office, Edinburgh.
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insurmountable, difficulties to the implementation of such
a system. However, a working model of cross border
regulation already exists for one industry with some of the
characteristics of a natural monopoly; electricity.
The Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) has
responsibility for operators north of the border and
operates from an office in Glasgow under a Deputy Director
General. The office oversees an industry structured in a
radically different way from its southern counterpart. And
although addressing a slightly different set of issues, the
Scottish operation is in a position to draw on the wider
resources and experience of Offer.
It may be argued that the arrangement may be extended to
water; and in terms of yielding more comparators, would
benefit the whole industry, north and south. This would, of
course, commit the Scottish regulator to a particular style
of operation. Nevertheless, as with electricity, it may be
possible for a Scottish operation to draw on Ofwat's
regulatory expertise whilst administering a system tailored
to a radically different industrial structure. The further
information on activities in regions with abundant
resources would enable the Director General to make more
informed decisions over the setting of price levels,
particularly in the north of England and Wales where
conditions are similar to those in parts of Scotland.
Overall, it would appear that, whilst a direct translation
of regulatory policy may be inappropriate, some examination
of the experience of Ofwat and its attempts to implement
yardstick competition, should inform the Scottish debate.
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Future.
There is, in the water industry, a guarded optimism about
the future development of a system of regulation embracing
the principles of yardstick competition. As predicted by
its originator, Shleifer, the system in all its purity has
been shown to generalise to cover an industry in which
heterogeneous local monopolies serve heterogeneous areas.
Even at this early stage of development it has begun to
reveal the cost minimising potential of yardstick
competitors in one sector, and to establish an incentive
structure more appropriate to the achievement of that
potential. Much remains to be done, but much has been
achieved since Stephen Littlechild first suggested that
this may be the solution to the regulation of the English
and Welsh water industry.
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